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Abstract
With the emergence of Free/Libre and Open Source Software as a significant force that is 
reshaping the software industry, it becomes more important to reassess conventionally 
held wisdom about software development. Recent literature on the FLOSS development 
process suggests that our previously held knowledge about software development might 
be obsolete. We specifically highlight the tension between the views embodied by the 
Linus’ Law and Brooks’ Law.
Linus’ Law was forwarded by Eric Raymond and suggests that the FLOSS develop-
ment process benefits greatly from large numbers of developers. Brooks’ Law, which is 
part of currently held wisdom on software development, suggests that adding developers 
is detrimental to the progress of software projects. Raymond explains that the distributed 
nature of the FLOSS development process and the capacity of source code to convey rich 
information between developers are the main causes of the obsolescence Brooks’ Law in 
the FLOSS development context.
By performing two separate studies, we show how both views of software develop-
ment can be complementary. Using the lens of Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) in the first 
study, we identify the characteristics of the development knowledge as being the main 
factors constraining new members from contributing source code to FLOSS development 
projects. We also conceptualize of these knowledge characteristics as being analogous to 
what Brooks’ described as the ramp-up effect. We forward the argument, and offer em-
ii
pirical validation, that managing these characteristics of knowledge would result in an 
increase the number of contributors to a FLOSS projects.
The second study is concerned with the impact if having these new members added to 
the development team in a FLOSS project. Using the lens of Organizational Information 
Processing Theory (OIPT), we forward the argument, and offer empirical validation, that 
more contributors can be detrimental to progress if the committers of a FLOSS project 
are overwhelmed. Our findings also suggest that large development teams are indeed pos-
sible in FLOSS, however, they must be supported by proper source code design and 
community structures.
iii
Dedication
To my parents and grand parents, who raised me to appreciate knowledge and set an ex-
ample for me to follow on dedication and integrity. To my wife, Ruqayyah, and sons, Fa-
had and Abdulrahman, who endured with me and supported me throughout my years as a 
PhD student. I love you all.
iv
Acknowledgement
Special thanks to Kuwait University and the Government of Kuwait for the scholarship 
that supported me throughout the PhD program. Special thanks also go to the attendees 
and organizers of the AOM 2006 FLOSS Workshop and the OSS 2009 PhD Consortium 
for their comments which helped me tremendously in shaping my thoughts into this 
work.
v
Table Of Contents
..........................................................................................................................Chapter 1 1
......................................................................................................................Introduction 1
....................................................................................................1  FLOSS: A Primer 4
................................................................1.1  The FLOSS Development Process 6
....................2  The Obsolescence of Conventional Software Development Wisdom 9
.........................................................................................3  The Research Question 11
..................................................................................................3.1  The Studies 14
.................................................................................................4  Literature Review 18
.........................................................................................................4.1  Study 1 18
.........................................................................................................4.2  Study 2 20
......................................................................................5  Results and Implications 23
.........................................................................................................5.1  Study 1 24
.........................................................................................................5.2  Study 2 27
............................................................................................................6  Conclusion 30
................................................................................................................References 31
........................................................................................................................Chapter 2 36
....Study 1: The FLOSS Marketplace and The Sustainability of FLOSS Communities 36
....................................................................................................................Abstract 37
..........................................................................................................1  Introduction 39
........................................................................................2  Theoretical Framework 43
.................................................................................................2.1  The Markets 44
......................................................2.2  Sustainability of a FLOSS Community  52
......................................................................2.3  The Contribution Transaction 57
......................................................2.4  Community-Level Antecedents to Cost 71
........................................................................................................3  Methodology  85
.........................................................................................................3.1  Sample 85
......................................................................................................3.2  Variables 90
.......................................................................................................3.3  Controls 98
..................................................................................3.4  Analysis and Results 101
....................................................................................................4  Discussion 114
....................................................4.1  Post-Hoc Analysis of Quadratic Effects 118
.......................................................................................5  Brooks’ Law Revisited 121
vi
.........................................................................6  Limitations and Future research 124
..........................................................................................................7  Conclusion 127
.............................................................................................................Appendices 132
..................................................Appendix A:  Modularity Related Constructs 133
..............................................................Appendix B:  Analyzing Contributors 134
...............................................................Appendix C:  Measuring Modularity 137
..............................................................................................................References 139
......................................................................................................................Chapter 3 146
..Study 2: Towards a Theory on the Technical Performance of FLOSS Communities 146
..................................................................................................................Abstract 147
........................................................................................................1  Introduction 149
...................................................................................2  Theoretical Development 152
...........................................................2.1  Structures in FLOSS Communities 152
....................2.2  FLOSS and Organizational Information Processing Theory 160
......................................................................................2.3  Theoretical Model 166
......................................................................................................3  Methodology  185
.......................................................................................................3.1  Sample 185
..........................................................................................3.2  Data Collection 186
....................................................................................................3.3  Variables 190
.....................................................................................................3.4  Controls 197
..................................................................................3.5  Analysis and Results 199
..........................................................................................................4  Discussion 207
........................................................................5  Limitations and Future Research 214
..........................................................................................................6  Conclusion 217
.............................................................................................................Appendices 220
..........................................Appendix A:  Robustness of Median Split Results 221
..............................................................................................................References 223
vii
Table Of Figures
Figure Page
.......................................................................1.1    Pictorial depiction of Brooks’ Law. 10
...................................................1.2    Position of studies with respect to Brooks’ Law 15
.........................................................................................2.1    The FLOSS value chain 46
..................................................................................2.2    The contribution transaction 58
..................................................................................2.3    Overview of research model 72
.......................................................2.4    Quadratic effect of knowledge codifiability  106
.....................2.5    Simple slopes for the quadratic effect of knowledge codifiability  107
...............................................................2.6    Quadratic effect of knowledge amount 107
.............................2.7    Simple slopes for the quadratic effect of knowledge amount 108
.........................................................2.8    Quadratic effect of knowledge relatedness 108
.......................2.9    Simple slopes for the quadratic effect of knowledge relatedness 109
............................................................2.10  Cubic effect of knowledge completeness 111
..........................2.11  Simple slopes for positive change in knowledge completeness 112
.........................2.12  Simple slopes for negative change in knowledge completeness 113
.....3.1    FLOSS community structure (adapted from Crowston and Howison, 2005) 154
3.2    Steps required to complete a source code contribution in a FLOSS community  155
................................................................................3.3    Overview of research model 168
...................3.4    Simple slopes for effect of TROUT over different levels of CENT 203
.....................3.5    Simple slopes for effect of CUNC over different levels of CENT 205
........................3.6    Simple slopes for effect of TINT over different levels of CENT 207
viii
Table Of Tables
Table Page 
.............................1.1    Comparison of conventional and FLOSS development process 8
............................................1.2    FLOSS studies related to new member participation 20
............................................1.3    FLOSS studies related to development productivity 22
....................................................................1.4    Summary of Study 1’s main findings 25
....................................................................1.5    Summary of Study 2’s main findings 28
.........................................................................................2.1    The FLOSS value chain 47
...............................................2.2    Contribution costs incurred by FLOSS developers 59
..............................2.3    Example of a technical conflict between developers A and B 62
........................................................................2.4    Overview of theoretical constructs 73
.........................................................................2.5    Antecedents to coordination costs 74
..................................................................................2.6    Variable operationalizations 89
................................................................2.7    Descriptive statistics for project sample 91
....................................................2.8    Variable correlations and descriptive statistics 103
........................................................................................................2.9    Model fitting 104
.............................2.10  Summary of empirical findings from the higher order model 115
.....................................3.1    Evidence of delays in FLOSS the development process 158
......................................................................3.2    Overview of theoretical constructs 168
........................................................3.3    Descriptive statistics for the project sample 189
..................................................................................3.4    Variable operationalization 189
....................................................3.5    Variable correlations and descriptive statistics 200
........................................................................................................3.6    Model fitting 201
............................3.7    Summary of empirical findings from the higher-order model 208
.......................................................3.8    Summary of this work’s main contributions 209
..................................3.9    Main-effect model with tertile split of CENT and CUNC 222
....................................3.10  Interaction model with tertile split of CENT and CUNC 222
ix
 Chapter 1
Introduction
Free/Libre and Open Source Software (FLOSS) refers to software that has its source code 
made available for users to examine, use, and modify (Raymond, 2001; AlMarzouq et al., 
2005). As a result of making the source code accessible, users may participate in the de-
velopment of the product by uncovering and fixing bugs and security holes or implement-
ing new features (Raymond, 2001). User participation in development is thought to in-
crease the quality of the software; as Eric Raymond put it, "Given enough eyeballs, all 
bugs are shallow" (Raymond, 2001, p.30). In addition, having more users would put the 
software in different operating conditions that could expose hidden bugs in the imple-
mentation, which can then be fixed by any user willing to put forth the effort to do so 
(Raymond, 2001; Liu and Iyer, 2007).
While the improved quality is the most tangible benefit of the FLOSS development 
model, there seems to be a broader impact of this model, which is reshaping the dynamics 
of competition in the software industry (Economides and Katsamakas, 2006; Bonaccorsi 
et al., 2006). Take for example the recent move by Sun to release Java as FLOSS and lev-
erage the FLOSS development model1, or Microsoft’s foray into FLOSS development 
with the establishment of the codeplex.com website for incubating FLOSS projects and 
1
1 See http://www.openjdk.org
providing tools for users and developers to collaborate2. In addition, the 2007 develop-
ment report by the Linux Foundation suggests that over 11% of the changes made to the 
Linux Kernel source code were sponsored by some of the biggest companies in the soft-
ware and technology industries, such as Intel, IBM, HP, Red Hat, Cisco, and Google 
(Kroah-Hartman et al., 2008). 
These moves by for-profit organizations seem at odds with the traditional way these 
entities operate in the software industry. On one hand, we see bitter competitors cooperat-
ing on the development of the Linux Kernel and other FLOSS projects. On the other 
hand, we see organizations that have built their business on selling software licenses, re-
leasing the software as FLOSS and relinquishing all of the profit that could potentially 
come from selling copies of the software (AlMarzouq et al., 2005). These two observa-
tions suggest that there is a fundamental shift happening in the software and technology 
industries, which we observe to be highly related to FLOSS.
The relationship between FLOSS and the shift in the software industry was high-
lighted by Tim O’Reilly’s description of FLOSS as a "commoditizing" force. According 
to O’Reilly, what FLOSS is doing to the software industry is exactly what the PC did to 
the super computer industry (Schwartz et al., 2009). As a result of the FLOSS commodi-
tizing force, established business models for selling software licenses are no longer as 
profitable, and new profitable business models are emerging that rely on commoditized 
software.
2
2 See http://www.codeplex.com
For example, Riehle (2007) observed that software licensing was a significant cost 
component to companies offering turn-key solutions, such as IBM. FLOSS would allow 
such companies to eliminate the cost associated with software licensing and take in a big-
ger profit, while reducing the cost to the customer at the same time. Furthermore, one 
could attribute the recent emergence of network and "cloud" services to this commoditiz-
ing force of FLOSS (Schwartz et al., 2009). These services deliver computing resources 
to customers, which are built on commoditized hardware and software layers, through the 
Internet. By shielding the customer from the complexities of managing a computing in-
frastructure, the companies that offer cloud and network services create value for the cus-
tomer and earn profit for themselves. In addition, these companies create value from the 
ease with which such services can be scaled up or down based on customer needs. With-
out the commoditized hardware and software layers, such infrastructures would have 
been expensive to create (Schwartz et al., 2009). As a result, profitability shifted from es-
tablished business models of licensing infrastructure management software to service 
models that offered complete infrastructure solutions.
Thus far, we have described what we believe is a fundamental shift in the software 
industry resulting from the FLOSS movement. This highlights the importance of under-
standing FLOSS for both academics and practitioners alike. What we have not explained 
yet is how FLOSS brought about that change. To understand this how this change came 
about, we first need to give a brief introduction to the concepts and history surrounding 
FLOSS.
3
1  FLOSS: A Primer3
The origins of FLOSS date back to the computing industry in the 1950s. Back then, all 
software was free and all source code was accessible since the value of software had yet 
to be recognized. During the 1960s, the Department of Defense built ARPAnet, which 
connected researchers and engineers and lead to the establishment of the initial informal 
guidelines for distributed software development (Raymond, 2000a), which can be viewed 
as the early incarnation of FLOSS. The situation with software changed when IBM un-
bundled software from hardware, which lead to the recognition software’s value. This 
newly found value lead to the establishment of a marketplace for software in the 1970s; 
more importantly, the newly found value encouraged the safe-guarding of source code as 
a means of protecting trade secrets, which was detrimental to the early version of FLOSS 
development (Glass, 2004).
Dissatisfied with the state of software development, Richard Stallman, a participant of 
MIT’s Artificial Intelligence lab, established the Free Software Foundation (FSF). The 
goal of the organization was to promote the development and use of free software. The 
idea behind free software is that users are guaranteed the rights to freely use, distribute, 
and modify the software. The foundation contributed to the effort to develop free soft-
ware solutions to many networking and software problems, such as Apache and Linux, 
which later powered the growth of the Internet.  The Internet and free software’s role in 
4
3 Adapted from our tutorial in CAIS (AlMarzouq et al., 2005)
its development further added to the success of the free software movement (Raymond, 
2000a).
The success of free software, especially that coming from the distributed and open de-
velopment model, inspired Eric Raymond to write his seminal piece The Cathedral and 
The Bazaar. His work played a key role in justifying the decision of Netscapeâ™’s CEO, 
Jim Barksdale, to release the source code for Netscape Navigator in 1998. What followed 
was the recognition of the importance of marketing the free-software movement to ensure 
its long-term survival. This recognition eventually led to the term "Open Source" being 
coined as a less ambiguous term than "Free" and without the negative connotations in the 
business world. The Open Source Initiative (OSI) was then established to promote the 
ideals of Open Source to the business world (Raymond, 2000b).
The Open Source movement recognized the value of making source code accessible as 
a means to create higher quality software and was more pragmatic than the FSF in recog-
nizing that the interests of the business world has to be met. Richard Stallman did not 
think the term Open Source conveyed the ideals of the FSF: that users had the right to 
freely modify, use, and redistribute the software (Raymond, 2000b). Therefore, the FSF 
and the OSI are two initiatives that promoted the same software development principles 
but differed in term of their ultimate goals (AlMarzouq et al., 2005).
One of the duties that both the FSF and OSI perform was the approval of FLOSS li-
censes that adhered to their ideals. Even today, the license is what distinguishes a soft-
ware as being FLOSS (AlMarzouq et al., 2005). While the overall premise of every li-
cense must adhere to the principles of giving users the ability to use, modify, copy, and 
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redistribute software as they see fit, some licenses go beyond that principle by preventing 
the software’s code from being mixed with proprietary source code and/or preventing the 
privatization of the source code (Stewart et al., 2006).
The software, however, is not the only valuable component of FLOSS. The commu-
nity that builds such software is equally valuable. A FLOSS community consists of all of 
the users and developers of the software who are dispersed over time and space. Commu-
nity members interact over the Internet and contribute source code, requirements, support 
for other members, and bug reports (Raymond, 2001; Scacchi, 2002). A community be-
gins when a developer provides a proof-of-concept implementation of a software that 
members can collaboratively work on improving. As the software improve in features and 
quality, it initiates a self-enforcing growth cycle and attracts more users, and developers 
that contribute further to its development (Raymond, 2001). Most community members 
only contribute temporarily until their needs are satisfied, and only a small fraction of the 
members stay indefinitely with the community (Shah, 2006). Therefore, the survival of a 
FLOSS community will depend on its ability to continually attract new contributors to 
the development process.
1.1  The FLOSS Development Process
One could argue that the way in which the software development process changed with 
the emergence of FLOSS is the main reason why FLOSS became a significant force that 
changed the software industry. With traditional software development methods, an or-
ganization would assume all of the risks associated with software development and, 
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therefore, reap the rewards when the software is successful. The traditional software de-
velopment method would start with requirements analysis to determine what features to 
incorporate into the software that will be built. Developers are then employed to imple-
ment and test the software. Finally, the organization building the software would continue 
to maintain the software after it has been released. The organization would assume the 
risks associated with failure in all of these steps in the development process, ranging from 
misspecification of the requirements and budget estimates to poor implementation and 
design. Because of the high risks associated with software development, it comes as no 
surprise that the majority of software projects fail (Brooks, 1975). Given these high risks, 
the rewards from the projects that do succeed result in the most profitable organizations 
in free-market history.
The FLOSS development process did away with much of the risks associated with the 
traditional software development process, mostly by doing away with deadlines and by 
distributing the risk amongst a larger group of stakeholders (i.e., contributors) and allow-
ing them to pool their resources (Raymond, 2001). The availability of the source code 
allows users to modify the software for their own use, which leads to the discovery of 
hidden bugs, since these unique use cases often trigger unusual execution paths in the 
source code. 
The increased number of eyes looking at the source code also reduces the likelihood 
that bugs will go undetected for a long time and increases the chances that someone will 
write a good fix from which all members will benefit (Raymond, 2001). The result of this 
collaborative behavior in the community is a reduction in the risks associated with im-
7
plementation, which results in higher quality software. In addition, the users are a source 
of ideas and inspiration for the developers. Since FLOSS community requirements are 
not set in stone like in traditional software-development settings, users can work on im-
plementing the features that they would like to see, resulting in software that is continu-
ally improving in both its functionality and quality. We highlight further differences be-
tween traditional software and FLOSS development processes in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Comparison of conventional and FLOSS development process
 Development Process Conventional FLOSS
Membership (Raymond, 
2001) Limited to project team
Open to any user of the 
software
Deadlines (Raymond, 2001) Negotiate with customers and enforceable contracts
Release early and often 
and no enforceable dead-
lines
Roles (Crowston et al., 
2005)
Defined by project man-
ager
Self-selection based on 
need and interest
Leadership (Scozzi, 2008) Explicit with role of pro-ject manager
Implicit and difficult to 
identify at times
Commitment of resources 
(van Wendel De Joode, 
2004)
Developers are committed 
prior to engaging in de-
velopment effort
Patches are contributed 
after work is completed 
by a developer, no re-
quirement for commit-
ment prior to engaging 
with a problem.
Requirements gathering 
(Scacchi, 2002)
Requirements made ex-
plicit.
Features emerge from 
community discourse
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2  The Obsolescence of Conventional Software Development 
Wisdom
Based on our description of the FLOSS development process, we find that the benefits of 
FLOSS are a result of a greater number of participants in the development process. As 
more developers pool their resources, the less costly the development will be for any one 
developer and the more the risk of failure will be distributed. The discovery of bugs and 
the number of features suggested or implemented will also depend on the number of users 
and developers involved in the development process. Eric Raymond eloquently summa-
rized the strength of FLOSS in what he dubbed, the Linus’ Law: "Given enough eyeballs, 
all bugs are shallow" (p.19 Raymond, 2001)
The Linus’ Law forwarded by Raymond seems to be at odds with conventional soft-
ware engineering wisdom drawn from Brooks’ Law. Brooks’ Law can be summarized as 
"Adding developers to a late project only makes it later" (p. 25 Brooks, 1975). What 
Brooks’ Law suggests, is that adding developers to an ongoing project is detrimental to 
its progress (Brooks, 1975). Brooks (1975) attributes the detrimental effect of adding de-
velopers to a software project to what he refers to as the ramp-up effect and to the com-
munication effort required in large software development teams. We offer a pictorial 
summary of Brooks’ Law in Figure 1.1.
9
Figure 1.1: Pictorial depiction of Brooks’ Law.
The ramp-up effect refers to the training effort required to get new members up to 
speed, such that they become productive team members. The duty of training these new 
members will fall on productive incumbent members. As a result, the productivity of 
these incumbent members will decrease, as they are distracted from working on the pro-
ject (Brooks, 1975).
Furthermore, adding more people to a project will increase the number of communica-
tion channels that any developer needs to maintain in order to ensure the functional integ-
rity of the software project (Brooks, 1975). Two developers will be required to expend 
less effort communicating about their work to one another than 20 members would. Each 
developer of the 20-member group will need to communicate to all of the other 19 mem-
bers, which takes a significant portion of the members’ time and hurts overall team pro-
ductivity. 
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Raymond (2001) went as far as declaring Brooks’ Law obsolete in the FLOSS context. 
He attributes the differences of the FLOSS development process in addition to the ability 
to use source code as a communication medium, a fact that Brooks (1975) overlooked, as 
being the main reasons why Brooks’ Law no longer applies. For example, the release-
early/release-often mentality employed in FLOSS implies that contributions from exter-
nal contributors are incremental in nature. Provided that the source code is solid and the 
patch is well written, patches can be easily comprehended and incorporated into the main 
code base with minimal effort. As such, new contributors will not place a significant 
learning or communication burden on the current development team in a FLOSS commu-
nity.
3  The Research Question
While Raymond’s (2001) arguments) are compelling and have even found empirical sup-
port (e.g. Koch, 2004; Schweik et  al., 2008), we believe that recent changes in the 
FLOSS movement (Fitzgerald, 2006) warrant a revisit to the conflict between Raymond’s 
and Brooks’ views.
FLOSS has had a surge in interest in recent years and has been increasingly adopted 
by for-profit organizations (Fitzgerald, 2006), which invalidates the view that FLOSS 
contributors are mostly hobbyists (Shah, 2006; Raymond, 2001). The 2007 report by the 
Linux Software Foundation found that the majority of contributors to the Linux Kernel 
were employed by the largest organizations in the software and hardware markets 
(Kroah-Hartman et al., 2008). Furthermore, researchers observed that some of the most 
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successful projects are able to maintain super-linear growth of the source code (Herraiz 
et al., 2006). Therefore, it is possible that the assumptions held by Raymond (2001) might 
differ from the current realities of FLOSS development efforts.
Indeed, researchers have begun to question many of Raymond’s (2001) assumptions 
and descriptions. For example, not all FLOSS communities observed a distributed 
bazaar-like development model, as the majority of FLOSS communities are highly cen-
tralized (Krishnamurthy, 2002; Crowston et al., 2005). In addition, not all communities 
seem to follow the release-early/release-often mentality (Krishnamurthy, 2002; Herraiz 
et al., 2006). More recently, there has even been work suggesting that Brooks’ Law might 
not be obsolete after all (Capiluppi and Adams, 2009). Therefore, it seems like there is 
mounting evidence that we still do not have a complete understanding of the FLOSS de-
velopment process in its more recent reincarnation.
The goal of this work is to resolve the paradox in our understanding of the software 
development process in the FLOSS context. Conventional wisdom points to the detrimen-
tal effect of team size in a software development team, while Eric Raymond’s description 
of the FLOSS development process and recent empirical work suggests that size is bene-
ficial. What is at stake here is the sustainability of the FLOSS development process and 
the livelihood of FLOSS communities. Failure to understand the implications of Brooks’ 
Law in the FLOSS context might result in dysfunctional development processes. There-
fore, with this work, we will attempt to answer the following research question: "Is 
Brooks’ Law obsolete in the context of FLOSS development?"
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To address this general research question, we need to take into consideration the dif-
ferences between the conventional and FLOSS development processes (see Table 1.1). 
There are a number of differences between the two processes that require us to reexamine 
the assumptions behind Brook’s Law before we declare it obsolete or not: namely, the 
voluntary nature of participation in FLOSS and the absence of enforceable deadlines in 
FLOSS development. We will also attempt to address issues that have been ignored by 
literature examining Brooks’ Law in the FLOSS context: mainly, the nature and effect of 
the ramp-up effect (Raymond, 2001; Koch, 2004; Schweik et al., 2008; Capiluppi and 
Adams, 2009). As such, we will perform two separate studies that address the main as-
pects of Brooks’ Law. The first will be concerned with the nature of the ramp-up effect 
and how it impacts a FLOSS community. The second will directly address the tension 
between Brooks’ and Raymond’s views with regards to the effect of greater numbers in 
FLOSS development communities. 
Answering our research question will be of practical and theoretical importance. We 
have highlighted the role FLOSS plays in enabling new service-based business models, 
such as cloud computing services. Understanding the nature of the FLOSS development 
process will be important to any company that seeks to build a business model that relies 
on FLOSS, as these companies will have to engage the FLOSS community in order to 
effectively build their services. Knowing how the FLOSS development process works 
allows such companies to participate in the most effective manner. This understanding of 
the FLOSS development process will be equally important to FLOSS community manag-
ers, as this understanding would empower them to shape the development process more 
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effectively and make it more efficient in order to utilize the time offered by contributing 
volunteers contributing in the most beneficial way possible.
There are also important theoretical implications to this work, such as understanding 
the boundary conditions of Brooks’ Law and consolidating two important but conflicting 
views of the dynamics of the FLOSS development process. Furthermore, our work will 
lead us to understand the nature and implications of the ramp-up effects in FLOSS com-
munities more fully. Finally, the results of this work will allow us to understand the fac-
tors that contribute to the increased performance of the software development process.
3.1  The Studies
To address our general research question, we will perform two separate studies that ad-
dress different aspects of Brooks’ Law and how it might apply to the FLOSS develop-
ment context (see Figure 1.2 for an overview of the studies). The first of these studies will 
be concerned with the nature of the ramp-up effect and its impact on FLOSS communi-
ties. The second study is concerned with the impact of developer numbers on the per-
formance of FLOSS communities. 
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Figure 1.2: Position of studies with respect to Brooks’ Law
3.1.1  Study 1
According to Brooks (1975), the ramp-up effect will reduce the productivity of a software 
development team because current members are responsible for training new members 
that join the development team after it has begun. In FLOSS development, current devel-
opers are under no obligation to train any new members, so how can we conceptualize of 
the ramp-up effect? 
We conceptualize the ramp-up effect in this study as knowledge barriers that incum-
bent members of conventional software development teams help new members overcome 
through training (Attewell, 1992). While it is possible for current developers in a FLOSS 
15
to also help new contributors, they are under no obligation to do so, especially since the 
source code can convey all of the knowledge required to become a developer (Raymond, 
2001). Therefore, assuming that the source code is the main knowledge source for new 
contributors, the ramp-up effect could vary from community to community based on the 
characteristics of the source code.
With this conceptualization of the ramp-up effect, we view source code design as a 
kind of resistor to the participation of new contributors. When the resistance is high, po-
tential contributors are required to expend considerable effort to acquire the necessary 
knowledge to become contributors. Since most contributors are volunteers, having a high 
level of resistance from the source code (i.e., knowledge barrier) would result in fewer 
new contributors for projects relative to projects with less resistance. As such, we ask 
"what are the factors that lead to greater numbers of new contributors in a FLOSS com-
munity?"
To answer this question, we conceptualize FLOSS communities as being competitive 
actors in what we refer to as the FLOSS marketplace. In this FLOSS marketplace, com-
munities compete to gain contributions from developers in order to sustain their devel-
opment activity. We also conceptualize the act of contribution as a transaction that is 
completed once a source code contribution is fully incorporated into the community code 
base. Using the insights from Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1975), we identify the characteristics of the underlying development knowledge as the 
main factors that increase the costs of contribution (i.e., increased knowledge barriers). 
Specifically, we argue that FLOSS communities could increase the numbers of new con-
16
tributors if they could manage the codifiability, completeness, and diversity of their un-
derlying development knowledge.
3.1.2  Study 2
In this study, we directly address the tension between Brooks’ view and Raymond’s view 
on developer numbers in FLOSS development teams. According to Brooks (1975), a high 
number of developers is detrimental to the progress of a software development team be-
cause of the effort required to maintain open communication channels by any one devel-
oper with the other members of the team. With more communication channels, the effort 
becomes significant and can distract the developer from his/her main development work, 
thereby, reducing the overall productivity of the team.
Raymond (2001), on the other hand, views larger numbers as beneficial for FLOSS 
development teams because the result is higher quality software and more productive 
communities. He argues against the need for significant communication efforts in FLOSS 
teams because the source code itself could be a rich communication medium.
In this study, we identify what we refer to as the committal structure of the FLOSS 
community and suggest that it is a potential bottleneck for the FLOSS development proc-
ess (Goldratt and Cox, 1994). The committal structure represents the way in which com-
mittal activities are performed (i.e., how patches are integrated into the code base). This 
study differs from the first study in that it focuses on the efforts shouldered by the com-
mitters during committal activities and how it might impact the performance of the com-
munity. In the first study, we focus on the effort shouldered by potential contributors up to 
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the act of committal and how that process may impact the contributors’ decision to go 
through with the process. Therefore, we identify the main research question for this study 
as "Is there a relationship between the organization of committal activities and develop-
ment performance in a FLOSS community, and upon what factors will it be contingent 
upon?"
To address this question, we conceptualize FLOSS communities as information-
processing systems in which the information-processing task is the act of committal. Us-
ing insights from Organizational Information Processing Theory (OIPT) (Galbraith, 
1973), we argue that the performance of FLOSS communities is contingent upon the ca-
pacity of the committal structure to process information and the information-processing 
requirements of the committal task. Using this conceptualization, we also reach an under-
standing of how performance can be viewed for FLOSS communities in which deadlines 
are not relevant. We identify task routineness, contributor uncertainty, and task interde-
pendence as the main sources of uncertainty that increase the information-processing re-
quirements of a FLOSS development community and, therefore, the performance of the 
community.
4  Literature Review
4.1  Study 1
We summarize the literature pertaining to why developers join FLOSS development ef-
forts in Table 1.2. What the table makes apparent is the following: 
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•	
 All of the literature in the table focuses on motivational factors as opposed to fac-
tors that might cause resistance to participation with the exception of the study by 
Midha (2008), which lacks an overarching theoretical modlel and might be consid-
ered exploratory in nature. 
•	
 Most of the literature focuses on individual characteristics with the exception of 
Baldwin and Clark (2006), which is purely theoretical; MacCormack et al., (2006), 
which is a case study with limited external validity; and Midha (2008), which lacks 
a strong theoretical foundation. 
•	
 Empirical studies in the table have limited generalizability because of the research 
approach (i.e., case study) or use sourceforge.net samples that can no longer be 
considered be representative of the FLOSS population (Paul, 2009b, 2009a). 
•	
 The tools used in studies that examine the structure of the code are somewhat com-
plicated and do not offer the means to feasibly compare the designs of multiple 
code bases (e.g., MacCormack et al., 2006) 
In our effort to address our first study’s research question, we hope to also address the 
gaps that we have highlighted in Table 1.2. Specifically, we will give a resistance- (i.e., 
cost) based explanation as to why developers contribute to FLOSS projects. Our work 
will also be of an empirical nature, focusing the project as the main unit of analysis. We 
will utilize a method proposed by Newman (2006a) to examine the structures of networks 
as a means to examine, assess, and compare the designs of FLOSS code bases and em-
pirically test the idea of structures of participation (Baldwin and Clark, 2006). Finally, we 
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will test our model using archival data, which we expect to result in findings with greater 
external validity than the previously conducted empirical studies on FLOSS participation.
Table 1.2: FLOSS studies related to new member participation
Study Type LoA Relevant Findings
 (Lerner and Tirole, 2002) Theoretical Individual
Motivation was derived from indirect signaling about 
quality, with the payoff to come in higher career earn-
ings.
(Hars and Ou, 2001) Empirical - Survey of 81 FLOSS participants Individual
Individual motivations to contribute to FLOSS can be 
classified into intrinsic and extrinsic categories.
(Ye and Kishida, 2003)
Theoretical - Based on learning 
theory of legitimate peripheral 
participation
Individual
FLOSS contributors are motivated by learning, which 
is enabled by the availability and modularity of the 
source code.
(Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003) Empirical - Survey and archival data of 336 Apache participants Individual
Mundain but necessary tasks are performed by par-
ticipants for their own learning benefit.
(von Krogh et al., 2003)
Inductive Theory - Interviews 
and archival data from Freenet 
project
Individual Individuals gain committal privileges through techni-cal and constant contributions.
(Hann et al., 2004) Empirical - Survey of 122 con-tributors to three Apache projectsIndividual
Use value, recreational value, and potential career 
impact were found to be the main motivators for par-
ticipation in the sample.
(Roberts et al., 2006) Empirical - Survey and Archival data of 288 Apache contributors. Individual
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for participation are 
related and have an impact on individual performance.
(MacCormack et al., 2006)
Exploratory study - Comparison 
of Linux and Mozilla code struc-
ture
FLOSS 
Project
FLOSS project development is enabled by code struc-
tures that enable participation (i.e., modular).
(Baldwin and Clark, 2006) Theoretical - Modeling FLOSS project
Modularity and option value of modules encourage 
participation.
(Shah, 2006) Inductive theory - Two commu-nities from sourceforge.net Individual
Need is the biggest driver of participation, most con-
tributors leave the community then. A small subset 
continues with the community and contribution be-
comes more of a hobby.
(Midha, 2008)
Empirical - Archival data from 
450 C/C++ based 
sourceforge.net projects
FLOSS 
project
Change in aggregate McCabe’s cyclomatic complex-
ity measure was found to be related to the number of 
new committers.
4.2  Study 2
While the empirical work on the performance of FLOSS communities is more diverse 
than participation, we notice that the notions of performance and goals are also diverse 
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and are usually referred to as success. We summarize the main studies that we examined 
for this study in Table 1.3, which highlights the following gaps in the FLOSS perform-
ance literature: 
•	
 With the exception of Capiluppi and Adams (2009), all of the studies seem to sup-
port the obsolescence of Brooks’ Law directly or indirectly. 
•	
 There is no treatment of the relationship between the structure of the source code 
and the development structure in the listed studies. 
•	
 Studies taking a social-network-analysis approach make the assumption that per-
formance is a result of some of the communication patterns observed in the com-
munication structure. However, there are a number coexisting structures present in 
a FLOSS community, such as the development and communication structures 
(Mockus et al., 2002). No clear theoretical underpinning is given as to why per-
formance is caused by the structures examined in these studies. 
With this study, we hope to find the answer to the main research question and, in the 
process, address the highlighted limitations in the current literature. We hope to specifi-
cally address the tension between Brooks’ view and Raymond’s view of FLOSS devel-
opment and explain why there are conflicting results in the literature. We will reach that 
result by using the insights from Organizational Information Processing Theory (OIPT) 
(Galbraith, 1973) in order to understand the relationship between the structure of soft-
ware and the development structure and how their fit could relate to performance. More 
importantly, we identify the committal structure, consisting of committers, as the main 
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development bottleneck that could limit performance (Goldratt and Cox, 1994). With this 
theory-driven approach, we hope to avoid the main concerns that have caused doubt 
about the internal validity of many prior studies on FLOSS performance.
 Table 1.3: FLOSS studies related to development productivity
Study Type LoA Relevant Findings
 (Mockus et al., 2002)
Case Study - Apache web server 
and Mozilla Browser communi-
ties with follow-up quantitative 
study on Mozilla archival data
Multiple
FLOSS communities use different coordination 
mechanisms depending on the size of the devel-
opment team. In addition, the relative size of the 
core developer group to other groups in the 
FLOSS community will have different implica-
tions on the productivity and sustainability of the 
community in addition to the software quality.
(von Krogh et al., 2003)
Inductive Theory - Interviews 
and archival data from Freenet 
project
Individual
Committers specialize in a specific component 
when they are first granted committal privileges 
due to contribution barriers.
(Sagers, 2004) Empirical - Survey and archival data from 38 FLOSS projects FLOSS project
Using network governance theory, success was 
found to be related to social mechanisms of 
coordination and safeguarding. These mecha-
nisms are restricted in terms of access to the 
source code, collective sanctions, and the reputa-
tion of developers. Success was measured as 
self-reported performance of the project, age of 
the project, and ratio of open issues (i.e., bug 
report and feature requests) to the total number 
of issues.
(Long and Yuan, 2005)
Empirical - Archival data of 300 
FLOSS projects hosted on 
sourceforge.net
FLOSS Project Success, in terms of number of downloads, is closely related to core developer advocacy.
(Daniel et al., 2006) Empirical - Archival data of 78 FLOSS projects hosted on FLOSS Project
The user and developer groups in a FLOSS pro-
ject enhance the absorptive capacity of a FLOSS 
project through two salient capabilities: knowl-
edge transfer and knowledge acquisition. FLOSS 
project with higher absorptive capacities were 
found to perform better in terms of closed tickets 
and lines of code added.
(Grewal et al., 2006)
Empirical - Archival data of 108 
FLOSS projects 
onsourceforge.net
FLOSS Project
The embeddeness of a network (i.e., how inter-
connected a project is to other projects through 
its members) is more closely related to technical 
success than commercial success. Technical 
success was measured as the number of commits, 
while commercial success as the number of 
downloads.
(Liu and Iyer, 2007)
Empirical - Archival data of 200 
FLOSS projects hosted on 
sourceforge.net
FLOSS Project
The software design and communication struc-
ture of the developers will be related to success 
in terms of the quality of the developed software 
and the velocity of the development.
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(Singh, 2007)
Empirical - Archival data of 
2013 FLOSS projects hosted on 
sourceforge.net
FLOSS Project
Small world properties (i.e., dense clustering and 
short average patch of communication between 
developers) are found to be positively related to 
productivity in terms of number of commits.
(Tan et al., 2007)
Empirical - Archival data of 
5191 FLOSS projects hosted on 
sourceforge.net
FLOSS Project
Direct and indirect ties, in addition to communi-
cation network cohesion, were all found to be 
positively related to the productivity of the 
FLOSS community as measured by number of 
commits.
(Wu et al., 2007)
Empirical - Archival data of 59 
FLOSS projects hosted on 
sourceforge.net 
FLOSS project
Project characteristics (e.g.., license and com-
plexity) and communication patterns (i.e., cen-
trality and density) are related to the performance 
of the FLOSS project.
(Midha, 2008)
Empirical - Archival data from 
450 C/C++ based 
sourceforge.net projects 
FLOSS project
Change in aggregate McCabe’s cyclomatic com-
plexity measure was found to be related to the 
number of bugs and the time to fix bugs.
(Capiluppi and Adams, 2009) Empirical - Archival data from KDE project repository Individual
The average number of communication channels 
generally decreases with increased numbers of 
contributors but increases significantly after a 
certain threshold number of concurrent develop-
ers was reached.
5  Results and Implications
Following the call of Koch (2004) to perform empirical research with more external va-
lidity, we empirically test our research models using data that we believe is more repre-
sentative of the FLOSS population than prior studies. While prior studies relied mainly 
on data collected from sourceforge.net, which hosts FLOSS projects (e.g., Stewart et al., 
2006, 2006; Koch, 2004; Liu and Iyer, 2007; Midha, 2008), we selected our sample from 
ohloh.net, which lists FLOSS projects regardless where or how they are hosted.
We believe our sample to be more representative given the recent decline of 
sourceforge.net as the leading hosting website for FLOSS projects (Paul, 2009b, 2009a). 
In addition, we found that only 22% of the top projects listed on ohloh.net (ordered by 
popularity) to be hosted on sourceforge.net.
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Using archival data from the source code repositories of 234 FLOSS projects, we 
collect quarterly observations for the relevant variables in both of our studies between the 
years 2007 and 2009 for a total of 1823 observations. Given the longitudinal nature of our 
observations and variations in the number of observations per project, we used mixed 
model analysis (Cohen et al., 2003) to fit our statistical model and make inferences about 
our observations. We summarize the main findings and implications of the results in the 
following sections.
5.1  Study 1
The importance of our first study stems from the conceptualization of the ramp-up effect 
in the FLOSS context and how it relates to the sustainability of a FLOSS community and 
the relationship between new-member participation and the sustainability of the devel-
opment effort in a FLOSS community. Using Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) (Coase, 
1937; Williamson, 1975), we identify knowledge codifiability, knowledge completeness, 
and knowledge diversity as the main dimensions of the underlying development knowl-
edge that relates to the numbers of new contributors.
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Table 1.4: Summary of Study 1’s main findings
Finding Impact
FLOSS marketplace conceptuali-
zation. •	
 Delineate the differences between the software and the FLOSS 
marketplaces. 
•	
 Application of theories related to market competition to under-
stand key aspects of FLOSS. 
Knowledge codifiability is posi-
tively related to an increase in the 
number of new contributors.
•	
 While source code is a codified form of knowledge, there are also 
tacit assumptions that can be made explicit in code documenta-
tion. 
•	
 Importance of good code documentation. 
Knowledge completeness is posi-
tively related to an increase in the 
number of new contributors.
•	
 While software development is an inherently uncertain task, this 
uncertainty tends to vary between FLOSS projects. 
•	
 Highly modularized projects reduce the uncertainty inherent in 
the software development task and could result in greater partici-
pation in FLOSS. 
Knowledge diversity is nega-
tively related to an increase in the 
number of new contributors.
•	
 Amount and relatedness of knowledge are two distinct dimen-
sions of knowledge diversity with their own unique impact on 
participation. 
•	
 Projects with highly diverse underlying knowledge might become 
more manageable if broken down into smaller FLOSS projects. 
The impact of knowledge codifi-
ability and diversity on the num-
bers of new contributors follows 
a diminishing returns pattern.
•	
 FLOSS communities need to play a balancing act in terms of how 
much of the code base should be documented and must always 
keep the documentation up to date. 
•	
 FLOSS communities need to be clear on the goals of their pro-
jects and be able to say no to the inclusion of certain features such 
that their projects can remain manageable. 
Application of the leading eigen-
vector and modularity measure 
(Newman, 2006a) to understand 
the structure of source code.
•	
 Objective measure of modularity that is programming-language-
agnostic. 
•	
 Software engineering tool that could assist in assessing code reor-
ganization efforts. 
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The findings from the first study have some important theoretical implications. In 
developing our theory, we framed the relationship between developers and FLOSS com-
munities as that of a marketplace in which the ramp-up effect is seen as a knowledge bar-
rier and a source of transaction cost. This framing opens up the possibility of studying 
FLOSS communities in light of strategic organizational theories to understand how 
communities can be more competitive in the marketplace. In addition, our work gives us 
a better understanding of the relationship between the characteristics of development-
related knowledge and the number of new contributors joining the development effort in 
a FLOSS community. 
Finally, we contribute by introducing a novel measure of modularity suggested by 
Newman (2006b), which will be important to understand the effects of code organization 
more fully. The empirical results in this study suggest that there is validity to this method. 
What is unique about this measure is that it is language-agnostic, as it relies mostly on the 
dependencies between source code files to estimate modularity. Such a property would 
make the measure not only useful for larger groups of developers using different pro-
gramming languages but also for theorists who wish to get at the heart of the concept of 
modularity without being influenced by programming–language-specific constructs.
Our findings also have some important practical implications for FLOSS commu-
nity organizers. The findings suggest that communities that manage the ramp-up effect by 
reducing contribution costs will be able to attract more contributors and increase their 
chances sustaining their development effort for a longer period of time. Such costs are 
26
manageable if the FLOSS community dedicates effort to tasks that are usually considered 
mundane, unexciting, and likely to attract the least interest from contributors, such as 
documentation and code reorganization. However, the results also suggest that there is a 
limit to managing such costs given the tendency of a source code to grow in complexity 
(Lehman and Belady, 1985)In addition, the modularity measure has the potential to be 
used as a tool by developers to understand the effect of their code reorganization efforts 
and whether such efforts actually improve the code structure or not.
5.2  Study 2
For the second study, we directly addressed the tension between Brooks’ and Raymond’s 
views of software development. Based on Information Processing Theory (Galbraith, 
1973) and the assumption that committers are boundedly rational (Simon, 1955), we 
identify the committal structure as the performance bottleneck in a FLOSS community. 
We summarize the main findings and their implications in Table 1.5
Our findings have important theoretical implications for research on FLOSS pro-
ductivity and community organization. We suggest that no committal structure is a supe-
rior choice; rather, it is the communities’ conditions that should dictate which structure to 
employ. We identify task routineness, contributor uncertainty, and task interdependence 
as the main factors that influence a community’s decision to choose the optimal commit-
tal structure.
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Table 1.5: Summary of Study 2’s main findings
Finding Impact
FLOSS communities perform-
ing simple tasks perform bet-
ter.
•	
 Importance of good source code design to simplify develop-
ment. 
•	
 Contributors should work closer to the community and make 
small incremental changes rather than work in isolation and 
accumulate their patches into a single patch that is hard to 
incorporate. 
Centralized committal struc-
tures are a better fit for routine 
tasks.
•	
 The committal structure should match the needs of the com-
munity. 
•	
 There is no single superior structure. 
Decentralized committal 
structures are a better fit under 
high contributor uncertainty.
•	
 Decentralized committal structures are necessary if commu-
nity involvement is valued. 
•	
 Brooks’ Law is not obsolete, but the committal structure has 
to be overwhelmed for it to become obvious. 
Task interdependence in-
creases information-
processing requirements on a 
FLOSS community and re-
duces performance.
•	
 Importance of modularizing the source code and its effect on 
the performance of a FLOSS community. 
•	
 Further validation of the Newman (2006a) modularity meas-
ure. 
Decentralized committal 
structures are a better fit under 
conditions of low task inter-
dependence.
•	
 Decentralized committal structures are enabled by proper 
code design. 
•	
 Centralized committal structures might be the only way to 
continue to maintain and develop tightly coupled code bases. 
•	
 Brooks’ and Raymond’s views are complementary. Raymond 
explains how FLOSS development is conducted under condi-
tions of fit, while Brooks’ views become apparent under con-
dition of lack of fit. 
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The findings also suggest that FLOSS development teams are no different from 
any other development team and that that our understanding of managing FLOSS com-
munities could benefit greatly from the organizational body of knowledge. Using OIPT, 
we elaborate on the concept of fit to for a community to achieve superior performance. 
Fit requires that the committal structure, as the source of information-processing capacity, 
should match the requirements of the development task. With lack of fit, a FLOSS com-
munity could either work on improving their information-processing capacity through the 
use of development tools and a more decentralized committal structure, or they could re-
duce their information-processing needs through code reorganization efforts.
Finally, and most importantly, the findings suggest that the views of Brooks’ and 
Raymond are not mutually exclusive; rather they suggest that having more contributors is 
indeed beneficial to the performance of FLOSS communities under the condition that the 
community achieves a fit between its committal structure and the information-processing 
requirements of the committal task. When there is a lack of fit, communities start to expe-
rience a degradation in performance or have no performance gains as the number of con-
tributors increases.
The findings also have important practical implications ,as they provide a better 
understanding for community organizers in terms of how to put less burdens on commit-
ters by properly organizing them. This, in turn, reduces the risk of losing them after a 
short time of service. Furthermore, these results give for-profit organizations an under-
standing of the similarities between FLOSS development teams and traditional software 
development teams, thereby leveraging their current knowledge base to improve the de-
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velopment performance of FLOSS communities further, especially since deadlines are a 
great concern for many of the for-profit organizations involved with FLOSS.
6  Conclusion
The two studies we conducted combine to give a detailed picture of the tension between 
Brooks’ and Raymond’s views of software development. In the first study, we forward a 
conceptualization of the ramp-up effect as knowledge barriers that impact the sustainabil-
ity, and potentially performance, of FLOSS communities by limiting the number of new 
contributors that join the development effort. The second study complements this under-
standing by directly exploring the interplay between a community’s structure and the 
source code’s structure and how it impacts the community’s overall performance. We also 
explain, in this last study, how performance in FLOSS communities should be conceptu-
alized relative to other communities due to the irrelevance of deadlines in the FLOSS 
context.
Based on these two studies, we conclude that Brooks’ and Raymond’s’ views are 
not at odds but actually complement one another. We found that Raymond’s views hold 
when the committal structure is not overwhelmed. In such conditions, the community can 
handle an increase in the numbers of contributors and could actually benefit from their 
contributions and increase performance. However, in conditions of lack of fit in which the 
committal structure is overwhelmed, greater numbers could be detrimental to the per-
formance of the community, as committers have to make a tradeoff between their own 
development work and committing the work of others. It is in such conditions that 
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Brooks’ view becomes prevalent in FLOSS. As such, we attribute the conflicting results 
in research to the differing contexts and assumptions in these studies.
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 Chapter 2
Study 1: The FLOSS Marketplace and The Sus-
tainability of FLOSS Communities
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Abstract
A great deal of the Free/Libre and Open Source Software (FLOSS) literature inappropri-
ately assumes that the reasons FLOSS community members make source code contribu-
tions are the same. The literature cites several reasons that members contribute, including 
satisfying one’s own needs, demonstrating one’s ability to potential employers, and gain-
ing peer recognition; however, much of this literature does not take into account the dif-
ferences between new and experienced contributors. We argue that these two groups of 
contributors are faced with different cost components related to contributing and that a 
FLOSS community’s ability to nurture new contributors will be important for its long-
term survival. To understand why new contributors participate, we distinguish between 
the software and FLOSS marketplaces and present the conditions that could influence ra-
tional profit-maximizing actors’ decisions not to contribute to a FLOSS project. With this 
framing, we develop a model based on Transaction Cost Theory that sheds light on how 
FLOSS communities can effectively convert users of the software into members that con-
tribute to its development. Based on this model, we conclude that the knowledge charac-
teristics required to make a contribution are the main impediment for first-time contribu-
tors. We argue that improving software design is the most effective way for FLOSS 
communities to encourage new contributors to participate in the development effort, as it 
reduces the burden on potential contributors to acquire the knowledge necessary to make 
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source code contributions. We discuss the process by which we will test this model and 
our use of a novel approach to measuring software modularity. Finally, we conclude with 
a discussion of the implications and limitations of our study.
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1  Introduction
Free, Libre, and Open Source Software (FLOSS) is licensed to enable users to redistrib-
ute and modify it freely (Raymond, 2001). As a result, users can easily obtain a copy of 
the code base and participate in development efforts by contributing their modifications 
to various FLOSS projects. These projects rely on such voluntary contributions for their 
continued development and growth (Lee and Cole, 2003).
Because users can obtain FLOSS at no cost, some individuals simply use these pro-
grams without contributing to their development. Known as the free-rider problem, this 
occurs when individuals take advantage of common-pool goods without taking action to 
support the community that develops them (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; O’Mahony, 
2003; English and Schweik, 2007). Should free-riding behavior become prevalent, the 
long-term survival of FLOSS communities would be seriously endangered. Therefore, to 
understand FLOSS sustainability, it is extremely important to understand the factors that 
lead individuals to voluntarily contribute source code.
Individual contributions to FLOSS communities take many forms. Some contributors 
report bugs or suggest features, while others write code to improve the software (Mockus 
et  al., 2002). In this study, we are primarily interested in code writers, as the FLOSS 
products would have not been produced without their efforts.
According to Shah (2006), code writers can be classified into two groups: contributors 
and committers. Contributors are those individuals considered external to the main devel-
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opment efforts in the community and occasionally contribute patches of code. Commit-
ters are members that have the necessary privileges to approve and incorporate patches 
into a community code base. In addition, the committers perform the largest share of de-
velopment and are, therefore, considered part of the FLOSS community’s core develop-
ment team (Crowston and Howison, 2005).
Although contributors and committers differ in terms of their level of involvement and 
the frequency of their contributions, the literature on FLOSS participation does not offer 
any clear, theory-driven distinctions between these types of participants in FLOSS com-
munities. Within the FLOSS literature, there is an implicit assumption that all participants 
contribute to FLOSS communities for the same primary reasons. For example, the litera-
ture suggests that gaining social status motivates individual developers to participate in 
code development rather than simply free-ride (Raymond, 2001; Lakhani and Wolf, 
2007). Alternately, individual participants may contribute to demonstrate their software-
development abilities to potential employers (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Roberts et  al., 
2006). Some would also suggest that individual developers contribute source code simply 
to satisfy their personal interests (Raymond, 2001).
What the FLOSS motivational literature overlooks is a barrier that impacts any new 
participant in any ongoing software development effort known as the ramp-up effect 
(Brooks, 1975). The ramp-up effect refers to the training and knowledge that new partici-
pants in a software development effort need to acquire before they can contribute any-
thing useful to the development effort (Brooks, 1975). Why the literature has overlooked 
such an effect could possibly be attributed explained by Raymond’s (2001) suggestion 
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that Brooks’ law, which forwarded the idea of the ramp-up effect, has become obsolete in 
the context of FLOSS development. The rationale behind this conclusion is the distrib-
uted nature of development in FLOSS communities in which the source code itself is 
considered a medium for communication, thus resulting in the need for fewer interactions 
between developers. However, should the ramp-up effect really exist, the failure of 
FLOSS communities to take it into account could have a detrimental effect on their long 
term sustainability.
To show why these detrimental effects are probable, consider the role the committers 
play in a FLOSS community. Committers are considered the main drivers of progress in a 
FLOSS community because they shoulder the majority of the development effort (Shah, 
2006; Crowston and Howison, 2005; Mockus et al., 2002). Committers, however, are not 
guaranteed to remain with a community indefinitely. Many committers have been found 
to leave after only four months of service with a FLOSS community, only to be replaced 
by the promotion of contributors that have proven their dedication to and experience 
within the community (Shah, 2006; Riehle, 2007). Therefore, FLOSS communities need 
to encourage new contributors to join development efforts in order to ensure that the 
ranks of the committers are replenished and that their FLOSS communities’ progress con-
tinues.
Managing the number of contributors is not an easy task because software code base 
becomes more complex as it evolves over time (Lehman et al., 1997). As a result, com-
mitters and/or contributors are required to maintain a strong familiarity with the code if 
they wish to continue making changes to it (Lehman et al., 1997). The increased com-
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plexity of the code base also results in an increase of the ramp-up effect, making it more 
difficult for new contributors to familiarize themselves with the intricacies of the code 
design, thus resulting in a decline in the number of new contributors over time. 
We argue in this work that the magnitude of the ramp-up effect that prevents new con-
tributors from making an initial contribution is determined by the characteristics of the 
development knowledge that contributors must obtain before making an effective contri-
bution. Therefore, the ramp-up effect can be viewed as a knowledge barrier (Attewell, 
1992) that contributors must transcend before making a useful contribution. While there 
is empirical support for complexity’s negative impact as a knowledge barrier on the pro-
motion of new committers (Midha, 2008), its effect on new contributors is not under-
stood. The value of this work comes from understanding how these knowledge barriers 
impact the numbers of new contributors from whom committers are promoted (Riehle, 
2007). Furthermore, we provide with this work empirical support for the idea that source 
code structure could encourage participation (Baldwin and Clark, 2006; MacCormack 
et al., 2006).
New contributors, in particular, will have more difficulty dealing with the growing 
knowledge barriers associated with software evolution as compared to seasoned contribu-
tors or committers, suggesting that the numbers of new contributors could dwindle 
throughout a FLOSS community’s existence as a result of increased development com-
plexity. For this reason, we take a particular interest in new contributors and try to de-
velop a distinction between contributors and committers. More formally, our research 
question is "What are the factors that lead to greater numbers of new contributors to a 
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FLOSS community?" We believe that the answer to this question is important because of 
the role contributors play in sustaining the development effort of FLOSS communities. In 
addition, the answer highlights the importance of making a distinction between the types 
of participants in FLOSS communities when building theories of participation.
To answer our research question, we first introduce our conception of the FLOSS 
marketplace and explain how knowledge acquisition, assimilation, and use are important 
activities performed by contributors. Next, we explain the costs associated with participa-
tion from the contributor’s perspective. Then, we shift our focus to the FLOSS commu-
nity and utilize Transaction Cost Theory (Williamson, 1975) to understand the 
community-level factors that increase an individual contributor’s contribution costs, such 
as the modularity of the code base and the level of documentation. We then formalize our 
theoretical model and suggest the means by which we can empirically test this model. 
Finally, we discuss the potential implications and limitations of this work. 
2  Theoretical Framework
The goal of our work is to explain how FLOSS communities can increase their number of 
contributors regardless of the contributors’ motivations. To that end, we first explain how 
the interaction between a FLOSS community and its contributors can be viewed as a 
market transaction in which contributors make a source code contribution to the commu-
nity. We refer to this market transaction as the contribution transaction, which will be dis-
cussed in more detail in Sec. 2.2.3. 
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Assuming that contributors are rational value-maximizing actors, we argue that reduc-
ing the costs associated with contribution transactions should increase the number of us-
ers that see code contribution as a rational choice, thereby increasing the number of con-
tributors in the community. Furthermore, we make two additional assumptions that set the 
boundary conditions for our theory. First, we assume that the users of the FLOSS soft-
ware have some understanding of computer programming and can write patches; there-
fore, the learning cost for the programming language is not significant enough to prevent 
a user from contributing. Secondly, we assume that the code base of the FLOSS project is 
still in active development and has room to grow and create value for its users. A mature 
project that no one sees a need to further enhance is highly unlikely to attract any new 
contributors and will not undergo active development.
2.1  The Markets
Markets coordinate the flow of goods and services between two adjacent steps in a value 
chain. Markets also facilitate the exchange of goods and services between individuals or 
firms external to one another where the terms of the exchange are determined by market 
forces. In this latter situation, buyers scan the market for alternatives before making a de-
cision on which terms to go with (Malone et al., 1987). For example, FLOSS developers 
would assess the technical superiority of a software package before using it and, subse-
quently, contributing to it to ensure that the software package will continue to serve their 
future needs (e.g. Ramm, 2008). Such behavior suggests that developers have preferences 
and choose which FLOSS communities they contribute to, which serves as a demand 
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force in the FLOSS marketplace. Therefore, for FLOSS communities to gain contribu-
tors, they have to improve their software and technical offerings, creating the competitive 
and supply forces needed to designate the exchange between developers and FLOSS 
communities as a marketplace. We will discuss this designation in more detail in 
Sec. 2.2.1.2.
Markets also allow transacting parties to maintain their rights to self govern (i.e., work 
for themselves) (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). We view the flow of source code contribu-
tions between developers and FLOSS communities to be coordinated under a market-type 
structure. In this FLOSS marketplace, each actor retains the right to self-govern, and the 
supply and demand forces determine what and who is involved in an exchange, as we 
shall make clear in Sec. 2.2.1.2.
The FLOSS marketplace and software marketplace are related in that FLOSS commu-
nities are participants in both. The two marketplaces can be conceptualized as two adja-
cent links in the FLOSS value chain in which source code patches that are accumulated 
by the FLOSS communities in the FLOSS marketplace are integrated into a coherent 
software system that has value in the software marketplace (see Figure  2.1). FLOSS 
communities use the FLOSS value chain as an alternative to the proprietary software 
value chain, which is used by software companies competing with FLOSS communities 
in the software market. The proprietary value chain differs from the FLOSS value chain 
in that software companies have hierarchical-like control over developers through em-
ployment contracts (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). FLOSS communities, on the other 
hand, use the market mechanism of the FLOSS marketplace to solicit source code contri-
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butions from contributors to maintain the development of the software that is sold/
exchanged in the software marketplace. 
 Figure 2.1: The FLOSS value chain
The differences between the software and FLOSS marketplaces, mainly the currency (See 
Table  2.1), allow us to conceptualize FLOSS communities as sellers in both market-
places. The FLOSS community is the seller in both markets since they receive currency 
for their offerings in either marketplace. In the software marketplace, the user1  (the 
buyer) engages in a market transaction with a FLOSS community (the seller) when he/
she chooses to download and use its software offering, since the software is made avail-
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1 Developers and users are referred to interchangeably because we are assuming that our theory applies to 
users that have some understanding of programming to be able to make a contribution.
able for free. In the FLOSS marketplace, however, the developer (the a buyer) engages in 
a market transaction when he/she offers a patch to obtain the community benefits offered 
by a FLOSS community (the seller) and that patch is accepted.
Table 2.1: The FLOSS value chain
Software Marketplace FLOSS Marketplace
Sellers
FLOSS communities, 
software vendors, IT so-
lution vendors
FLOSS communities.
Sellers’ Goals
Maximize profit, in-
crease market share of 
product
Maximize patch contributions and qual-
ity.
Buyers Software users, hardware manufacturers or vendors
Individual developers contributing their 
own free time or organizations that do-
nate the work time of the developers it 
employs.
Buyers’ Goals
Create the highest qual-
ity product for the lowest 
price
Maximize benefit from FLOSS commu-
nity by having patches accepted beyond 
satisfying immediate software needs. 
Benefits include recognition (Lerner and 
Tirole, 2002; Roberts et al., 2006) and 
community development assistance 
(Raymond, 2001; Dahlander and Mag-
nusson, 2005).
Currency Cash for software Patches for community benefits.
Market 
Forces Exam-
ple
Similar software offer-
ings by different sellers 
that differ in price and 
quality.
Different FLOSS communities offering 
solutions to similar problems that differ 
in their technical superiority and associ-
ated community benefits.
 
2.1.1  The software marketplace
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The software marketplace is considered a marketplace because of the market forces that 
exist within it (i.e., supply and demand). Demand is generated by users who seek to ob-
tain software that can maximize their returns; that is, users will choose software that 
meets their feature and quality requirements for the minimum expense. To meet this de-
mand, sellers compete to offer different software choices in order to win as many of users 
as possible. To remain in business, a seller’s goal is to maximize profit from selling soft-
ware to users by either minimizing the cost of producing the software and thus improve 
their price offering or by improving their offerings2 but demanding higher prices. Sellers 
can afford to remain in this market as long as the income they make covers the expenses 
associated with developing the software and competing in this marketplace. This model 
describes the proprietary value chain depicted in Figure 2.1, which is employed by for-
profit organizations, such as software development companies. These companies pay the 
salaries of the developers they contract from the proceeds of the software sales as part of 
competing in the software marketplace.
FLOSS communities are amongst the competitors for software development compa-
nies in the software marketplace. The way FLOSS communities sustain, or fund, their 
development activities as part of their value chain differs than that of the software devel-
opment companies. While FLOSS communities compete for a larger user base, just like 
any other seller in the software marketplace, they do so as a means of attracting contribu-
tors to fund their development instead of selling software, which highlights the impor-
tance for FLOSS communities to be competitive in the software marketplace. Since any-
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2 Improving a software offering can be done by improving the softwares quality or features.
one can obtain the software produced by FLOSS communities freely without contributing 
to the development efforts , we argue that the act of contribution follows a different dy-
namic than the one described in the software marketplace, which relies on the fact that 
users derive benefits from software usage. This is why we describe the act of contribution 
in the context of what we refer to as the FLOSS marketplace.
2.1.2  The FLOSS Marketplace
The FLOSS marketplace is considered such due to the existence of supply and demand 
forces. The sellers in this marketplace are FLOSS communities that supply benefits to 
contributors associated with community participation, such as peer recognition (Lakhani 
and Wolf, 2007), development assistance (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005), and better 
employment opportunities (Roberts et al., 2006; Lerner and Tirole, 2002). The develop-
ers3  are the buyers in this marketplace, and they will have varying perceptions of value 
based on the benefits offered by the FLOSS communities. Assuming that developers are 
value-maximizing actors, they will choose to contribute to communities that offer them 
the highest returns. The fact that developers have choices regarding which community 
they can participate with suggests that communities will have to compete with each other 
by offering greater benefits in order to become the primary choice of the majority of de-
velopers. Communities that are able to attract the greatest number of developers—who 
will eventually become contributors—will have a better chance of sustaining their devel-
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3 We refer to these individuals as developers since they have yet to make a contribution and are so far only 
potential contributors. See Sec. 2.2 for more detail.
opment efforts. Therefore, the sustainability of a FLOSS community’s development effort 
will be closely associated with its ability to compete in the FLOSS marketplace.
There are numerous behaviors that can be observed in FLOSS communities that sug-
gest the existence of competition in the FLOSS marketplace. We observed that there are 
numerous software packages that provide solutions for the exact same problem. For ex-
ample, Ruby on Rails, Django, Zope, Pylons, and Grails are all FLOSS web frameworks 
that can be used to build web applications. Web frameworks are by no means the only 
example of competing implementations; the trend continues with almost all software 
categories, including databases, operating systems, and ERP systems, to name a few4 . 
Based on this observation, we conclude that FLOSS communities are not purely coopera-
tive in nature or else we would have observed only a single solution for each problem. 
Furthermore, we observed that communities actively promote their software. As part of 
this active promotion, members frequently compare their own community’s product to 
those of other communities (e.g. Ramm, 2008) or even list comparisons on the commu-
nity websites5. Finally, we observed that FLOSS communities often imitate software fea-
tures and development processes employed by other FLOSS communities that users and 
potential contributors might have expressed an interest in. These imitations include, for 
50
4 Both http://wikipedia.com and http://ohloh.net are good sources to identify competing FLOSS implemen-
tation for the software categories we mentioned in addition to other categories. Of the identified software 
categories, we were able to identify at least four competing and successful implementations for each cate-
gory. 
5 See http://south.aeracode.org/wiki/Alternatives and http://www.cherrypy.org/wiki/CherryPyAndPaste as 
examples.
instance, the compliance with the WSGI6  protocol by most Python-based web frame-
works, which is perceived to make both development and deployment of web applica-
tions easier. The recent move by Wine, Mozilla, and OpenJDK to distributed revision 
control systems (e.g., Git and Mercurial) instead of centralized systems (e.g., CVS and 
Subversion) serves as another example of imitation amongst FLOSS communities that 
serve to improve the development process and appease contributors. We view these ac-
tions by communities as a means to gain a competitive advantage or competitive parity in 
both the software and FLOSS marketplace,s which can be seen as evidence supporting 
the existence of competitive forces in these marketplaces (Mata et al., 1995).
These observations of the competitive behavior in FLOSS communities might not be 
sufficient to demonstrate the competition in this marketplace. Therefore, to argue for the 
existence of this competition more effectively, we need to observe that contributors, as 
buyers, are willing to change their preferences should FLOSS communities improve their 
offerings. Furthermore, we need to observe that communities do indeed benefit from im-
proving their competitive position by offering greater benefits to developers, which might 
include improved product offerings. As it happens, both observations can be made in the 
FLOSS marketplace. Empirical evidence shows that users and developers show a prefer-
ence and willingness to migrate between FLOSS projects (Oh and Jeon, 2007), which 
means that FLOSS communities are able to influence the decisions of users and develop-
ers to be part of their community.
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6 WSGI stand for web server gateway interface, which is a specification on how web servers and applica-
tion server communicate.
Furthermore, communities stand to gain much in terms of contributions should a high-
profile developer choose to use the software and make significant contributions to im-
prove its appeal to other users and developers. In such a case, it is likely that more con-
tributors would join the development effort of the community. For example, Guido van 
Rossum, the inventor of the Python language, mentioned in an interview that the Django 
web framework is the most Pythonic amongst the Python web frameworks (Laporte and 
DiBona, 2006). Django was incorporated as part of the Google app engine project that 
van Rossum was working on, which eventually led to his development contributions to 
the Django project. Ever since, the number of contributors, and even users for that matter, 
continued to increase for the Django project7. Based on these observations in FLOSS 
communities, we conclude that it is safe to assume that competitive behavior exists in the 
FLOSS marketplace and that communities stand to gain from being more competitive.
2.2  Sustainability of a FLOSS Community
Based on the FLOSS marketplace framing (See Sec. 2.2.1), we can assume that the com-
petitive forces will drive FLOSS communities to improve their offerings to gain more 
contributions. The offerings can be in the form of a better solution to a technical problem 
or benefits associated with a community model of software development. The contribu-
tions received by the community would result in the improvement of the software system 
and would start a self re-enforcing cycle that results in the FLOSS community being 
more competitive, thereby attracting more contributions.
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7 See http://www.ohloh.net/p/compare?metric=Contributors&project_0=Django
While contributions could come from a number of sources when a FLOSS community 
is highly competitive in the FLOSS marketplace, we are specifically interested in the 
community’s ability to obtain contributions from new sources (i.e., new contributors). It 
is common knowledge that the development efforts in FLOSS communities is mostly 
shouldered by relatively few individuals who repeatedly contribute source code patches; 
these individuals are also known as the core developers and include both committers and 
frequent contributors (Krishnamurthy, 2002; Mockus et al., 2002; Crowston and Howi-
son, 2005). These core developers do not usually contribute to a FLOSS community in-
definitely, and there generally comes a time when they stop contributing altogether (Shah, 
2006), assuming of course that there is room for the project to grow and that the decline 
in participation is not due to maturity8. 
Therefore, to ensure that the development effort is sustained within a FLOSS commu-
nity, the community needs to take actions to promote the participation of new contribu-
tors, thus replenishing the ranks of the lost core developers (Riehle, 2007). Should new 
contributors cease to join a FLOSS community, there will come a time when the ranks of 
the core developers will dwindle, thus impacting the community’s ability to progress with 
development. Therefore, we define the sustainability of a FLOSS community as the 
community’s propensity to maintain its development effort over time by effectively con-
verting users into developers. 
2.2.1  User Conversion Strategies
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8 We attempt to control for this effect in our sample selection as we explain in Section 2.3.1 and find an 
insignificant effect for age suggesting that we have appropriately selected our sample. 
Assuming that the users are rational value-maximizing actors, FLOSS communities could 
increase the number of users who provide contributions by making it more rewarding for 
them to do so. When a good, such as a FLOSS product, is made available for public con-
sumption (Weimer and Vining, 2004), a user has a choice between using the software 
without incurring any cost related to development or using the software while contribut-
ing to its development. Both options allow the actor to benefit from the software, but the 
rational value-maximizing approach would be to use the software without incurring any 
contribution costs, which is known as free-riding. Since FLOSS users often exhibit free-
riding behavior (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2005; O’Mahony, 2003; von Hippel and von 
Krogh, 2003), we believe it is reasonable to assume that users, in addition to developers 
who are a subset thereof, are value-maximizing rational actors.
Of the strategies that FLOSS communities can adopt to increase returns for develop-
ers, we focus on cost reduction strategies because they have the potential to increase re-
turns for potential participants regardless of their motivations. Attempts to increase the 
value of the software might improve a FLOSS community’s chance of success in the 
software marketplace, thereby increasing its user base. However, having a large user base 
does not guarantee an increase in contributors. As rational value-maximizing actors, users 
need to perceive the value of contributing to be higher than free-riding. As such, reducing 
the cost of contribution would increase the returns from contribution relative to free-
riding, thereby making the option to participate more attractive to a greater number of 
users. Assuming that the returns developers get from participation vary as a result of both 
varying cost and value perceptions, we expect the number of contributors in a FLOSS 
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community to increase as the cost of contribution is reduced. The idea behind this expec-
tation is that reducing contribution costs will increase the returns from contributing for all 
of the developers relative to other rational options.
Arguing that a cost reduction strategy is effective in attracting new contributors does 
not imply that benefits of value increasing strategies are ineffective. Indeed, literature fo-
cusing on FLOSS participation and motivation suggests that individuals have motivations 
that differ in nature (e.g., Raymond, 2001;Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Roberts et al., 2006; 
Lakhani and Wolf, 2007). While value increasing strategies could be effective at targeting 
specific groups of potential contributors (cf. Lakhani and Wolf, 2007), we are simply 
making the argument that cost reduction strategies are more effective in that they impact 
all potential contributor groups regardless of their motivation. The way in which value 
perceptions are distributed in a community will have an impact however on how many 
contributors join the development effort when the cost is reduced. For example, due to 
the nature of different FLOSS communities, there might be a greater number of potential 
contributors who are close to the borderline of contributing than another community. As 
such, when both communities reduce the cost to contribute for a similar amount, the 
number of new contributors might differ.
Given this relationship between value and cost in rational value maximizing decision 
making and the differing nature of value (i.e., motivation), we find our selves in need of 
making a simplifying assumption of the nature of the variability in value between differ-
ent FLOSS communities. We make the assumption that this variability is relatively nar-
row in range. A result of this assumption is that, as we shall explain, the antecedents to 
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cost will have a uniform, or relatively similar, impact on participation across communi-
ties. Violating this assumption will result in our inability to detect an independent effect 
for cost, as cost reduction will result in few or no added contributors for communities 
with a large variability in value perceptions. We will revisit this assumption when dis-
cussing the methods used to test our proposed model.
2.2.2  Cost Reduction Strategy
Reducing the cost of contribution involves reducing the cost of development tasks. 
Software development tasks are considered to be highly complex and knowledge inten-
sive. This means that in order for developers to make initial contributions, they first need 
to overcome the knowledge barriers of the development process (Fichman and Kemerer, 
1997). These knowledge barriers are a significant source of cost that exist because the 
requisite knowledge required for development is immobile in nature and, therefore, costly 
to transfer (Attewell, 1992; Choudhury and Sampler, 1997). These barriers are found to 
be closely related to the complexity of the software and grow as the software matures; as 
a result, developers will find it easier to join a software development project earlier rather 
than later in its life cycle (Lehman et al., 1997). Within the FLOSS context, these knowl-
edge barriers include understanding how the source code is organized, how it is compiled, 
and how modifications can be made to it. As these knowledge barriers increase over time, 
new developers will find it increasingly difficult to perform these tasks, and as a result, 
the project will lose future replacements for current team members. Therefore, managing 
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development knowledge barriers and keeping them low will be very important to ensure 
the continued supply of new contributors and the sustainability of the FLOSS project.
Since contributors in the FLOSS marketplace benefit in their own way from the ex-
change of source code for community benefits (Raymond, 2001; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; 
Shah, 2006; Krogh and Hippel, 2006; Lakhani and Wolf, 2007) and FLOSS communities 
also benefit from the contributed code, we conclude that this exchange is an economic 
transaction that can be viewed in light of transaction cost theory (TCT). We refer to this 
transaction as the contribution transaction and to the knowledge barriers as the main 
source of contribution costs, which are viewed as transaction costs9. A community’s abil-
ity to manage these transaction costs will increase the number of developers who prefer 
the contribution arrangement and will, therefore, increase the number of new contributors 
to the community. We leverage the insights from TCT to gain a better understanding of 
the main sources of transaction costs and how these costs affect the number of contribu-
tors in a FLOSS community. To accomplish this goal, we first need to explain the steps 
that comprise a contribution transaction. 
2.3  The Contribution Transaction
To understand the costs associated with contributions, we first need to review the steps 
that a developer goes through to complete a contribution transaction (See Figure  2.2) 
(Raymond, 2001; Shah, 2006; Mockus et al., 2002; Lee and Cole, 2003). A contribution 
transaction is completed in the FLOSS marketplace when a developer contributes a 
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9 From this point on, we will refer to contribution costs and transaction costs interchangeably.
source code patch to a community and the community accepts it as part of its code base. 
Contribution is a process that occurs over time and includes costs that are predominantly 
associated with obtaining the requisite knowledge to make a contribution. Since we al-
ready assume that the returns developers perceive vary, our theory takes into account the 
difference in developers’ programming abilities, which might affect developers’ contribu-
tion costs and, therefore, their perceived net returns. Throughout the contribution process, 
the developer will incur different types of costs when going through the different contri-
bution steps. We group the steps that comprise a contribution transaction into two stages 
based on the major cost components (See Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2): learning and coordi-
nation. Also, it should be noted that these costs are mostly knowledge based (Kogut and 
Zander, 1996).
 Figure 2.2: The contribution transaction
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Table 2.2: Contribution costs incurred by FLOSS developers
Learning Stage Coordination Stage
Description
This is the stage in which a use-
ful modification is made to the 
author’s private copy of the 
community code base. The 
author could benefit from this 
modification even though it is 
not yet integrated into the com-
munity code base.
This stage involves integrating the 
modification made in the initial 
stage into the community code 
base. Completion of this stage sig-
nals the completion of the contribu-
tion transaction and community 
benefits bestowed on the contribu-
tor.
Steps in 
Figure 2.2 1,2, & 3 4, 5, & 6
Required by Anyone making a private or pub-lic change to the code base
Anyone contributing a patch to the 
community code base
Recurrence
Required to obtain requisite de-
velopment knowledge before a 
contribution can be made to a 
FLOSS project that is considered 
new to the developer making the 
contribution. Incremental effort 
is expended afterwards for the 
developer to understand changes 
made by others.
With every contribution to resolve 
any conflict.
 
During the learning stage of contribution, the contributor works in isolation from the 
community to obtain a modified version of the code base and to implement enhancements 
that satisfy his/her own needs. Of course, communication could occur between different 
members of the core development team within the FLOSS community; however, we are 
interested in the behavior of potential contributors who have yet to be assimilated into the 
community. As a result, it is safe to assume that potential contributors have yet to under-
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stand the community norms or know to whom exactly they need to speak; thus, they are 
likely to work in isolation. Nevertheless, communicating with other community members 
during this stage might serve to lower the learning costs. The end product of this initial 
stage is a usable, enhanced version of the software (Shah, 2006; Ven and Mannaert, 2008) 
that might create technical conflict if merged with the community code base. However, 
since the developer of these changes is able to benefit from the software, there is no re-
quirement for him/her to coordinate with the community. For this reason, we assume that 
the cost to coordinate with other developers is not relevant in this stage.
 Even a proficient programmer will be faced with difficulty during the learning phase 
of contribution. While such individuals may have general programming knowledge, de-
veloping knowledge about a specific code base can be very challenging and time consum-
ing (Brooks, 1975; Lehman et al., 1997). Before developers can modify a code base, they 
need to acquire and assimilate knowledge that is specific to the FLOSS community’s 
code base, which is generally highly immobile in nature (cf. Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Attewell, 1992; Choudhury and Sampler, 1997). An example of such knowledge would 
be the detailed programming techniques used throughout a specific code base (Fichman 
and Kemerer, 1997). Understanding the unique data structures and assumptions about a 
community’s access conditions is another form of source-code-specific knowledge that is 
important, yet difficult, to acquire. If developers take such knowledge lightly, the soft-
ware is put in an undesirable state, especially if uninformed changes are made to the code 
base (Goetz et al., 2006). In addition, how the source code is organized into different files 
and how these files are brought together to work as a coherent system (Baldwin and 
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Clark, 2006) is also very important requisite knowledge needed by any developer who 
wishes to make changes to a code base. Developers incur cost by performing tasks neces-
sary to acquire this requisite knowledge, which involves reading the source code and 
documentation or communicating with knowledgeable individuals. 
The tasks necessary to gain knowledge in the learning stage can be viewed as knowl-
edge barriers that any developer needs to overcome when attempting to make a first con-
tribution to a FLOSS project. Once the requisite knowledge is obtained, the developer 
can reuse it for subsequent contributions to the same project. Such knowledge cannot be 
considered non-recurring, since a developer might be required to reacquire such knowl-
edge if enough time is spent away from the project. Given enough time, the general lay-
out of the source code and all of the assumptions embedded in the code will change, mak-
ing it difficult for the developer to contribute (Lehman et al., 1997).
The costs of the coordination stage differ from the earlier stage because the contribu-
tor is no longer working in isolation but interacts with other contributors and committers. 
The costs associated with the later steps involve coordinating the efforts of contributors 
working concurrently on the community code base (Malone and Crowston, 1994; Crow-
ston, 1997). Because committers need to approve and incorporate patches into the code 
base, their capacity to process information might limit the number of patches accepted by 
a community and, as a result, limit the number of contributors that complete a contribu-
tion transaction. For this study, we are interested in the costs incurred by contributors 
rather than the cost incurred by the community through the committers. As a result, we 
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will not focus on the committers in our theorizing or control for their effects in our meth-
ods10.
When working simultaneously on the same code base, developers might introduce or 
remove source code sections that carry assumptions with them that are poorly understood 
by other contributors or violate patches offered by new contributors (Collins-Sussman 
et al., 2004; Goetz et al., 2006). For example, consider if developer A contributes a patch 
that adds a code section that depends on the value of an earlier variable. Developer A 
makes the assumption that this value will remain constant at the time of execution. De-
veloper B contributes a patch that modifies the value of the variable on which developer 
A’s code depends, thereby violating the assumption developer A made and putting the 
software in an unstable state that might prove costly to fix. Another possibility is that de-
veloper B’s patch would remove the variable on which developer A’s code depends, 
thereby breaking the software altogether (See Table 2.3 for example). We refer to such 
problems introduced by mis-coordination as technical conflict, or simply conflict for 
short.
Table 2.3: Example of a technical conflict between developers A and B
Original Code Developer A Developer B
int x = getSomeValue()
if(x == CERTAIN_VALUE){
  /* do some work on x */
  //new value of x
  return x;
}
int x = getSomeValue()
if(x == CERTAIN_VALUE){
  /* do some work on x */
  
  StoreValueInDatabase(x);
  //new value of x
  return x; 
}
int radius = getSomeValue()
if(radius == CERTAIN_VALUE){
  /* do some work on radius 
*/
  //Which variable name
  //do we use?
  return newValue; 
}
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10 In study 2 of this dissertation, we take an information processing perspective to examine the relationship 
between the decision structure of the FLOSS community as represented by the committers, the characteris-
tics of the development task, and the development performance of a community. 
Since technical conflict results from mis-coordination, resolving it is a matter of en-
suring that both developers share the same knowledge (i.e., assumptions) about their con-
tributions. This involves initiating communication between the developers (Collins-
Sussman et  al., 2004; Malone and Crowston, 1994; Crowston, 1997) or reading the 
source code and documentation incorporated within the contributed patch. As with the 
initial stage, the costs in the later stage are also based on knowledge transfer and acquisi-
tion. Therefore, what stands between any developer and his/her participation in a FLOSS 
community are the coordination costs required to overcome knowledge barriers (Attew-
ell, 1992; Conner and Prahalad, 1996). As such, the main costs associated with contribu-
tion are those incurred by the developer to acquire the requisite source code knowledge 
and the cost of coordination with others to reconcile the technical conflicts that occur 
when making a contribution to a FLOSS community.
TCT (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) enhances our understanding of how 
knowledge-related costs influence a FLOSS community’s ability to attract contributors. 
TCT posits that rational transacting parties will choose the most efficient exchange ar-
rangement (i.e., market vs. hierarchy) to complete their transactions. Inefficiency is born 
out of transaction costs that increase the overall cost of the transaction. From a FLOSS 
developer’s perspective, the choice to participate in the FLOSS marketplace by means of 
a contribution transaction signals that this is the most efficient choice for that individual. 
That is, the cost to contribute a patch, including acquiring the requisite knowledge to do 
so, offers a higher return for that particular developer than any other available options.
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According to TCT, transaction costs are necessary for conducting an economic ex-
change but have no direct bearing on the production costs of the goods or services ex-
changed (Williamson, 1975). For a software developer, the production costs include the 
planning necessary to develop a solution and the time spent writing the code. These costs 
are associated with the direct effort involved in the software production that will result in 
a usable product. In software development, such costs are usually considered sunk since 
there is no marginal cost to reproduce another copy of the product (Baldwin and Clark, 
2006). Transaction costs are considered to be any additional costs beyond the production 
costs that are required to sell a software product to a customer (Williamson, 1975). In the 
case of the FLOSS marketplace, these would include the additional costs for preparing a 
patch for a specific FLOSS community (i.e., learning and coordination), which would be 
different if the same software was developed in a different context (e.g., within a software 
company or a different FLOSS community).
For example, if a software developer creates a database system, all of the effort that 
went into the creation of the standalone database product is considered a production cost. 
Any additional effort to adapt this product to embed it into a customer product or to con-
figure it for a customer are additional costs required in order to sell the product to a par-
ticular consumer. Since such configuration costs are incurred every time the product is 
sold to a new customer, they must be incurred before completing each of the sale transac-
tions to the customers, hence the term transaction costs. Similarly, in the FLOSS market-
place context, a software developer can develop a software feature as a standalone prod-
uct, which would be the production cost of that feature. What is key here is that no spe-
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cific adaptations are made to accommodate the requirements of a specific FLOSS project. 
If the developer wants to incorporate his/her feature into a specific FLOSS community 
code base, then the developer is first required to obtain the knowledge specific to the ex-
isting FLOSS community code base (i.e., learning cost) before the developed feature can 
integrated with that specific code base. This knowledge is considered above and beyond 
the requirements of production and is, therefore, considered a transaction cost. If the de-
veloper wanted to incorporate the same feature into a different FLOSS community, then 
he/she is again required to learn the knowledge specific to the new community’s code 
base and once more create a specific patch for it. Therefore, transaction costs are born 
from the effort expended by the developer during the learning stage of the contribution 
transaction.
In addition to acquiring the requisite code-base-specific knowledge, a developer can 
incur additional transaction costs from the need to coordinate efforts with other develop-
ers working simultaneously on the same code base. When a developer starts working on 
modifying a code base, other developers would have already committed numerous 
changes to it. These changes might affect the work of the developer and lead to a techni-
cal conflict, but the only way to know if and how a conflict can be resolved requires the 
developer to acquire knowledge that is specific to the changes made by other developers. 
There are numerous ways to coordinate the efforts of these developers. For example, they 
could communicate during development and exchange knowledge that would allow them 
to create compatible patches and avoid conflicts. However, since no one can be certain 
who is working on the code base at any one time, the most practical way to coordinate 
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efforts in FLOSS communities is to rely on a revision control system. A revision control 
system identifies the most obvious conflict related to an individual overwriting the work 
of others, and based on the system’s findings, the developers can communicate to con-
solidate the differences in their work (Collins-Sussman et  al., 2004). Other conflicts 
might not be as easy to discover and may manifest themselves as unpredictable behaviors 
in the software system (i.e., bugs). The effort expended by the FLOSS developers to read 
through others’ work and to communicate with one another to resolve technical conflicts 
is another source of transaction costs that also involves the transfer of immobile knowl-
edge between different developers.
After showing that the learning and coordination costs can be viewed as transaction 
costs related to contribution transactions, we can use TCT to understand the sources of 
these costs. According to TCT, transaction costs exist for two reasons: bounded rational-
ity and opportunism. Of these, we argue that only bounded rationality will be relevant in 
the FLOSS marketplace context. Bounded rationality implies that the participants in the 
marketplace have a limited ability to process information (Simon, 1955) and that transac-
tion costs arise from the efforts made by the participants in seeking, acquiring, and proc-
essing information that is necessary for the completion of a transaction (Williamson, 
1975). In the case of the FLOSS marketplace, transaction costs arise from the cost in-
curred by the developer to seek, acquire, assimilate, and use the knowledge that is unique 
to a FLOSS community’s code base, which involves information processing and commu-
nication (Turner and Makhija, 2006; Choudhury and Sampler, 1997). Therefore, develop-
ers will be limited in their ability to read source code or documentation, to seek and so-
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cialize with knowledgeable individuals, and to coordinate development efforts with other 
developers. Developers who lack sufficient time or the capacity to incur the cost of such 
activities will not be able to participate in a FLOSS project. Therefore, a FLOSS commu-
nity could reduce transaction costs if actions are taken to reduce the need for, or the cost 
associated with, the aforementioned information-processing activities performed by de-
velopers.
According to TCT, the other reason transaction costs exist is due to opportunism. Op-
portunism implies that there will be participants in the marketplace who will exploit any 
opportunity that is presented to them to gain higher returns, even if doing so is against the 
interest of others. This suggests that some market participants will avoid fulfilling con-
tract obligations if they can do so without facing negative consequences. Transaction 
costs are incurred when either party involved in the transaction expend effort to monitor 
and prevent opportunistic behavior by the other party. For opportunism to be relevant to 
our current study, it must impact the transaction costs incurred by the contributors.
 2.3.1  Opportunism in FLOSS
Academic literature on FLOSS identified two forms of opportunistic behavior: free-riding 
and commercial appropriation (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; O’Mahony, 2003). 
Free-riding is the act of using the software without contributing to its development, while 
commercial appropriation is the act of profiting from the software without compensating 
the developers for their effort. With regards to free-riding, developers choose to partici-
pate in a FLOSS community knowing beforehand what the FLOSS license entails; 
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namely, that FLOSS-licensed software does not place any restriction on usage, even if 
users choose to free-ride. Furthermore, free-riding behavior does not have any significant 
negative impact on either the community or its contributors because the software is a 
digital good and its value does not decrease nor do its costs increase with additional us-
age (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). 
As for commercial appropriation, the General Public License (GPL) was drafted spe-
cifically to prevent such behavior (O’Mahony, 2003). When an entity appropriates the 
effort of developers, a license violation occurs. Such violations, when addressed, are usu-
ally dealt with by the non-profit organization that oversees the interest of the community 
(O’Mahony, 2003). Hence, individual developers do not shoulder any of the burdens that 
could potentially deter them from contributing. In other words, we do not expect the cost 
associated with monitoring and preventing opportunistic behavior to have any significant 
impact on the decision or ability of FLOSS users to participate in the development effort. 
Appropriation might be a bigger issue when deciding to release a software package 
under a FLOSS license because a for-profit organization stands to lose all of its future 
income from directly selling the software (West, 2007). However, appropriation might be 
less of a concern for any organization considering contributing to an ongoing FLOSS ef-
fort by providing bug fixes and incremental feature enhancements. The cost of such ac-
tivities would be a negligible because the total development effort would be distributed 
amongst the community members. More importantly, the Open Source movement, as rep-
resented by the Open Source Initiative, approves of licenses that permit appropriation. 
Permissive licenses, as they have come to be known, entice commercial participation be-
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cause they tie the success of the commercial entity with the success of the FLOSS com-
munity (AlMarzouq et al., 2005). Empirical evidence suggests that FLOSS communities 
that use permissive licenses (i.e., licenses other than the GPL) have increased contribu-
tions and sponsorship from for-profit organizations (Stewart et al., 2006).
We are not trying to argue that opportunism does not exist in the FLOSS context; on 
the contrary, the need for FLOSS licenses and the existence of non-profit organizations to 
look after the best interests of FLOSS communities suggests that it exists (von Hippel and 
von Krogh, 2003; O’Mahony, 2003). What we are arguing, however, is that opportunism 
will not be a significant force on a user’s decision to make a source code contribution to 
an already established and active FLOSS project. In support of our argument, consider 
the main factor that gives rise to opportunism-based transaction costs, namely asset 
specificity (Williamson, 1975; Clemons and Hitt, 2004). When a transacting party makes 
an investment that is valuable only as part of a specific transaction, the other transacting 
party is the only entity that would be able to take advantage of the situation. As a result, 
transaction costs arise from the need to monitor and prevent transacting parties from tak-
ing advantage of one another.
In the FLOSS marketplace context, when a developer makes a contribution, the com-
munity has no way of forcibly (i.e. control) extracting any benefits from a contributor be-
yond what the contributor offers willingly. More importantly, when the software is li-
censed as FLOSS, a contributor is guaranteed to benefit from the software in the future; 
therefore, no entity can hold any contributor hostage to his work by threatening to pre-
vent him/her from benefiting from the software. Should such a situation occur, the con-
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tributor could simply fork11  the source code or switch to another project. Finally, the par-
ties involved in the contribution transaction (i.e., the FLOSS community and the con-
tributor) have congruent goals, which mitigates the need to monitor opportunistic behav-
ior (Ouchi, 1980; Clemons et al., 1993). The goals of the community and the contributor 
are congruent because the community relies on contributions, and the contributor, as a 
user, would like to see the software improved and maintained. This symbiotic relationship 
enables both parties to benefit from the act of contribution. Therefore, we conclude that 
opportunism-based transaction costs are not significant in the FLOSS marketplace con-
text.
Although opportunism is not relevant to understanding users’ contributions to FLOSS, 
it does not mean that TCT is inappropriate for understanding contributions in the FLOSS 
marketplace, as transaction costs can and do exist in the absence of opportunism (Conner 
and Prahalad, 1996). According to Clemons et al. (1993), coordination costs and transac-
tion risks are the two main dimensions of transaction costs. Coordination costs are costs 
born out of the bounded rationality condition, and transaction risks are costs associated 
with mitigating the opportunistic behavior of the other party in an exchange. Therefore, 
transaction costs in the FLOSS marketplace are purely coordination costs, which Clem-
ons et  al. (1993) define in the most liberal form to encompass all costs born out of 
bounded rationality. In our case, these costs include those related to acquiring the requi-
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11 Forking occurs when a developer makes a copy of a source code and starts a new development branch. 
Every developer forks the community's source code before developing a feature that is eventually contrib-
uted to the community. Forking can also occur at the community level when members disagree on funda-
mental issues. The result is that the community is split with each half working on a different copy of the 
original code base.
site development knowledge and coordination with other developers. This idea is consis-
tent with our view that the costs associated with a contribution transaction are knowledge 
based, requiring information-processing efforts on behalf of the developers. We will clar-
ify the details of TCT further in the subsequent section as we identify the causes of trans-
action costs in the FLOSS context. Thus far, we have explained how contribution transac-
tion costs are mostly knowledge and coordination based (Kogut and Zander, 1996). As a 
result, it will be important to understand the characteristics of knowledge that are related 
to the effort expended by individuals to learn and coordinate (Grant, 1996b).
2.4  Community-Level Antecedents to Cost
After establishing that transaction costs in the FLOSS marketplace are knowledge based 
and born out of bounded rationality, it becomes important to understand the characteris-
tics of the requisite development knowledge and how it might impact the cost of contri-
bution. Doing so allows us to understand how a community could manage source-code-
related knowledge in order to minimize the transaction costs incurred by its developers. 
We follow the classification proposed by Turner and Makhija (2006), which is based on 
an extensive review of knowledge management literature. This classification states that 
the main observable dimensions of knowledge are codifiability, completeness, and diver-
sity. We also work under the assumption that the source code that resides in a FLOSS 
community is an explicit form of the knowledge required for development and that the 
characteristics of this knowledge can be observed from the source code. In the following 
section, we will use TCT to explain how the dimensions of knowledge relate to transac-
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tion costs, and we will identify the salient community-level characteristics that could im-
pact developer-level transaction costs (See Figure 2.3 and Table 2.4 for an overview).
Figure 2.3: Overview of research model
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Table 2.4: Overview of theoretical constructs
Construct Definition
Sustainability of FLOSS 
Community
The ability of the FLOSS community to continue to main-
tain the development effort over time by effectively convert-
ing users to developers.
Knowledge Codifiability The extent to which the development-related source code knowledge is articulated, unambiguous, and observable.
Knowledge Complete-
ness
The degree to which the available knowledge for the soft-
ware development task is entirely sufficient to predict the 
behavior of the software system after modification.
Knowledge Diversity: 
Amount
The number of distinct knowledge domains from which the 
requisite development knowledge to contribute to a FLOSS 
community draws.
Knowledge Diversity: 
Relatedness
The extent to which the different knowledge domains from 
which the requisite development knowledge of a FLOSS 
community draws are related.
 
2.4.1  Sustainability
Sustainability, the endogenous variable of this study, is defined as a FLOSS community’s 
ability to continue to maintain the development effort over time by effectively converting 
users to developers. As explained in Sec. 2.2.2, we expect that FLOSS communities with 
low contribution transaction costs will observe greater numbers of new contributors as 
compared to communities with high transaction costs. We attribute this tendency to a 
greater proportion of potential contributors that see contribution as a rational choice rela-
tive to free-riding. Since the complexity of software and contribution transaction costs are 
expected to increase over time (Lehman et al., 1997), we argue that communities are able 
to increase the number of new contributors over time if they are able to maintain low, or 
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lower, contribution transaction costs. We summarize how the main constructs impact the 
components of contribution costs (i.e., learning and coordination costs) in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Antecedents to coordination costs
Construct Learning Cost Coordination Cost
Knowledge 
Codifiability
Reduce effort in comprehending 
the source code by making explicit 
knowledge that is important to 
comprehend the source code.
Knowledge 
Completeness
Incomplete knowledge (i.e., uncer-
tain) is a result of the dynamic na-
ture of the code base and will re-
quire contributors to expend addi-
tional effort at time of committal 
to comprehend changes made 
since that last source code check-
out was performed.
When committing to a dynamic 
code base, a contributor might 
break the work of others that has 
already been committed and will 
require coordination with these 
community members to resolve 
any incompatibilities with the con-
tributed patch.
Knowledge 
Diversity: 
Amount
To work on an isolated program-
ming unit of the code base (i.e., 
module), a contributor needs to at 
least understand how this module 
interacts with other modules in the 
code base. The effort to acquire 
such knowledge grows with the 
number of modules in the code 
base.
Knowledge 
Diversity: Re-
latedness
Comprehending larger modules 
that result from highly related 
knowledge will require greater ef-
fort from contributor.
Working on larger modules that 
result from highly related knowl-
edge is likely to result in the need 
of one or more developers to work 
on the same modules and result in 
technical conflict.
2.4.2  Knowledge Codifiability
Knowledge codifiability refers to the extent to which knowledge can be articulated into 
indisputable, unambiguous, and observable information (Kogut and Zander, 1992). 
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Highly codifiable knowledge is referred to as explicit knowledge (Zander and Kogut, 
1995; Turner and Makhija, 2006) and can be transferred easily between individuals with-
out losing meaning (Grant, 1996b, 1996a). Non-codifiable knowledge, referred to as tacit 
knowledge (Turner and Makhija, 2006), is more difficult to transfer between individuals, 
as it is difficult to articulate and requires extensive communication amongst individuals 
before it can be transferred between them (Alavi and Leidner, 2001).
 An important aspect of any FLOSS code base is the amount of documentation that 
resides within it. These comments are a codified form of the tacit knowledge that resides 
in the minds of the developers. Such knowledge could include assumptions about vari-
able access rules that source code might not clearly convey. Since such knowledge is only 
useful for a specific project, it is considered asset specific, meaning that it is of no value 
outside that specific project (Williamson, 1975). 
Maintaining source-code-related knowledge in a tacit form (i.e., in the minds of de-
velopers) would make the transfer of such knowledge expensive (Zander and Kogut, 
1995; Grant, 1996a). This type of specificity is referred to as human-asset specificity be-
cause the knowledge is specific to the individual who obtains it (Williamson, 1975; Ma-
lone et al., 1987). Communicating such knowledge requires significant investments from 
developers, which could involve time and effort searching for and socializing with other 
community developers to share and acquire the requisite development knowledge. Since 
the knowledge obtained is specific to the FLOSS project, most of it will be useless for 
developers in other projects, which would make it difficult for many developers to justify 
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expending the effort to obtain this specific knowledge when the effort needed to acquire it 
is significant.
When a FLOSS community expends the effort and codifies this knowledge by embed-
ding it as comments within the code base, the knowledge becomes easier to communi-
cate. It is no longer specific to certain individuals; rather, any individual has the ability to 
obtain it simply by reading the documentation. Knowledge in its explicit form as docu-
mentation12 becomes easily searchable and transferrable. Even though this knowledge is 
still specific to the FLOSS code base, it is now less human specific and much easier to 
obtain and comprehend by more developers than when it was in a tacit form. This, in 
turn, reduces the amount of transaction costs incurred by developers wanting to obtain 
this knowledge. Therefore, we conclude that communities that expend greater efforts in 
documenting the code base will reduce transaction costs related to contribution, thereby 
gaining a greater number of new contributors over time. As such,
H 1 The extent to which source-code-related knowledge for a FLOSS community is codi-
fied will be positively related to the sustainability of that community. 
2.4.3  Knowledge Completeness
Knowledge completeness is defined as whether the available knowledge for decision 
making or task completion is entirely sufficient (Turner and Makhija, 2006). It is consid-
ered the mirror image (i.e. opposite) of knowledge uncertainty, which is defined as the 
unpredictability in the knowledge that is a result of its dynamic nature (Turner and Ma-
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12 We use the terms documentation and comments interchangeably.
khija, 2006). The outcome of any task in which the individual performing the task pos-
sesses complete knowledge about it becomes predictable. For example, a manufacturing 
worker that is required to tighten a specific screw on a product need only know how to 
use a screwdriver and which screw to work on. This task is simple and requires limited 
knowledge to perform, which makes it easy for the worker to know everything there is 
about tightening that specific screw for that specific task. The worker will always know 
what happens when the screw is tightened, which makes the outcome of the task highly 
predictable.
On the other hand, when the knowledge available to an individual performing a task is 
not complete, the outcome of the task becomes unpredictable. Knowledge associated with 
software development tasks are considered incomplete because developed software usu-
ally behaves unpredictably. While the developer might have honestly attempted to de-
velop software to meet certain specifications, the nature of software development intro-
duces many uncertainties that might break the software that the developer may not have 
accounted for. For example, a developer might produce software that works perfectly in 
the development environment and on a specific hardware configuration. However, once 
this software is released commercially, the developer may start receiving complaints from 
customers that the software does not work on their particular hardware configurations. 
Although the developer might know how to deal with such problems once they arise, at 
the time of software development, the developer did not think that the customers’ hard-
ware configurations would matter. Thus, the developers’ knowledge was incomplete, and 
the outcome of the task was unpredictable.
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In the FLOSS marketplace context, the developers are boundedly rational and have no 
way of knowing what any other developer is doing until a conflict arises. As described in 
Sec. 2.2.3, contributors who have not absorbed the norms of the community are not able 
to communicate or coordinate development activities as effectively with other members. 
This uncertainty gives rise to technical conflicts (e.g., developers overwrite the work of 
one another) that need to be resolved before a patch can be fully committed to the code 
base (Collins-Sussman et al., 2004). Therefore, developers who do not possess the com-
plete knowledge that allows them to finish their development task with certainty will be 
required to expend additional effort in examining the contribution logs to understand 
what other developers have done and to communicate with them to resolve any technical 
conflicts. This leads us to conclude that there is a transaction cost associated with every 
contribution transaction due to a lack of complete knowledge, which requires a developer 
to expend extra effort before a patch can be fully committed.
According to TCT, uncertainty is a primary cause of transaction costs (Williamson, 
1975). In the absence of opportunism, unforeseen changes in the environment that are 
born out of uncertainty can lead to honest disagreement between transacting parties who 
are boundedly rational since each of them would possess incomplete, but different, 
knowledge. The effort expended from the two parties to acquire more complete knowl-
edge in order to reach an agreement is the main source of transaction cost (Conner and 
Prahalad, 1996). Similarly, technical conflict in a FLOSS community could occur be-
tween two developers when they do not have complete knowledge about what each de-
veloper is doing. Therefore, to reduce the transaction costs incurred by developers from 
78
the occurrence of technical conflicts, a FLOSS community should design its code base 
such that the outcomes of development tasks are more predictable, thereby reducing the 
chance of technical conflicts.
Designing the code base to be modular is one approach to reducing the uncertainty 
associated with developing a code base and to reducing technical conflict (Baldwin and 
Clark, 2000; Tiwana, 2008). A software system is said to exhibit modularity if its parts 
can be developed independently of one another but still work well together as a whole 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2006). This approach entails limited dependency between parts (i.e., 
loose coupling) and a high level of dependency between the components that comprise a 
single part (i.e., cohesion) (MacCormack et al., 2006). 
Making changes to modular code bases is inherently less certain because side effects 
are usually isolated to the modified module (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Jackson, 2006). In 
addition, modular code bases reduce the cognitive burden on developers, since develop-
ers will not be required to comprehend the complexities of implementation of modules 
that are not relevant to their needs (Jackson, 2006; Darcy et al., 2005). Finally, modular-
ity allows different developers to work in parallel on different modules and be able to 
easily integrate their work together with out the need to know what other developers are 
working on (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Tiwana, 2008). 
Modular structures bring about these benefits by maximizingwithin modules and depend-
encies between modules (Darcy et al., 2005; MacCormack et al., 2006). 
What is critical to obtain the benefits of modularity is that the structure of the code 
base (i.e. dependencies) needs to remain consistent. With a stable structure developers 
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can work on specific modules knowing that if they do not change the way in which the 
module interacts with other modules, their modifications will continue to work once inte-
grated with the main code base (Darcy et al., 2005). Such stability is said to convey more 
complete knowledge to developers because the developer can be certain that his/her work 
will continue to work after changes are completed. Stability in the FLOSS context would 
mean that by the time a contributor prepares his/her patch, it is likely that no additional 
effort is needed to integrate the patch to the community code base. As such, the source 
code is said to convey complete development knowledge when it is checked out by the 
contributor.
On the other hand, if the code base of a FLOSS community was highly dynamic, then 
the community code base is likely to mutate significantly in the from the time a copy of 
the code base is checked out by a contributor to the time a patch is submitted for commit-
tal. To integrate such a patch, the contributor is required to exert extra effort to compre-
hend what changes were made to the community code base and how to modify the patch 
to work with such changes. Such code base is said to convey highly uncertain knowledge 
(i.e., incomplete) when it is checked out by the contributor (Turner and Makhija, 2006). 
Therefore,
H 2 The extent to which source-code-related knowledge for a FLOSS community is com-
plete will be positively related to the sustainability of that community. 
2.4.4  Knowledge Diversity
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Knowledge diversity is defined as the amount and relatedness of the knowledge required 
to complete a software development task that is equivalent in functionality to what cur-
rently resides in the FLOSS community (Turner and Makhija, 2006). According to Turner 
and Makhija (2006), diverse knowledge overlaps with the notion of complex knowledge 
as described by Zander and Kogut (1995) but goes further to incorporate the notion of 
relatedness. Knowledge amount refers to the number of distinct knowledge domains from 
which knowledge draws, whereas relatedness refers to how difficult it is to decompose 
knowledge into independent parts. Knowledge that is highly related resides entirely in the 
mind of a single individual, while the parts of highly unrelated knowledge could be dis-
persed over the minds of numerous individuals (Galunic and Rodan, 1998). Turner and 
Makhija (2006) argue that the notions of relatedness and amount are highly interrelated 
and difficult to separate because knowledge drawing from a larger body of knowledge is 
also likely to be unrelated. Nevertheless, we believe that each dimension of knowledge 
diversity (i.e., amount and relatedness) will have its own unique impact on the cost to 
contribute to a FLOSS community as we shall explain in the next section. Therefore, we 
will discuss the impact of the dimensions of knowledge diversity on the sustainability of 
a FLOSS community independently.
Knowledge Amount
We define knowledge amount as the number of distinct knowledge domains from which 
the requisite development knowledge to contribute to a FLOSS community draws. De-
velopment tasks that draw from a broad base of functional domains are referred to as 
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complex tasks (Zander and Kogut, 1995). Simple and highly specialized tasks will draw 
from a narrow body of highly related knowledge and will require little effort to complete 
(Grant, 1996a). Given that a source code is an explicit form the requisite development 
knowledge, the complexity of the software product will reflect the complexity of the de-
velopment task.
In the FLOSS marketplace context, the development of complex products will not 
only require understanding general programming principles, but depending on how gen-
eral the software product is, developers might also need to draw on knowledge from dif-
ferent disciplines. An Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system serves as a good ex-
ample of a general software system that draws from a broad and complex knowledge 
base. In addition to understanding how to build robust software systems, developers need 
to draw on knowledge from other disciplines, such as accounting and resource manage-
ment, in order to build an ERP system. There is also the possibility of needing to imple-
ment knowledge about different programming languages to integrate an ERP with 
COBOL-based legacy systems. A more specific software system, such as a text editor, 
will draw from a much narrower and simpler knowledge base. Internalizing the highly 
diverse knowledge required for the development of complex software products will be 
impossible for a single developer to do (Grant, 1996a) and will be a formidable task even 
for a group of developers.
Well designed code bases, as generally found in FLOSS projects (MacCormack et al., 
2006), could reduce the cognitive burden on developers and only require them to com-
prehend a subset of the code base (Baldwin and Clark, 2006) by encapsulating (i.e. 
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grouping) the code of related functionality into independent parts (i.e. modules) (Page-
Jones, 1998; Darcy et al., 2005). However, as we have explained in Section 2.2.4.3, de-
velopers still need to obtain a high level understanding of the interplay between the indi-
vidual parts of the software system and how they might relate to the part they are working 
on before they can modify it (Darcy et al., 2005). Doing so, however, becomes more dif-
ficult as the software continues to grow and draw from an even greater number of knowl-
edge domains (Lehman et al., 1997). The effort required to reach an understanding that 
would allow a potential contributor to make a modification to the code base will increase 
as the number of individual parts that comprise the software increase. As a result, poten-
tial contributors are required to invest more upfront effort before making their initial con-
tributions, as the requisite development knowledge amount increases. Therefore, we ex-
pect knowledge amount to have a negative relationship with the sustainability of a 
FLOSS community. Hence,
H 3 The amount of source-code-related knowledge that exists in a FLOSS community is 
negatively related to the sustainability of that community. 
Knowledge relatedness
While we have discussed in Section 2.2.4.3 numerous benefits that are a direct result of 
modularity, such as the reduction of development uncertainty (Tiwana, 2008) and ena-
bling parallel development (Baldwin and Clark, 2006), these benefits are mostly a result 
of the loose coupling of the modules that comprise the code base. In regards to knowl-
edge relatedness, we would like to get at the effort associated with comprehending a sin-
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gle cohesive module (Darcy et al., 2005). Highly modular code bases may be equivalent 
in terms of the number of modules and the degree of coupling between modules; how-
ever, they could vary greatly in terms of the size of each individual module (See Appen-
dix A for a clear delineation of the modularity-related constructs in our study.) We attrib-
ute this variability in size to the relatedness of the underlying knowledge.
Knowledge relatedness refers to the extent to which the different knowledge domains 
from which the requisite development knowledge draws are related. When the requisite 
knowledge is highly related, it must be wholly comprehended in the mind of a single in-
dividual (Galunic and Rodan, 1998). However, if the development knowledge is highly 
unrelated, it can be easily decomposed into independent parts that different individuals 
are able to comprehend, thereby making it possible for different individuals to work on 
relevant parts of the source code independently. Assuming that the source code is an ex-
plicit form of knowledge and that FLOSS communities are effective in designing the 
source code to reflect the underlying knowledge, then highly unrelated knowledge will 
result in modules that encapsulate functionality that draws from a single domain. As re-
latedness increases, these modules will draw from a greater number of related domains 
and result in larger modules (Darcy et al., 2005).
The increased module sizes will also have a negative impact on coordination costs as 
the encapsulation of multiple functionalities will likely create the needs for multiple de-
velopers to work on the same module. As a result, a greater need for coordination arises 
whenever contributors are required to work on the same module (Crowston, 1997). The 
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increase in coordination effort contributes to the overall increase in contribution costs and 
thus negatively relates to sustainability.
When there are two code bases equivalent in modularity and amount of knowledge but 
one code base has larger modules than the other due to higher knowledge relatedness, 
new contributors are likely to expend less effort contributing to the code base with the 
smaller modules. Assuming that the contributor needs to comprehend the underlying 
knowledge of only a single module to make a contribution, the effort needed for the 
smaller module will be less difficult to acquire than for the larger one. The same could 
also be said of the need for coordination, as larger modules encapsulated a greater num-
ber of functionality will create the need for contributors to work on the same module and 
result in greater coordination effort. As a result, we expect knowledge relatedness to in-
crease contribution costs because it increases the size of modules in the code base that 
has an adverse effect on both coordination and learning costs. Hence,
H 4 The relatedness of source-code-related knowledge that exists in a FLOSS community 
is negatively related to the sustainability of that community. 
3  Methodology
3.1  Sample
Prior studies on FLOSS chose their sample from the projects listed on sourceforge.net 
since it was the most accessible data (e.g. Krishnamurthy, 2002; Crowston and Howison, 
2005; Stewart et al., 2006; Liu and Iyer, 2007; Midha, 2008). However, such data is not 
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fit to test our theory given that many projects listed on sourcefore.net are not popular or 
actively being developed (Krishnamurthy, 2002). Because we assume that the FLOSS 
projects to which our theory applies have inherent value to the users which could result in 
contribution, we limit our sample to include successful FLOSS projects that have proven 
their worth. However, we needed to take care when selecting observations from this sam-
ple, as we did not want to include inactive projects, either from lack of interest or matur-
ity, as this might bias our results since such projects will not have new contributors re-
gardless of the variation in our hypothesized effects. In addition, since the act of partici-
pation requires the project to be known, projects that are popular are likely to attract more 
users and contributors. Therefore, we needed to select FLOSS projects that were equally 
popular, or we needed to be able to assess and control for the popularity of the projects 
we chose for our sample. 
Ohloh.net met the requirements that we placed on our sample. With more than 
275,000 listed projects, it offered the best representative sample of the FLOSS popula-
tion. Unlike sourceforge.net, which provides data for only projects that it hosts, ohloh.net 
covers projects hosted independently or those hosted by services like sourceforge.net. In 
addition, Ohloh.net provides a meta-community of developers that self report usage and 
contribution, which can be used as a means of estimating the popularity of the projects.
To test our hypotheses (see Figure 2.3), we sampled from the top 1000 most popular 
FLOSS projects listed on ohloh.net that enjoyed active development between the begin-
ning of January 2007 and the end of June 2009. Of these projects, we found only 22% to 
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be hosted on sourceforge.net, confirming our claim that ohloh.net offers a more represen-
tative sample of popular FLOSS projects. 
Because it was impractical to analyze all of the projects in the top 1000 and to maxi-
mize the external validity of the empirical findings from our sample, we opted to analyze 
projects that use one of the three most popular programming languages in FLOSS devel-
opment: C, C++, and Python. Between them, these programming languages were used by 
over 18% of all of the listed projects on ohloh.net and by 47% of the projects in our sam-
ple frame. Furthermore, given the fact that Python is a dynamically typed scripted lan-
guage and that C and C++  are statically typed compiled languages, we believe that we 
have a good representation of the most widely used programming paradigms within 
FLOSS communities. 
We excluded from our sample meta-projects that included more than a single project, 
such as the Gnome and KDE projects. However, we analyzed projects under these com-
munities if they were popular enough to be listed independently in the top 1000 projects 
on ohloh.net. From our sample frame, we identified 289 potential projects to analyze, 
which represented 28.9% of the top 1000 projects. Once our sample was identified, we 
proceeded to download the source code repository for the projects on which we per-
formed our analysis. There were however five projects that were impractical to analyze 
using our methods given their extremely large code bases and were, therefore, excluded. 
In addition, a number of projects had incomplete development history or missing values 
for the variables used in our study, which is why we ended up with a total sample size of 
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235 projects. Below is a summarization of the steps we took to obtain and analyze our 
sample:
1.	
 Download list of top 1000 projects listed on ohloh.net to ensure we analyze valu-
able and popular FLOSS projects. 
2.	
 Download source code repositories for C-, C++-, and Python-based discrete 
FLOSS projects. 
3.	
 Extract quarterly data points for variables listed in Table 2.6. 
4.	
 Screen the data for missing values and periods of inactivity that could bias our re-
sults. 
5.	
 Prepare data. 
6. Perform statistical analysis. 
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Table 2.6: Variable operationalizations
Construct Definition Operational Defini-tion Operationalization
 Sustainabil-
ity
The ability of the 
FLOSS community to 
effectively convert 
users to contributors 
in order to maintain 
the development ef-
fort over time.
The number of new 
unique contributors 
to the FLOSS pro-
ject.
Estimated as the count 
of new individuals join-
ing the development ef-
fort identified from the 
revision control system 
during the analysis pe-
riod without reference to 
the contributors in the 
previous periods 
(Midha, 2008).
Knowledge 
Codifiability
The extent to which 
development-related 
source code knowl-
edge is articulated, 
unambiguous, and 
observable.
The extent to which 
the source code base 
is documented.
Estimated as the line 
count of documentation 
in the source code as a 
ratio of source lines of 
code for the beginning 
of the analysis period 
(Zander and Kogut, 
1995).
Knowledge 
Completeness
The degree to which 
the available knowl-
edge for the software 
development task is 
entirely sufficient to 
predict the behavior 
of the software sys-
tem after modifica-
tion.
The magnitude of 
change in the struc-
ture of the code base.
The change in graph 
modularity measure 
(Newman and Girvan, 
2004; Newman, 2006b) 
that results from parti-
tioning the source code 
dependency graph using 
the leading eigen-vector 
method (Newman and 
Girvan, 2004; Newman, 
2006a) for the beginning 
of the analysis period.
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Knowledge 
Diversity: 
Amount
The number of dis-
tinct knowledge do-
mains from which the 
requisite development 
knowledge to contrib-
ute to a FLOSS com-
munity draws.
The number of 
unique modules in 
the code base.
Estimated as the count 
of modules identified by 
the leading eigen-vector 
method for the begin-
ning of the analysis pe-
riod (Newman and Gir-
van, 2004; Newman, 
2006a).
Knowledge 
Diversity: 
Relatedness
The extent to which 
the different knowl-
edge domains from 
which the requisite 
development knowl-
edge of a FLOSS 
community draws are 
related.
The increase in aver-
age module size as a 
result of having high 
knowledge related-
ness.
Estimated as the count 
of source code lines for 
the beginning of the 
analysis period as a ratio 
of number of modules 
(Darcy et al, 2005).
 
3.2  Variables
Since our theory involves learning processes in which new developers overcome knowl-
edge barriers to become contributors, we expect time to play an important factor (Attew-
ell, 1992). Once our project sample was identified, we obtained quarterly observations for 
our variables between January 2007 and June 2009. Since some of the projects were 
started after January -2007, we had an unequal number of observations per project. We 
excluded from each project the first observation because we used it as a reference for 
subsequent observations to determine the value of some of the variables. In addition, the 
last observation from each project was discarded because some of the variables were 
based on the difference between the value of current and subsequent periods. In total, we 
had 1832 total observations. Table 2.7 gives some descriptive statistics about the projects 
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we analyzed. As can be seen, the quarterly observations suggest that the projects in our 
sample were actively developed and having at least a single patch commit performed per 
quarter. Since our subsequent analysis also suggests that there is no significant effect for 
the age of the project, we can safely assume that our results are not impacted by inactivity 
due to maturity.
Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics for project sample
Median Mean STD
AgeIn weeks relative 
to 1-1-2007 4 5.64 48.7
Popularity 57.5 192.1 447.71
CommittersCount 
per quarter 5 10.84 14.489
Contributor-
scount per quarter 8 16.29 26.786
Commitscount per 
quarter 116 289.2 456.656
 
3.2.1  Sustainability
Content Validity
 Sustainability is defined as a FLOSS community’s ability to effectively convert users to 
contributors in order to maintain development efforts. Since FLOSS developers do not 
remain with the community indefinitely, sustainability will center on a community’s abil-
ity to attract new contributing members. In our sample, new contributors can be identified 
from the log messages in the revision control system of the FLOSS community. The revi-
sion control system keeps track of all of the commits made to the community code base 
91
and associates every commit to a committer. Identifying the contributors is a matter of 
parsing the log message prepared by a committer for any indication that the patch was 
contributed from someone else, such as a name, pseudo-name13, or email. Individuals 
with no references to them as contributors or committers in prior log messages are con-
sidered to be new contributors.
Procedure
 Given how complex the procedure was, we provide a high-level summary of the main 
steps we performed to extract the number of new contributors and offer a more detailed 
description in Appendix B: 
1.	
 Extract contributor names for projects that list names in log messages: 
(a)	
Perform manual extraction of names for randomly selected sample. 
(b)	
Perform automated extraction for the same sample as the manually extracted 
sample. 
(c)	
Assess Inter Class Correlation (ICC) (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979) between 
manual and automated name extraction results and optimize automated proc-
ess for increased reliability (ICC = 0.92). 
2.	
 Extract contributor names for projects that list contributor names in project tracker:
(a)	
Extract ticket numbers from log messages. 
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13 A pseudo-name is a name used to identify an individual that is not his/her real name. Internet users use 
such names to maintain anonymity or make it more convenient for them or others to type or remember their 
names.
(b)	
Parse ticket webpage and extract name of contributor and the contribution 
date. 
3.	
 Clean names by removing any extracted value that does not represent name, 
pseudo-name, or email. 
4.	
 Normalize names such that misspelled names and related names refer to a single 
individual. 
5.	
 For each analysis period, count new normalized names having no reference to them 
in prior analysis periods as a single new contributor. 
3.2.2  Knowledge Codifiability
Content Validity
 We defined knowledge codifiability in Sec.   2.2.4.2 as the extent to which the 
development-related source code knowledge is articulated, unambiguous, and observable. 
The source code itself is a form of codified knowledge; however, a develop cannot inter-
nalize this without obtaining certain requisite knowledge (Grant, 1996a; Fichman and 
Kemerer, 1997). For example, there might be some assumptions about data structure ac-
cess or organizational conventions that, if violated, would render the source code unsta-
ble. Such information can be embedded as documentation in the source code, which 
would be considered an explicit form of the requisite knowledge needed for development. 
Such documentation could also include explanations for some of the source code that de-
velopers could reference when they need to.
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Procedure
To get an indication of the extent to which requisite knowledge was codified, we counted 
the lines of code comments that were available for the developers. We used the ratio of 
lines of comments to lines of source code as an estimate of the extent to which the 
development-related source code knowledge is codified. We obtained this estimate for the 
beginning of the analysis period (i.e., the estimate was obtained by analyzing the source 
code from the commit that occurred closest to and after the first day of the quarter to be 
analyzed).
3.2.3  Knowledge Completeness
Content Validity
As mentioned in Sec. 2.2.4.3, knowledge completeness refers to whether the available 
knowledge for the software development task is entirely sufficient to predict the behavior 
of the software system after modifications. Thus, it seems likely that tasks that are highly 
uncertain would not have enough available knowledge to complete them. For FLOSS 
software development, this not only involves the knowledge to develop the software but 
also the knowledge to determine that the software is fit for use after a change is made 
(i.e., that the change will not introduce a bug or break the system). When the develop-
ment task is highly uncertain, the developer may be unclear as to whether the software 
will behave in a predictable manner after a change is made or whether conflict will occur 
with other developers when a commit is made. Such uncertainty arises because other de-
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velopers would have committed changes that the developer would not know of until he/
she attempts to commit his changes.
We also explained in Sec. 2.2.4.3 how a modular software structure could reduce the 
uncertainty related to the development process by limiting the dependencies between 
modules, thereby enabling parallel development by contributors (Baldwin and Clark, 
2006) and reducing the maintenance cost of any introduced bugs (Page-Jones, 1998). In 
addition, similar functionality is encapsulated into modules that reduce the cognitive bur-
den on potential contributors to acquire complete knowledge. We mentioned also that 
these benefits are contingent upon the stability of the source code structure (Darcy et al., 
2005). Given that the software is an explicit form of the requisite development knowl-
edge, we argue that the degree to which development knowledge is incomplete or uncer-
tain could be estimated by the magnitude of change in modularity of the code base.
Procedure
 The process in which we obtained a modularity measure is summarized below: 
1.	
 Extract dependency graph of source code between source files. 
2.	
 Perform leading eigen-vector method partitioning that maximizes modularity (See 
Appendix C). 
3.	
 Extract the modularity measure from the partitioned graph along with the number 
of modules. 
We extracted the modularity value for both the beginning and end of the analysis period 
and used the difference to estimate the change in the structure of the code base, which we 
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then used as a proxy for knowledge completeness. Since change in modularity measure 
can be either positive or negative, then the magnitude of change will be smallest close 
zero and highest close to the maximum and minimum values. As such, knowledge com-
pleteness will be highest for low magnitudes of change whereas it will be lowest for high 
magnitudes of change. Because we are interested in the effect of the magnitude of change 
in modularity and hypothesizing that the effect of low magnitudes of change differ from 
that of higher magnitudes, then it is best to  test for this effect using non-linear terms. 
Specifically, it is best tested using a cubic effects because it can capture the effect of posi-
tive change in magnitude independently of negative change.
3.2.4  Knowledge Diversity: Amount
Content Validity
According to our discussion in Sec. 2.2.4.4, knowledge amount refers to the number of 
distinct knowledge domains from which the requisite development knowledge to contrib-
ute to a FLOSS community draws. Given that software is an explicit form of this knowl-
edge, we could determine its amount by identifying the number of unique modules in the 
code base. Assuming FLOSS communities are effective in modularizing source code, 
which they are (MacCormack et al., 2006), the result is that highly related programming 
tasks are grouped in a single cohesive module (Page-Jones, 1998). The functionality 
within a cohesive module will draw from the same body of knowledge. This knowledge 
will differ from the knowledge contained in other modules. Therefore, we argue that 
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knowledge amount could be estimated using the number of cohesive functional units (i.e., 
modules) in the code base. 
Procedure
Since the leading eigen-vector method (See Section 2.3.2.3) identifies modules by maxi-
mizing cohesion and minimizing coupling, we used the number of identified modules 
from this method at the beginning of the analysis period as an estimate for the amount of 
requisite development knowledge.
3.2.5  Knowledge Diversity: Relatedness
Content Validity
According to our discussion in Sec. 2.2.4.4, knowledge relatedness refers to the extent to 
which the different knowledge domains from which the requisite development knowledge 
of a FLOSS community draws are related. Related knowledge is difficult to split and 
must be absorbed as a whole into an individual’s mind in order to be of use (Galunic and 
Rodan 1998). When knowledge is highly unrelated, the different knowledge domain can 
easily be identified, and the modules of the code base clearly reflect them. As knowledge 
relatedness increases, knowledge from different domains becomes more difficult to dis-
tinguish or separate. As a result, the modules reflecting such knowledge would draw from 
more knowledge domains, resulting in larger source code modules.
Procedure
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Once the number of modules using the leading eigen-vector method (See Section 2.3.2.3) 
is identified, we divided the total lines of source code by it. The result is the average size 
of the module measured in source lines of code.
3.3  Controls
3.3.1  Number of Committers
Seeking and finding the right knowledge is an important step in knowledge acquisition 
(Alavi and Leidner, 2001). Whether this knowledge is tacit or codified, finding knowl-
edge that is relevant to a developer’s needs might prove to be a formidable task. In active 
FLOSS projects, knowledge related to where relevant documentation resides is already 
internalized by the developers who contribute frequently, such as committers. This allows 
the committers to assist other developers and makes it easier for them to find relevant 
knowledge, thereby reducing the effort needed to make a contribution.
Furthermore, there is evidence that committers can be overloaded from community 
interaction, which could limit the amount of knowledge transferred from committers to 
contributors (Kuk, 2006). Communities with a greater number of committers will have a 
greater capacity to transfer development-related knowledge, and since communities ob-
serve a great degree of variability in their number of committers, it becomes necessary to 
control our results for their numbers. Given that the revision control system lists the name 
of the committer that performed the for every commit performed, we extract these names 
and normalize them for the analysis period (See Appendix B). We count the unique nor-
malized names of committers for the analysis period and use it as a control.
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3.3.2  Popularity of the FLOSS project
The popularity of a FLOSS project might also play a role in the number of contributors 
simply because contributors are themselves users. Therefore, a FLOSS community’s 
numbers are limited by how many people know of and use its software. Furthermore, as-
suming that projects with higher value will attract a greater number of users (c.f. Ray-
mond, 2001;Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Roberts et al., 2006; Lakhani and Wolf, 2007), 
popularity can serve as a control for the effect of value on participation. This would allow 
us to capture the effect of reducing cost of participation that results in the increase in 
number of contributors that is independent of the effect of value.
To control for popularity, we used the number of users that reported using the software 
on ohloh.net. Given that ohloh.net is a social website for FLOSS developers, the number 
of users that report using a software product serves as a good proxy for popularity 
amongst developers. 
3.3.3  License Restrictiveness
Following the work of Stewart et al. (2006), we operationalized license restrictiveness by 
coding the licenses based on whether they included the General Public License (GPL) or 
not. GPL is one of the most restrictive FLOSS licenses with provisions that prevent the 
mixing of FLOSS source code with proprietary source code and the requirement that de-
rivative work be released under the GPL license. Such provisions might prevent many 
users, especially for-profit organizations, from leveraging FLOSS for their own use. This 
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could limit a FLOSS community’s number of users and, as a result, the number of poten-
tial developers.
3.3.4  Project Age and Analysis Period
The age of the project is an important control that serves as a proxy for several other fac-
tors (Stewart et al., 2006). For example, older projects could be well established and more 
popular than newer projects. Project age may also serve as a proxy for the experience or 
familiarity the committers have with the community, which could make their interactions 
and knowledge exchanges easier. We calculated the age of each FLOSS project as the 
number of weeks from the first commit to January 1, 2007 with projects that have a nega-
tive age signifying that they began after Jan 1, 2007. In addition, we control for the 
analysis period from the start of the project. This is important since projects might un-
dergo different stages of growth, which could influence the number of new contributors 
per stage.
3.3.5  Programming Language
The programming language used for each FLOSS project could also have an impact since 
it is inherently easier to make changes to scripted languages, such as Python, than it is to 
compiled languages, such as C, which require the mastery of a different set of building 
and compilation tools. In addition, code written in Python is inherently shorter than code 
written in C or C++ given the dynamic nature of the language. The popularity of the pro-
gramming language among developers will also limit the pool of potential developers that 
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might participate in a FLOSS project. We used dummy variables to encode the languages 
used in the code bases, since all three could be mixed together.
3.4  Analysis and Results
Given the longitudinal nature of our data, we used mixed models where the project is a 
level two random effect variable. In addition, we modeled our main effect variables are as 
level one random effects which takes into account the serial correlation between observa-
tions (Cohen et al., 2003). The first step we performed in our analysis was to assess the 
distributional characteristics of our variables to ensure that none of the main assumptions 
of mixed model analysis were violated. Since most our variables are count based, we ei-
ther had to perform log or negative power transformations to ensure that our independent 
variables did not violate the assumption that the variables were normally distributed. As 
for the dependent variable, since it is a count-based variable with no negative values, we 
opted to fit our model using a poisson-based generalized mixed model (Gardner et al., 
1995; Cohen et al., 2003). As a result, we checked for signs of any violations to the as-
sumptions of a poisson-based regression model. Specifically, we looked for signs of zero 
inflation or over-dispersion and found our data to satisfy the requirements of the model 
with less than 25% of the observations of the dependent variable being zeros and the dis-
persion parameter showing a value close to one14 (Gardner et al., 1995; Warton, 2005).
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14 We performed the additional step of fitting a QuasiPoisson generalized mixed model to deal with the case 
that over dispersion might exist in our data (Gardner et al., 1995) and ended up with the exact same results 
as a poisson model including inference tests. The dispersion parameters for the different models we fitted 
were between the values .6 & 1.7.
The next step before the analysis was to assess the correlations of our variables to de-
termine the discriminant validity of our variables and to discount any issues in our analy-
sis related to multicolinearity. Table 2.8 provides the correlation between the variables 
used in our study and some descriptive statistics. Given that there are no unusually high 
correlations between the variables, we concluded that our variables are distinct and pro-
ceeded to check if there were any projects that exerted an unusually high influence on the 
result of our analysis. Using Cook’s distance (Cohen et al., 2003) from the influence.ME 
package (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2009), only a single project exhibited an unusually high in-
fluence with a Cook’s d value of one (Cohen et al., 2002). The observations from that 
project were excluded from the analysis, which brought down the number of analyzed 
projects to 234 and total observations to 1823. 
The subsequent step was to fit our statistical model and to make some statistical infer-
ences; for this step we used the R statistical package version 2.9.1 (R Development Core 
Team, 2009) in addition to the lme4 library for fitting random effect models (Bates and 
Maechler, 2009). By process of adding our main effect variables and assessing the sig-
nificance of including the variable as a random effect using Chi2 difference tests, we iden-
tified KAMT, KREL, KCOD, and KCOMP as random effects embedded within projects. 
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Table 2.8: Variable correlations and descriptive statistics
SUS KCOD KCOMP KREL KAMT COM AGE PER isGPL isC isCpp isPy POP
SUS 1.00
KCOD -0.10 1.00
KCOMP -0.02 0.02 1.00
KREL 0.19 -0.32 -0.05 1.00
KAMT 0.30 0.00 0.03 -0.07 1.00
COM 0.40 -0.12 0.00 0.13 0.38 1.00
AGE 0.15 -0.04 -0.03 0.30 0.13 0.12 1.00
PER -0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.04 1.00
isGPL 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.05 1.00
isC 0.18 -0.34 0.01 0.38 0.09 0.18 0.33 0.00 0.10 1.00
isCpp -0.01 -0.13 0.02 -0.02 0.40 0.15 -0.09 -0.02 0.09 0.01 1.00
isPy -0.09 0.41 -0.02 -0.35 -0.14 -0.07 -0.27 0.00 -0.14 -0.58 -0.33 1.00
POP -0.34 0.02 0.03 -0.18 -0.18 -0.24 -0.40 -0.03 -0.12 -0.20 0.07 0.20 1.00
min 0.00 -0.37 -0.45 -6.39 -3.44 -1.73 -7.63 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.21
mean 5.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.54 0.42 0.82 0.43 0.14 0.00
median 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.11 -0.12 0.26 4.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
max 94.00 0.56 0.55 4.77 3.63 3.09 13.14 10.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.15
std 4.45 0.09 0.01 0.93 1.03 1.36 2.59 2.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
  
Table 2.9 summarizes the results of our model fitting statistical analysis. The first of 
these models is the null model used as a baseline to determine the explanatory power of 
subsequent models. The second model is the control only model for which we included 
the control variables as fixed effects. As can be seen from Table 2.9, the control model 
has an R2 of %14.6 based on the reduction in the deviance value from the null model. The 
Chi2 difference test also suggests that the control model explains significantly more vari-
ance than the null model.
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Table 2.9: Model fitting
Model Null Control Main Effects Quadratic Cubic
Estimate Std. Err. p Estimate Std. Err. p Estimate Std. Err. p Estimate Std. Err. p
KCOMP
3 -14.242 5.643 0.012*
KCOMP
2 -3.043 1.538 0.048* 0.28 2.01 0.889
KCOD2 — -9.478 4.133 0.022* -9.443 4.149 0.023*
KAMT2 — -0.082 0.029 0.005** -0.082 0.029 0.005**
KREL2 — -0.12 0.036 <.001*** cubic 0.036 <.001***
KCOD — -0.896 0.975 0.363 -0.693 0.947 0.464 -0.715 0.949 0.451
KCOMP — 1.580 0.531 0.003** 1.626 0.549 0.003** 1.994 0.567 <.001***
KAMT — -0.060 0.079 0.525 -0.04 0.08 0.617 -0.045 0.08 0.575
KREL — 0.157 0.095 0.123 0.124 0.096 0.193 0.129 0.096 0.176
COM — 0.731 0.030 <.0001*** 0.805 0.034 <.0001*** 0.791 0.034 <.001*** 0.789 0.034 <.001***
AGE — 0.008 0.032 0.806 -0.011 0.039 0.778 -0.018 0.038 0.642 -0.014 0.038 0.694
PER — -0.031 0.004 <.0001*** -0.032 0.005 <.0001*** -0.031 0.005 <.001*** -0.031 0.005 <.001***
isGPL — 0.033 0.153 0.832 -0.027 0.175 0.921 -0.058 0.171 0.734 -0.057 0.171 0.738
isC — 0.471 0.252 0.061. 0.340 0.304 0.262 0.274 0.294 0.352 0.254 0.294 0.388
isCpp — -0.286 0.167 0.086. -0.268 0.198 0.192 -0.296 0.192 0.123 -0.28 0.193 0.146
isPy — 0.005 0.291 0.97 0.36 0.358 0.319 0.35 0.341 0.305 0.342 0.342 0.317
POP — 2.074 0.890 0.02* 1.992 1.037 0.055. 1.857 1.009 0.066. 1.818 1.013 0.073.
Int 1.009*** 0.849 0.275 0.002** 0.974 0.338 0.003** 1.07 0.319 <.001*** 1.085 0.32 <.001***
AIC 5619 4812 4574 4549 4545
LogLik -2807 -2396 -2259 -2242 -2239
Deviance 5615 4792 4518 4485 4479
R2 — %14.6 %19.53 %20.13 %20.24
Chi2 Diff — 822.468 274.282 29.639 6.037
p — <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** 0.014*
Significance codes: ’***’ <0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ‘ 1
  
Our interest lies mostly with the main effects model in which the Chi2 difference test 
suggests that the model explains significantly more variance than the control model with 
an R2 of %19.53. Among the coefficients of the hypothesized effects, only KCOMP is 
found to be significant at p=0.003 and estimated at 1.58. However, since we are interested 
in effect of magnitude of change, the linear effect for KCOMP is not of interest to us.
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As for the non-supported effects, we consider if the reason for obtaining such a result 
was due to the non-linear nature of these effects. If you recall from Sec. 2.2.1.2, we ex-
plained how value of the software or community benefits could also play a role the deci-
sion of value-maximizing developers to make a contribution. The interplay between such 
value and contribution cost that grows with further software development (Lehman et al., 
1997) gives us reason to believe in the existence of non-linear relationships between 
these variables and sustainability. In addition, we made the assumption that value is dis-
tributed within a narrow range across FLOSS communities for a linear effect to be de-
tected. The results so far suggests the violation of this assumption, however, we would 
like to know if this holds true for all FLOSS communities or a subset of them. More im-
portantly, we would like to know if this is a result of the non-linear nature of their rela-
tionship or that there is no independent effect for cost.
To search for the non-linear effects, we continued our investigation by testing for 
quadratic relationships. The expectation is that high levels of our variables of interest will 
have different value and cost implications on a FLOSS community than low values of the 
same variables. For example, a community with might have a small code base because 
the software is at the initial stages of development and is yet to be of value for many us-
ers. Adding features for communities at this stage might yield higher value than cost and 
would result in effects that are opposite to what we predicted.
To test for quadratic effects, we added each quadratic term individually and used a 
Chi2 difference test to ensure that each term explained a significant amount of variability. 
Our investigation resulted in the higher order model (depicted in Table 2.9) in which 
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KAMT, KREL, and KCOD all observed negative and significant quadratic effects. Fur-
thermore, the Chi2 difference test suggests that the higher order model explains a signifi-
cant amount of variance above and beyond the main effects model with an R2 of %20.13. 
To get a better understanding of the nature of these relationships, we graphed in Figures 
2.4-2.9 the curves representing the quadratic relationship followed by the graph of the 
simple slopes to illustrate how the relationship changes over different values of the 
KAMT, KREL, and KCOD.
Figure 2.4: Quadratic effect of knowledge codifiability 
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Figure 2.5: Simple slopes for the quadratic effect of knowledge codifiability 
Figure 2.6: Quadratic effect of knowledge amount
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Figure 2.7: Simple slopes for the quadratic effect of knowledge amount
Figure 2.8: Quadratic effect of knowledge relatedness
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Figure 2.9: Simple slopes for the quadratic effect of knowledge relatedness
The quadratic effects in figures 2.4, 2.6, and 2.8 suggest that the nature of the relation-
ship to sustainability is changing for different values of the independent variables in 
question. To illustrate this, we plot the simple slopes in figures 2.5, 2.7, and 2.9. Moving 
in single standard deviation steps away from the mean, we plotted the first simple slope to 
exhibit significance based on a two tailed t-test and the following value for the standard 
error:
Sb =
￿
S11 + 4XS12 + 4X2S22
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-0.411*
0.392*
where S11 and S22 are variance in the regression coefficients for the main and quadratic 
effects respectively, and S12 is the covariance between these same coefficients (Aiken and 
West, 1991).
As can be inferred from the simple slope graphs, the negative relationship hypothe-
sized in H1 is supported for below average values of KCOD. The support is evident from 
the significant and negative slopes in Figure 2.5 for values standard deviations or more 
below the mean. This might seem unlikely to occur, however, the absolute minimum 
value for KCOD is zero when there is no documentation in the code base. The significant 
simple slope for values below three standard deviations suggests that having some docu-
mentation is certainty better than none. H2 and H4 are supported for the above average 
and high values of both KAMT and KREL. This is evident from the significant and nega-
tive simple slope values in Figures 2.7 and 2.9 for values that two and one standard de-
viations above the mean respectively. 
Notice that we also obtained a significant and negative effect for the coefficient of the 
quadratic KCOMP term (-3.043, p-value = 0.048). While this term suggests that there is a 
detrimental effect for any change in the absolute value of the modularity measure, the 
quadratic term will not tell us if the smaller changes will result in a positive relationship 
between knowledge completeness and sustainability. To uncover such an effect, we test 
for a cubic KCOMP coefficient and find it to be negative and significant (-14.242, p-value 
= 0.012). We depict this cubic effect in Figure 2.10.
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Figure 2.10: Cubic effect of knowledge completeness
To simplify interpretation, we plot two simple slope graphs for the cubic effect of 
KCOMP. The first, depicted in Figure 2.11, is a graph representing positive change in the 
KCOMP measure. Given that KCOMP is mean centered, notice how the coefficient of the 
simple slope for the line depicting small change is positive and significant (1.994, p-value 
= <0.001). The simple slope shares the same significance test as the one for the linear ef-
fect of KCOMP in the cubic model (Aiken and West, 1991). This line suggests that the 
relationship between knowledge completeness and sustainability is positive for small 
changes in the structure of the code base (i.e., high knowledge completeness) supporting 
H2 for high levels of knowledge completeness. Notice also how the relationship between 
sustainability and knowledge completeness reverses its direction for high values of 
change in modularity measure (i.e., low knowledge completeness). The change in the 
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slope is significant as indicated by the significance of the cubic KCOMP term, supporting 
H2 for low levels of knowledge completeness.
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Figure 2.11: Simple slopes for positive change in knowledge completeness
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Figure 2.12: Simple slopes for negative change in knowledge completeness
We also plot the simple slopes for the effect of negative changes in the modularity 
measure in Figure 2.12. As can be seen, the results for negative changes in modularity 
measure mirror those of the positive changes. With a positive and significant simple slope 
for knowledge completeness for low levels of change in modularity measure (1.994, p-
value = <0.001), the relationship between sustainability and knowledge completeness is 
positive for low levels of knowledge completeness. The relationship reverses itself for 
more extreme values of negative change in modularity.
As for the small effect sizes for the cubic and quadratic models, it is typical when 
looking for higher order effects in archival data (e.g., Kuk, 2006; Lavie, 2007; Gulati et 
113
1.994***
0.948
-2.02
al., 2009) and inline with the 0.002 median effect size for moderation effects found by 
Aguinis et al. (2005) in their review of management and psychological literature from the 
past 30 years. Both the error present in the data and amount of residual variance after par-
tialling out the main effects make it difficult to detect higher order effect (McClelland and 
Judd, 1993). Furthermore, higher order effects with small magnitudes will be even more 
difficult to detect and will require large sample sizes (Ullrich et al., 2008; Champoux and 
Peters, 1987). The fact that we found a significant effect for our higher order effects given 
all these odds against finding them suggests that the actual effect might be even greater 
than what the results are telling us. Furthermore, Champoux and Peters (1987) suggest 
that the significance and magnitude of the effect are more important than the change in 
effect size in determining the importance of the higher order effect.
4  Discussion
For the purpose of discussing our findings, we summarize our empirical findings in Table 
2.10. We hypothesized in H1 that knowledge codifiability will have a positive relation-
ship to sustainability, which is defined as a FLOSS community’s ability to convert users 
to contributors effectively in order to maintain development efforts. We argued that mak-
ing requisite knowledge more explicit would reduce contribution costs by making such 
knowledge more accessible. What we found is that this hypothesis holds for below aver-
age values of knowledge codifiability and starts to reverse in direction for above average 
values of knowledge codifiability. We provide an explanation of this reversal in the direc-
tion of the relationship in the following section.
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Table 2.10: Summary of empirical findings from the higher order model
Hypothesis Coeffecient Support
H1: The extent to which source-code-
related knowledge for a FLOSS commu-
nity is codified will be positively related 
to the sustainability of that community.
KCOD2: -9.954 
p=0.016*
Supported for below average values of 
knowledge codifiability.
H2: The extent to which source-code-
related knowledge for a FLOSS commu-
nity is complete will be positively related 
to the sustainability of that community.
KCOMP3: 
-14.242, 
p=0.012**
Supported.
H3: The amount of source-code-related 
knowledge that exists in a FLOSS com-
munity is negatively related to the sus-
tainability of that community.
KAMT2: -0.088 
p=0.002**
Supported for above average values of 
knowledge amount.
H4: The relatedness of source-code-
related knowledge that exists in a FLOSS 
community is negatively related to the 
sustainability of that community.
KREL2: -0.129 
p=0.0003***
Supported for above average values of 
knowledge relatedness.
  
We argued in H2 for a positive relationship between knowledge completeness, which 
was operationalized as the change in modularity of the code base and sustainability. We 
argued that a a stable code base code base would convey more complete knowledge for a 
contributor that requires to integrate a patch into the community code base. Complete 
knowledge entails that ones the code base is checked out, the contributor would not be 
required to to rewrite his patch at time of committal because the community code base 
changed significantly in its structure rendering his/her patch incompatible. As a result, the 
effort to integrate a patch is reduced, thereby, increasing the number of new contributors 
that are likely to participate. H2 was best supported in the cubic model that shows a posi-
tive relationship between knowledge completeness and sustainability for high levels of 
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knowledge completeness. This relationship reverses direction when for extreme values of 
knowledge completeness whether they are positive or negative.
There are a number of important implications for both theory and practice from the 
results of H2. The finding provides empirical support for theories that propose that source 
code structures could encourage participation (Baldwin and Clark, 2006). The findings 
also lend support to the validity of the modularity measure since the measure observed 
behavior that we predicted prior to knowing the results of the analysis. As for practice, 
this finding highlights the importance of stability of code design and the importance of 
the release early release often practice. Such a practice encourages small incremental 
changes that do not bring significant changes to the community code base, which our 
work suggests is important to encourage participation from new contributors. 
In H3 and H4, we argued that both dimension of diversity (i.e., amount and related-
ness) for knowledge that exits in a FLOSS community are negatively related to the sus-
tainability of the FLOSS community because they increase contribution costs. This rela-
tionship was found to hold for above average values of knowledge amount and related-
ness, as can been seen from the significant and negative slopes in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. 
This negative relationship was attributed to the increased contribution cost associated 
with the increased effort in comprehending a code base that consists of a diverse and 
large number of modules. While we have discussed the benefits of modularity in reducing 
contribution costs by allowing developers to contribute by working and comprehending 
individual modules, knowledge relatedness negates the effect of modularity by requiring 
a developer to comprehend a group of highly related modules. The result is that develop-
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ers are required to expend greater effort to acquire knowledge that is required to make the 
initial contribution. 
These results highlight how certain projects are inherently complex and are likely to 
be unsustainable in the long run. The inherent complexity highlights the need for FLOSS 
communities to be clear in terms of the goals they want to achieve with the software 
products they are developing. An effective way of managing complexity is to partition 
complex projects into smaller related projects that deal with specific, but smaller, prob-
lems. Such an approach is only enabled by open standards. An example of this strategy is 
evident in the Python community in which the WSGI protocol is a standard that allows 
different applications to work with web-requests and pass it on to the next application 
that could make use of it. This allowed a highly complex web framework known as 
ZOPE to be partitioned into smaller, but manageable, FLOSS projects15.
Furthermore, the complexity highlights one of the strengths of the FLOSS market-
place: renewal. FLOSS projects could grow to be complex simply from the accumulation 
of source code over time (Lehman et al., 1997). Such projects become difficult to main-
tain and might spur potential contributors who cannot break into a community to develop 
their own FLOSS solutions that might surpass older and more complex solutions that 
they originally considered using, thereby, heightening the competition in the FLOSS 
marketplace. This is highlighted by the emergence of the Django web framework to re-
place the Zope web framework, and now the emergence of micro web frameworks to re-
place Django, which itself is becoming difficult to maintain.
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15 See http://repoze.org/
4.1  Post-Hoc Analysis of Quadratic Effects
The quadratic effects are very interesting because the relationships’ directions are re-
versed. This warrants a closer examination of the unexpected reverse effects in light of 
the FLOSS marketplace framework that we have developed. We start with the negative 
effect associated with an increase in knowledge codifiability as measured by the ratio of 
lines of documentation to the lines of code. This negative relationship becomes evident 
and significant for above average ratios of documentation to code. This is the least sur-
prising of the reverse effects, given that we made the assumption that contributors are 
boundedly rational (Simon, 1955). As the amount of documentation increases, potential 
contributors are still required to expend effort to read the documentation and find their 
way through it to get to the relevant parts. Therefore, the effort to acquire the knowledge 
embedded in the documentation might increase and may reach a point where the value 
the contributor will get from contribution no longer justifies the effort required to read the 
documentation, let alone make the contribution.
This finding has a very important implication to FLOSS communities, as it suggests 
that long-known truths about the value of information still hold in the new age of distrib-
uted software development (Ackoff, 1967). The increased amount of documentation 
might be a signal that the quality of the documentation is poor or that too much unneces-
sary information is included, making it more difficult to find relevant knowledge. There-
fore, FLOSS communities should be aware of how critical documentation is. Even 
though documentation is often considered a chore and many developers tend to avoid it 
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(Lakhani and Wolf, 2007), the quadratic effect suggests that it is necessary and, more im-
portantly, that it must be done right or it could have the reverse effect on potential con-
tributors (at the minimum). FLOSS communities may want to consider hiring or solicit-
ing the assistance of individuals with good technical writing skills to edit and improve the 
documentation. Furthermore, the documentation should be continuously improved just 
like the software itself and not be left to accumulate unnecessary or outdated bits of in-
formation over time.
The positive relationships for low levels of knowledge amount and relatedness were 
the most surprising of our empirical findings. While it is contrary to the cost argument we 
used to explain how effective FLOSS communities convert users into contributors, it 
highlights another very important dynamic in the FLOSS marketplace. We are referring 
here to the potential value that is generated from implementing and adding source code. 
Needless to say, adding such source code would result in an increase in complexity, but 
this is the case with any conventional software project (Lehman et al., 1997), especially 
successful projects. The added value would result in an increase in the number of users of 
the software, which might indirectly result in a greater number of new contributors.
Furthermore, the unexpected positive relationship could highlight the importance of 
implementing just enough of the code base to allow developers to gravitate around it 
(AlMarzouq et al., 2005). With a significant portion of the source code written that offers 
just enough functionality to be useful, potential contributors can leverage all of the 
knowledge behind the software without needing to acquire the development knowledge 
fully and re-implement what has already been implemented in the code base. As knowl-
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edge diversity from implementing more functionality increases, the cost of internalizing 
all of the underlying knowledge requirements also increases. When a software project 
that requires diverse knowledge is released as FLOSS, the rational choice for any devel-
oper that seeks to contribute to such a project is to pool his/her effort with that of the 
community. This way, the developers can specialize in creating specific components 
rather than working on the whole code base, resulting in higher quality and more innova-
tive software (Grant, 1996a). 
However, it is important to note that the range of values for which the effect of knowl-
edge diversity starts to reverse its effect cannot be specified ex-ante. The reason for this is 
that these values have to be taken into consideration relative to other characteristics of the 
source code and of the FLOSS project, as our statistical analysis suggests. Because each 
project is unique in its design and the characteristics of its underlying knowledge, there is 
no specific number of modules or module size that fits all. More importantly, the com-
plexity of the code base cannot be known until the source code is actually written. Even if 
it is known, FLOSS communities sometimes consciously choose to make the software 
complex in order to maintain compatibility with older versions of the software that might 
be used by community members or interoperate with other software packages. This find-
ing highlights the complexity of the trade-offs that have to be made by FLOSS communi-
ties.
Therefore, the quadratic effect related to the dimensions of knowledge diversity sug-
gests that when a developer is faced with the choice between working with a FLOSS 
community or repeating the effort of the community by developing a similar solution us-
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ing a proprietary model, the rational choice would be to pool the developer’s effort with 
that of the FLOSS community. However, there is only a certain amount of complexity 
that the developer can tolerate; otherwise, the rational choice might be to simply create a 
new project or develop the software solution in-house. Similar to the implications related 
to H3 and H4, this finding highlights the importance of the renewal of complex projects 
in the FLOSS marketplace. Furthermore, it suggests that such acts of project renewal may 
have a good probability of success when they are released as FLOSS. The main reason 
for this success is that the alternatives to participating a highly complex FLOSS project or 
developing a similar propriety system might be less cost effective.
Another important effect of the quadratic effects of the dimension of knowledge diver-
sity is that the success of a FLOSS community, as measured by the number of new con-
tributors joining the development effort, is a delicate balancing act between what features 
should be included in the code base and how much complexity such features introduce. 
The results suggest that an increase in complexity is healthy to a certain degree, as it adds 
value to users and contributors. Adding too many features, however, could be detrimental 
to the sustainability of the project in the long run. Adding too many features might be a 
result of the community’s lack of clear goals as to what problems they would like their 
software to target. Therefore, it is important for communities to set goals such that it be-
comes clear to committers when to refuse and when to incorporate contributed features 
into the code base.
5  Brooks’ Law Revisited
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According to Brooks (1975), one of the main causes for software project delays is due to 
the current developers’ distraction from training newly added members, which is referred 
to as the ramp-up effect. It has been debated in the research community whether the 
Brooks’ contributions, collectively known as Brook’s Law, apply in the FLOSS develop-
ment context (Capiluppi and Adams, 2009) or not (Koch, 2004; Schweik et al., 2008). 
The debate mostly focused on the effort needed to communicate but disregarded the ef-
fects of a ramp-up. Our study’s findings contribute to this discourse by proposing a con-
ceptualization of the ramp-up effect fit for the FLOSS context and by providing empirical 
support of its effects.
One way in which FLOSS development differs from conventional software develop-
ment is that developers are volunteers (Raymond, 2001). As a result, members are under 
no obligation to waste their time in training other contributors. However, the knowledge 
embedded in the source code itself allows potential contributors to bring themselves up to 
speed by reading the source code and acquiring the necessary knowledge to make contri-
butions (Raymond, 2001). Since new contributors do not significantly distract current de-
velopers, it is assumed that the ramp-up effect is not relevant to FLOSS development. 
However, when the ramp-up effect is conceptualized as the knowledge barriers that a de-
veloper must overcome to become an effective team members, it becomes easier to argue 
for the ramp-up effect’s influence in the FLOSS context. 
If the ramp-up effect is viewed as a knowledge barrier, it implies that it varies from 
one project to the next (Attewell, 1992). Therefore, in conventional teams, the amount of 
effort from or the distraction to current members will be proportional to the size of these 
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effects (Attewell, 1992). However, in FLOSS teams, the size of the ramp-up effect will be 
proportional to the effort expended by potential contributors in reading the source code 
and acquiring the embedded knowledge. Therefore, we argue that projects that have high 
knowledge barriers due to the nature of the knowledge embedded into the code base will 
deter potential contributors from joining the development effort. The result of such situa-
tions is that the FLOSS project would lose effort that could have potentially been gained 
if the knowledge barriers were lower. Furthermore, these knowledge barriers might im-
pact the propensity of the FLOSS project to sustain development over time.
Our empirical findings support the idea that knowledge barriers and, therefore, the 
ramp-up effect vary between projects. The magnitude of these barriers will depend on the 
codifiability, completeness, and diversity of the knowledge underlying the source code. 
Therefore, we conclude that the ramp-up effect is indeed still relevant in the FLOSS de-
velopment context. However, because participation in FLOSS teams is voluntary, the 
ramp-up effect impacts the performance of FLOSS communities through different dy-
namics than in conventional software development teams.
Given that software production is considered a knowledge intensive task, other online 
and virtual communities focusing on the production and dissemination of knowledge 
could also benefits from our findings. Communities of practice and knowledge production 
communities, such as Wikipedia, that rely on the participation of volunteers could benefit 
from increasing the numbers of new contributors by lowering the contribution costs. As 
with FLOSS communities, an initial contribution to Wikipedia will require the participant 
to learn and comprehend the article that he/she is about to contribute to, understand how 
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to use the tools to contribute, and coordinate with the gatekeepers of the community to 
have their contribution accepted. Future research on such communities could benefit from 
our conceptualization of the ramp-up effect as a bases to understand the costs associated 
with the initial contribution.
6  Limitations and Future research
Although we have built up the logic to argue that the reduction of transaction costs is the 
most effective strategy for increasing the number of external participants, we believe that 
the value appropriated by individuals from contributing to a FLOSS project is still valu-
able to understand contribution behavior, especially at the individual level. Our novel ap-
proach in framing the FLOSS marketplace opens up the possibility for leveraging other 
value-based organizational theories to understand FLOSS participation. For example, 
resource-based theory could be leveraged to understand how certain community-based 
resources could cause new contributor participation or even how FLOSS communities 
could sustain a competitive advantage, however that concept might be conceptualized, in 
the FLOSS marketplace.
A potential limitation to our work is associated with the tools that we used to collect 
our empirical data. Our tools allowed us to collect data only about completed transac-
tions; that is, we were not able to collect information pertaining to developers’ attempts to 
submit patches that were rejected. This information resides in the project trackers and de-
veloper mailing lists related to individual projects. Given that each project uses a differ-
ent system, the complexity of the tools that we would have needed to collect all of this 
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data would have been an order of a magnitude more complex than what we have devel-
oped and used for this study. This information, however, could add further insight into the 
effects of contribution costs and community structures, and future studies could benefit 
from collecting and making inferences from such information. This was more of a trade-
off than a limitation, though, as we chose generalizability over rich data. To our knowl-
edge, this is the only FLOSS-related work that attempts to base large-sample observa-
tions on an established theory like TCT.
Furthermore, we have alluded to the possible influence of having star programmers 
join the development effort of a FLOSS community and how that might increase the 
popularity of a project and result in greater numbers of new contributors. While ideally, 
we would have liked to capture such information, the scope of the projects and the time-
lines that we have examined made it impossible for us to know which programmers are 
considered stars. We attempted to make up for this limitation by controlling for the effect 
of popularity as reported by FLOSS developers on ohloh.net. If it was at all possible to 
identify the time periods in which star programmers joined a FLOSS projects, future 
studies could provide a better understanding of the impact of such an effect.
Some of the empirical findings were also a surprise and warrant further investigation 
to understand more fully the nature of the relationships they represent. For example, 
while we have not predicted the non-linear nature of the relationship of knowledge codi-
fiability, amount, and relatedness, we offered post-hoc analysis that could establish the 
basis for future investigations. Follow-up studies could examine the quadratic relation-
ships and treat them explicitly using deductive theory. While we now know that there is a 
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certain threshold at which benefits associated with knowledge codifiability and knowl-
edge diversity turn into liabilities, it is difficult to establish a priori what these threshold 
points are. This does not however diminish the value of this finding, as FLOSS communi-
ties are now made more informed of the complexities associated with managing commu-
nity sustainability.
It is also important to note that this is the first attempt that we know of that uses the 
leading eigen-vector method of community structure identification (Newman and Girvan, 
2004; Newman, 2006b) to assess the dependency structure and modularity of a software 
code base. Given that the modularity-based variable observed both discriminant validity 
and a significant relationship to the dependent variable in the direction predicted by our 
theory, this leads us to conclude that there is validity to the measure. However, given that 
this is a new measure, we have yet to establish meaning to subtle variations in the meas-
ure to be able to use it in more practical settings. Although the measure serves well in 
comparing which code base is more modular relative to another code base and assessing 
the design improvements for the same code base by comparing new values to previous 
values of modularity, we still do not have a complete understanding of what the implica-
tions are for absolute modularity values in and of themselves. We believe that further use 
of this method could provide a better understanding of these values and their implications 
and, more importantly, an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of this method. 
For example, further use of this method would allow us to determine whether a modular-
ity value of .9 has indeed significant management implications when compared to a code 
base with a modularity of .5 or .89. In addition, further investigation is needed to under-
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stand the nomological network in which such a measure is embedded in order to under-
stand whether the measure can serve project managers well as a standalone measure or 
whether it should be considered relative to other metrics, such as code size, team size, 
and number of modules.
7  Conclusion
 In this study, we conceptualize FLOSS communities as competitors in both the software 
and FLOSS marketplaces. FLOSS communities compete in the software marketplace to 
get more people to use their software products. In the FLOSS marketplace, communities 
compete for a larger portion of contributor mindshare, contributors receive community-
related benefits, and the community benefits from advancing its software development 
effort. The two marketplaces are related in that development efforts in the FLOSS mar-
ketplace would allow the community to become more competitive in the software mar-
ketplace by improving its software offerings. At the same time, FLOSS communities 
compete on converting users of their software to contributors that participate in the 
FLOSS marketplace. We take particular interest in the conversion of users into first-time 
contributors and use the insights from TCT to explain how contribution transaction costs 
are the main impediment to initial contributions. We identify the characteristics of knowl-
edge, codifiability, completeness, and diversity as the main sources of contribution-
related transaction costs. We then provide empirical support for our theory.
We contribute to the body of knowledge on FLOSS community management by find-
ing empirical support to the idea that the codification of requisite development knowledge 
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by means of documenting the source code is important in reducing the effort required of 
potential contributors. By reducing the costs associated with acquiring requisite knowl-
edge, a FLOSS community can increase the number of developers who make a contribu-
tion to its source code. However, such costs can only be managed up to a point. After that 
point navigating through the code base starts to become cumbersome and might deter de-
velopers from contributors. 
In line with the theory forwarded by Baldwin and Clark (2006), we contribute by find-
ing empirical support for the idea that diverse and complete development knowledge, 
which is reflected by modularity, size, and the number of modules in a code base, is re-
lated to the number of contributors. These findings highlight the importance of properly 
designing software to encourage participation. Modular designs that minimize dependen-
cies across modules and maximize them within modules are designs that encourage par-
ticipation. Maximizing dependencies within a module requires developers to group 
highly related modularity within a module, making it easy to find by potential contribu-
tors. Reducing the dependencies across modules would help make changes in one module 
have little effect on other modules, thereby enabling parallel development and more pre-
dictable software that is easier to manage (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Page-Jones, 1998).
The relationship of the size and number of modules to contribution in particular might 
suggest that there are certain types of software products that have a tendency to attract 
contributors if the software was developed by a FLOSS community. We attributed this to 
the reduction in risk associated with the development effort since contributors get to 
benefit from the software and pool their efforts, thereby distributing the risk of failure 
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over a larger group of contributors. This situation would be a more rational option than 
developing such software alone. However, we also found that having a very large number 
of modules might also come at a cost and deter participation since developers will have a 
hard time finding their way around the code base in order to make their changes.
The final contribution we make is the utilization of the leading eigen-vector method 
for community structure identification (Newman and Girvan, 2004; Newman, 2006a) and 
the graph modularity measure (Newman, 2006b) as software metric tools. We also con-
tribute by finding evidence of the validity of the modularity measure. This evidence is 
observed through the support of the relationship between modularity and sustainability 
that was predicted prior to obtaining the result in addition to the discriminant validity of 
the measure.
Our contributions have important implications for both theory and practice. As part of 
the theoretical implications, we clarify the theoretical distinction between the FLOSS 
marketplace and the software marketplace. This distinction will have profound theoretical 
impacts since it differentiates between the dynamics of usage of FLOSS through the 
software marketplace and those of development through the FLOSS marketplace. Fur-
thermore, our conceptualization of the marketplace contributes to the discourse on 
whether FLOSS development represents a cathedral or a bazaar (e.g. Bezroukov, 1999; 
Raymond, 2001; Krishnamurthy, 2002; Crowston and Howison, 2005). What our framing 
suggests is that the constellation of all the FLOSS communities can be thought of as a 
babbling bazaar in which users and developers can pick and choose the software they use 
and the projects they work on. After all, a bazaar is merely a marketplace.
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As with any marketplace, competition is a very important aspect that is not yet under-
stood well in the FLOSS context. Our framing also allows us to highlight some competi-
tive forces in the FLOSS marketplace and to use established theories in organizational 
literature, like TCT, to gain a better understanding of the dynamics in the FLOSS market-
place. This opens up the possibility of using other organizational theories that focus on 
competition to understand the competitive nature of FLOSS communities more fully.
In addition, we outline the importance of understanding the structure of the source 
code as a proxy for requisite knowledge given that it is an explicit form of that knowl-
edge. We also propose the use of new methods that offer rigorous and objective means to 
compare and examine software structures (i.e., source code dependency graphs). Since 
these tools measure aspects that are important in software engineering efforts, such as 
modularity, they can be used to assess the impact of initiatives that aim to improve a 
software’s structure, whether it be in FLOSS communities or software engineering pro-
jects. 
Overall, the results support the basic idea behind our theory, namely that FLOSS con-
tributors are rational value-maximizing actors that will refrain from contribution when 
the cost to contribute is higher than the returns gained from participation. In addition, the 
results also lend support to the existence of transaction costs in the context of FLOSS 
participation and are closely tied to the characteristics of the code base. Both ideas are 
supported by our empirical findings that support our hypotheses and the diminishing re-
turns of knowledge codifiability, amount, and relatedness. This suggests that managing 
the costs of participation is indeed an effective strategy to encourage new contributions 
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and maintaining the sustainability of FLOSS communities. The interplay between cost to 
participate and the value of that participation is yet to be understood and is a good direc-
tion for future research. Such research could provide a better explanation to the observa-
tion of diminishing returns from knowledge codifiability, amount, and relatedness. In ad-
dition, our empirical findings suggest that the knowledge diversity construct is multidi-
mensional as suggested by Turner and Makhija (2006) given the distinct effect for each.
Another important practical implication of our findings is our outline of the impor-
tance of activities that are usually considered to be chores in FLOSS communities, such 
as code reorganization and documentation. The importance of these activities not only 
lies in how they improve the maintainability of a code base but also in their ability to in-
crease the number of new contributors. 
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 Appendix A:  Modularity Related Constructs
Figure 2.7: How the different modularity-related constructs vary independently
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 Appendix B:  Analyzing Contributors
The following message is an example of a log message from the Django project revision 
control system that indicates a patch was made by a contributor with the pseudo-name 
nfg:
Fixed #9859  Added another missing force_unicode 
needed in admin when running on Python 2.3. Many 
thanks for report & patch to nfg.
- (Django Revision 9656) 
We wrote automation scripts to identify the names of contributors from log messages 
by looking for certain keywords in the log messages such as "thanks" or "patch." While 
identifying the names from log messages might be a trivial task when performed by hu-
mans, automating such a task was quite involved given that projects identified contribu-
tors differently and that the same individual could use multiple spelling for his/her name. 
Nevertheless, we undertook this task and developed the automated scripts. Once we com-
pleted the scripts, we needed a way to assess their reliability. Since we knew that the 
same process could be performed reliably by a human, we assessed the inter-rater reli-
ability for the results of a manual process relative to the results of an automated process 
for the name identification. Towards that end, we first randomly sampled around 100 log 
messages from each of the projects in our sample. We then counted the names identified 
from each log using both a manual process (i.e., human) and an automated process that 
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used the automation scripts we developed. We then computed the inter-class correlation 
(ICC) between the results produced by the manual relative to the results produced by the 
automated processes. Using the ICC measure as an estimate of the inter-rater reliability 
(Shrout and Fleiss, 1979), we obtained a value of 0.921 for a total of 18500 observations 
from 185 projects from our sample. This result led us to conclude that the results from the 
automation scripts and manual process were interchangeable and that we could proceed 
to use our automation scripts to identify the names of contributors reliably.
Notice, however, that the automation scripts were used only on 185 projects from the 
total 235 projects in our sample. The reason we could not use the automation scripts on 
some of the projects is that these projects identified a ticket number in the commit log 
messages rather than attributing individuals. For such projects, we wrote a different set of 
automation scripts that collected these ticket numbers and used them to retrieve contribu-
tor information from the project tracking website16. Only information related to contribu-
tions made between the beginning of January 2007 and the end of June-2009 was col-
lected.
After obtaining the names of the authors from all of the projects in our sample, we 
then proceeded to clean the data to reduce any errors associated with the automated col-
lection of names. We first manually cleaned the names by removing any references that 
did not represent real authors. For example, when terms like "bug #1234" were captured 
as authors, they were discarded. We only retained names, pseudo-names, or emails. 
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16 The project tracking website is the website used to list known bugs and list feature requests. Some 
FLOSS projects rely more heavily on such websites for their development process, where contributors 
would post their patch for review on the project tracker before it is reviewed and committed.
Following the cleaning step, we proceeded to normalize the names to ensure that dif-
ferent reference to the same individual counted as a single author rather than different 
authors. We developed an application that listed all the identified names of all committers 
and contributors within a project and then made a all the other names that could poten-
tially be variations of identified names. For example, a name like "John Doe" would have 
all of the following names listed as potentially related to it should they exist in the sys-
tem: "John," "Doe,""john.doe@gmail.com," and "jdoe". We then manually confirmed 
which names were related, and the system then counted all of these related names as a 
single individual, whether for a committer or contributor. In cases in which the authors 
were identified as "Guest," "anon," or "anonymous" because they forgot to mention their 
names, we normalized the names following the recommendation of Howison and Crow-
ston (2004) to count only a single anonymous contributor as unique per single commit.
We then proceeded to count the number of new contributors within an analysis period. 
To identify new contributors, we counted only individuals who had not been referenced 
in prior analysis periods either as contributors or committers. Since we had no history 
about contributors prior to 2007, we excluded the first three months of our data from the 
analysis and used it only as a means of identifying new contributors for subsequent peri-
ods. It is important to note that the normalized names were used in this counting process 
to avoid inflating the numbers of new contributors when a individuals used different 
spellings of their names to identify themselves.
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 Appendix C:  Measuring Modularity
To measure modularity, we utilized the leading eigen-vector method of community struc-
ture identification (Newman, 2006a) to partition the dependency graph of the source 
code. This partitioning method is similar in nature to principle component analysis (PCA) 
(Newman, 2006a). While PCA uses a covariance matrix to cluster items and maximize 
the explained variance in the data, the leading eigen-vector method uses the eigen-vectors 
of the modularity matrix to divide a graph continually while maintaining the maximum 
possible modularity measure (Newman and Girvan, 2004) in order to discover groups.
Modularity is a measure of how cleanly a graph is partitioned (Newman and Girvan, 
2004; Newman, 2006b). It takes into account the groups identified by any clustering 
method, such as the leading eigen-vector method, and then gives a probability of how 
random the edges are distributed in a graph. A great number of edges within groups and a 
low number of edges between vertices belonging to different groups indicate that the dis-
tribution of edges follows a pattern and is not random and that the modularity value will 
be closer to one. When the edges are random, the probability that an edge goes from one 
node to another will be the same. In such graphs, we will not see any particular edge pat-
tern for any group. When the graph is partitioned, the number of edges leaving a group 
will not differ from the number of edges within a group, which results in an inefficient 
partitioning of the graph with modularity values close to or possibly lower than zero17. 
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17 According to Newman (2006a), modularity values that are less than zero are equivalent to zero.
So, the question that the value of modularity would answer would be "are we seeing more 
than the expected number of edges in a group, and less than expected number of edges 
spanning groups?"
When the software code dependency graph is partitioned using the leading eigen-
vector method, the files are classified into modules to maximize the edge count (i.e., de-
pendencies) between files that are in the same module, while minimizing the count of 
edges that span modules. Just like PCA, items that hold together well (i.e., exhibit cohe-
sion) are identified as modules. However, a lack of edges between modules, as in PCA, 
would signify how distinct each module is (i.e., exhibits loose coupling). Once the struc-
ture was identified, we extracted the modularity measures of the partitioned source code 
dependency graph and used it as an estimate of the modularity of the code base design. 
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Chapter 3
Study 2: Towards a Theory on the Technical Per-
formance of FLOSS Communities
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Abstract
Committers in Free/Libre and Open Source Software (FLOSS) communities play a 
critical role in the progress of the software development tasks in the community. Not only 
are they some of the most productive members in terms of development activities, but 
they also get involved by committing the work of other contributors into the community 
code base, coordinating the development effort, communicating with the broader com-
munity for both technical and development support, and participating in most decision-
making processes. As a result of this enormous effort shouldered by committers, it comes 
as no surprise that the FLOSS research found that most committers leave the community 
they are part of after serving for only a short time period.
Given the critical role that committers play in the progress of FLOSS communities, 
we question how committers are able to balance the demands of their own development 
work and their committal duties towards the community and identify the committers as a 
potential development bottleneck. As a result, we expect the tradeoffs made by the com-
mitters to have implications on the pace of progress made by a FLOSS community. 
Which is why we start questioning Raymond’s claim that Brooks’ law is obsolete in the 
FLOSS development context, as some of the tradeoff decisions made by the committers 
might result in greater development effort, but not necessarily progress.
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Using the lens of Organization Information Processing Theory (OIPT), we explain 
how the technical performance of a FLOSS community is constrained by the committers’ 
capabilities. Our findings suggest that the way in which committers are organized will 
have a profound implication on the technical performance of the FLOSS community. Fur-
thermore, we find that there is no superior form of organization (i.e., centralized vs. dis-
tributed organization of committers); rather, the needs of the community should deter-
mine the best organizational form. We provide empirical support for our proposed model 
and offer some theoretical and practical implications for our findings. We conclude by 
discussing the limitation of our work and suggest directions for future research.
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1  Introduction
Free/Libre and Open Source Software (FLOSS) is produced by online communities in 
which members’ individual development efforts are coordinated with the efforts of other 
members and are integrated into a coherent whole (O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). Mem-
bers write source code patches that implement a feature or fix a bug, which they then 
submit for integration into the community source code base to benefit all members (Ray-
mond, 2001). 
The idea that a large group of distributed developers can work together to develop 
software that rivals, if not exceeds, commercial software (AlMarzouq et al., 2005) goes 
against the conventional wisdom of software engineering. Specifically, FLOSS develop-
ment seems to go against the ideas forwarded by Fred Brooks’, which are referred to as 
Brooks’ Law given how widely they are accepted by software engineers (Brooks, 1975).
One of the ideas from Brooks’s Law that clearly goes against the grain of FLOSS de-
velopment is that developers are required to exert effort in communicating with other 
team members to maintain the functional integrity of the developed software. However, 
as more developers are added, conventional software projects start to experience delays 
because more of the developers’ time is wasted on communication. Based on this law, the 
development performance of large FLOSS communities, such as the Linux Kernel, could 
not be possible (e.g., Kroah-Hartman et al., 2008).
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In his seminal work The Cathedral and The Bazaar, Eric Raymond (2001) drew on his 
personal experiences in FLOSS development to provide an explanation as to why 
Brooks’ Law does not apply in the case of FLOSS development. Unlike the significant 
effort required in traditional software development teams (Brooks, 1975), Raymond sug-
gests that communication requirements between FLOSS developers is minimal because 
the source code can convey much of the information needed for coordination. Such 
source-code-enabled communication allows for distributed development, which Ray-
mond described as a babbling bazaar. In addition, Raymond highlights the benefits of the 
FLOSS practice of releasing software updates early and often. These benefits not only 
include improved software quality due to the early discovery and correction of bugs, but 
more importantly, developers can contribute incremental changes that reduce the effort 
needed to communicate with one another and can thus increase the development per-
formance of the community.
However, more recent literature began to find differences between many FLOSS pro-
jects and the way Raymond described them, thereby raising questions about the assump-
tions we hold regarding FLOSS. For example, while Raymond described FLOSS com-
munities as being distributed babbling bazaars, Krishnamurthy (2002) found that the ma-
jority of FLOSS projects hosted on sourceForge.net were highly centralized, describing 
them instead as caves. Mockus et  al. (2002) and later Crowston and Howison (2005) 
found that FLOSS communities varied in how they organized their development activi-
ties. More interestingly, it seems that empirical support was found for both Raymond’s 
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(eg. Koch, 2004; Schweik et al., 2008) and Brooks’ (Capiluppi and Adams, 2009, eg.) 
views.
The opposing results from the literature suggest that both views are likely to be recon-
ciled and that there is much that we have yet to know about the development performance 
of FLOSS communities. Specifically, we would like to understand if one of the views 
prevails due to the variations found in how FLOSS communities organize development 
and whether this variation will have any implication on performance. This will be impor-
tant to both theory and practice given the increased interest in FLOSS by for-profit or-
ganizations (Fitzgerald, 2006). Furthermore, the transformation of the FLOSS phenome-
non (Fitzgerald, 2006) tells us that it will be important to revisit our understanding of the 
development process in FLOSS communities and that we need to ground our understand-
ing of its performance in established theory.
To state our research question formally, we want to know: “Is there a relationship be-
tween the organization of committal activities and development performance in a FLOSS 
community, and what factors will it be contingent upon?”  To answer this question, we 
would like to view FLOSS communities in light of traditional organizational theories, 
which we discuss in more detail in Sec. 3.2.2. Specifically, we leverage insights from Or-
ganizational Information Processing Theory (OIPT) (Galbraith, 1973) to reconcile the 
views of Raymond and Brooks on the performance of FLOSS development teams.
We conclude that no development structure is necessarily better than another; rather, 
we suggest that FLOSS communities make structural decisions to meet the demands of 
the tasks that they are performing. Our findings suggest that varying the organization of 
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development activities might not be the only way to foster performance gains in FLOSS 
communities. Taking actions to reduce the uncertainty associated with the development 
tasks, such as code reorganization, might also improve the development performance of a 
FLOSS community.
To address our research question, this paper will be structured as follows. First, we 
review the FLOSS development process and identify the critical factors constraining a 
FLOSS community’s performance and identify the committal structure. Then, we review 
OIPT and explain the notion of fit between the committal structure and tasks in a FLOSS 
community. Next, we leverage the insights from OIPT to present our research model, 
which predicts the performance of a FLOSS community based on the fit between the de-
velopment task and the development structure. In the section that follows, we discuss the 
methods used to validate our research model empirically. Finally, we discuss the results, 
implications, and limitations of our study and offer directions for future research. 
2  Theoretical Development
2.1  Structures in FLOSS Communities
FLOSS communities have been described as knowledge-sharing and production commu-
nities (Lee and Cole, 2003). They integrate the voluntary efforts of individual members 
into a common pool (i.e., the software), which requires a great deal of effort and coordi-
nation (O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). The process in which this coordination occurs 
within FLOSS communities has been described as emergent (O’Mahony and Bechky, 
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2008), as individuals’ roles emerge from the tasks they perform, which they self-select 
based on their abilities and interests (Raymond, 2001; Lee and Cole, 2003; Bonaccorsi 
and Rossi, 2003; Crowston et al., 2005; Shah, 2006). Most members participate tempo-
rarily and very few continue with the community indefinitely (Shah, 2006; O’Mahony 
and Ferraro, 2007). Therefore, FLOSS communities’ structures tend to be dynamic and 
evolve along with community needs (Oh and Jeon, 2007).
Although community membership is dynamic, a FLOSS community’s structure can be 
inferred from the patterns of member participation. Crowston and Howison ( 2005) de-
scribe the structure of FLOSS communities as onion shaped, having four different types 
of community members: the core, the periphery, active users, and passive users (see 
Fig. 3.1). The development work is conducted by both the core and periphery members. 
The distinction between these two development groups is that core members perform 
most of the development work and participate in a more frequent and consistent manner 
than periphery members (Crowston and Howison, 2005). Bug reports and feature re-
quests could come from members of the core, periphery, or active-user groups. Active 
and passive users do not contribute to the development but are merely consumers of the 
FLOSS community product; however, active users differ from passive users in that they 
contribute feature requests and bug reports to the community.
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Figure 3.1: FLOSS community structure (adapted from Crowston and Howison, 2005)
There are two distinct substructures in the overall FLOSS community structure: the de-
velopment structure and the communication structure. The development structure consists 
of community members who perform development tasks and centers on how the mem-
bers are organized. The communication structure, on the other hand, spans the whole 
community and centers on how communication patterns are organized (Mockus et  al., 
2002; Crowston and Howison, 2005). The development structure is of interest to us since 
we want to understand the development performance of FLOSS communities.
Within the development structure, there are two different types of members: the com-
mitters and the contributors. Both types of members contribute to the software develop-
ment effort in the FLOSS community, which is why we will refer to them collectively as 
developers in this work. However, the committers differ in that they have access rights to 
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the community code base. As a result, committers can incorporate changes they make di-
rectly into the community code base, while contributors have to work with a committer to 
do so. Committers rise from the ranks of the contributors after they have proven their 
trustworthiness and technical competence from their continued contributions to the com-
munity (Shah, 2006; Riehle, 2007). 
2.1.1  The FLOSS Development Process
In Fig.  3.2 we summarize the steps developers go through before their source code 
patches are incorporated into the community code base.
 Figure 3.2: Steps required to complete a source code contribution in a FLOSS commu-
nity
We refer to the first stage a developer goes through as the learning stage. It starts when 
the developer reviews a fresh copy of the community code base and then attempts to un-
derstand its structure and functionality; this is what Brooks refers to as the ramp-up effect 
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(Brooks, 1975). After acquiring the necessary knowledge to make changes to the code 
base, the developer then proceeds to make modifications. By the end of this learning 
stage, the developer has a modified copy of the code base that implements a feature or 
fixes a bug. Thus far, the developer has worked in isolation and most of the effort he/she 
has expended is related to learning about the code base.
We refer to the next stage in the contribution process as the coordination stage. The 
first step of the coordination stage is the preparation step in which the developer prepares 
a patch that can be contributed to the community. This step includes pulling a recent copy 
of the community code base and making sure that the recent changes by the contributor 
do not conflict with changes made my other developers since the initial review step. This 
step also includes making modifications to the patch to make sure it complies with com-
munity coding standards, such as including unit tests or documentation. The developer 
then posts the patch to the community tracker or mailing list and waits to receive any 
feedback from the community for possible modifications. 
The final step occurs when the patch is committed to the code base by a committer, 
which may involve further modifications to rectify any problems that the committal step 
might uncover. At the end of this step the patch is incorporated into the community code 
base. If the patch was the developer’s first contribution to the code base, then the devel-
oper is considered a contributor to the community at this time. 
The last three steps of the contribution process, which comprise the coordination 
stage, will require the contributor to work with other committers and possibly contribu-
tors in the community. As a result, in this stage any costs are generally related to coordi-
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nation and increase with the number of other contributors with whom one needs to coor-
dinate (cf. Brooks, 1975), which is why we refer to it as the coordination stage.
The focus of this work is mainly on the coordination stage. The costs in the coordina-
tion stage will vary from one community to another depending on factors that we will 
identify later in this work. More importantly, however, as we explain in the next section, 
we expect that committers will be a potential performance bottleneck given the effort re-
quired of them before any contribution can be committed.
2.1.2  The Bottleneck
Although committers might initially seem to have an easier job than contributors, they are 
actually the busiest FLOSS community members, as they are responsible for committing 
contributions directly to the code base. Not only are they themselves developers in the 
community, they are also tasked with making decisions about other contributors’ work 
(Shah, 2006), which makes them critical to any contribution. For example, if a contribu-
tion is accepted, the committer is tasked with integrating the contributed patch into the 
code base, which places more responsibility and work on the committer’s shoulders, es-
pecially when the committed code breaks the work of other developers.
Once we realize the tremendous effort shouldered by committers, it becomes easy to 
understand why many of them spend only four months on average serving the community 
after they are promoted (Shah, 2006). Some try to cope with this increased responsibility 
by limiting their interactions within the community to include only members who they 
think possess valuable knowledge (Kuk, 2006). To illustrate that this is indeed a problem 
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that many FLOSS communities face and that it is worthy of community consideration, we 
present excerpts from the guidelines of some well known FLOSS projects in Tab. 3.1.
Table 3.1: Evidence of delays in FLOSS the development process
Community Excerpt Notes
Subversion
If you don’t get a response for a while, and 
don’t see the patch applied, it may just mean 
that people are really busy.
Patch committals can experi-
ence delays.
Mozilla
Getting attention: If a reviewer doesn’t re-
spond within a week or so of the review re-
quest: 
• Join #developers ... 
Because delays in the review 
process are all too common, 
the Mozilla community has a 
process for how to deal with 
the problem.
Apache
What if my patch gets ignored?
Because Apache has only a small number of 
volunteer developers, and these developers are 
often very busy, it is possible that your patch 
will not receive any immediate feedback. De-
velopers must prioritize their time, dealing 
first with serious bugs and with parts of the 
code in which they have interest and knowl-
edge. Here are some suggestions on what you 
can do to encourage action on your patch:...
Delays in patch committal are 
all too common and the 
community explains the rea-
sons and gives suggestions on 
how to alleviate the problem.
 
Since all development work must involve a committer and committers are the busiest 
members of the community, we conclude that their activities are the bottleneck to the 
FLOSS development process (cf. Goldratt and Cox, 1994). This means that the perform-
ance of a community will depend on the performance of the committers and that any per-
formance impacting optimization should target committers’ (Goldratt and Cox, 1994). As 
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a result, we conclude that the way in which workload is distributed among the committers 
will be an important determinant of performance. 
 2.1.3  The Committal Structure
The committal structure refers to how committal workload is distributed among the 
committers. The committal structure can be centralized, if committal activity is per-
formed by a focal group that is considered small relative to the size of the development 
structure’s membership. The committal structure can also be decentralized when this fo-
cal group represents a larger portion of the developers. A highly centralized committal 
structure would include only a single committer, whereas, a highly decentralized structure 
would include all the developers as committers.
Somewhat contrary to the babbling bazaar description by Raymond (2001), which rep-
resents a decentralized committal structure, FLOSS communities display both centralized 
(e.g. Krishnamurthy, 2002; Crowston and Howison, 2005) and decentralized tendencies 
(Mockus et al., 2002; Crowston and Howison, 2005). However, the implications of these 
structures are yet to be understood fully. 
To the extent that we can view FLOSS communities as organizations, we can leverage 
insights from established organizational literature to give us a better understanding of the 
implications of these structures. The Organizational Information Processing Theory 
(OIPT) stream of literature (e.g. Galbraith, 1973; Tushman and Nadler, 1978; Tushman, 
1979) seems to be the most relevant for understanding committal structures and for 
reaching the overall goals of this study, as it is concerned with the fit between organiza-
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tional structures and organizational performance. Therefore, we will first review the OIPT 
literature and then revisit committal structures to understand their implications on per-
formance.
2.2  FLOSS and Organizational Information Processing The-
ory
Organizational Information Processing Theory (OIPT) (Galbraith, 1973) introduces the 
idea that organizations are information-processing systems that deal with uncertainty in 
their environment. The theory suggests that organizations that find a fit between their 
information-processing capabilities and their information-processing needs will perform 
better than organizations that cannot find such a fit. The theory also implies that there is 
no single organizational structure associated with superior performance; rather, it sug-
gests that different organizational structures are suited for different conditions (Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967). These insights are important for understanding the implications of the 
different committal structures in FLOSS communities and their relationships to develop-
ment performance. Specifically, the theory suggests that neither a centralized nor a decen-
tralized committal structure is better; rather, it suggests that the FLOSS community’s 
needs should determine which structure is a better fit for what developers and users want 
to accomplish.
Before using OIPT, we first need to demonstrate the theory’s relevance in FLOSS 
communities. Towards that goal, we first need to establish that FLOSS communities can 
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be viewed as organizations; then we need to establish that the main task performed by 
such communities involves information processing. 
Ahuja and Carley (1999) define a virtual organization as “a geographically distributed 
organization whose members are bound by a long-term common interest or goal, and who 
communicate and coordinate their work through information technology.”  (p. 742). 
FLOSS communities are a special type of a virtual organization since community mem-
bers work towards the common goal of software development, are geographically dis-
persed, and coordinate their work through information technology. So, the first require-
ment for using OIPT in this context is fulfilled, as FLOSS communities are essentially 
virtual organizations.
Secondly, software development tasks, which are the main tasks performed by FLOSS 
communities, have been described as knowledge-intensive (O’Mahony and Ferraro, 
2007; Lee and Cole, 2003). Completing these knowledge-intensive tasks requires devel-
opers to acquire specific knowledge related to a development process in order to partici-
pate effectively (Fichman and Kemerer, 1997; Lee and Cole, 2003). These tasks also re-
quire team members to constantly coordinate with one another to ensure that the changes 
they make to the code base do not conflict with those made by other team members 
(Crowston, 1997). As depicted in Fig. 3.2, both learning (stages 1 to 3) and coordination 
(stages 4 to 6) activities are part of the development process in FLOSS communities. 
Given the specific nature of the knowledge related to development in FLOSS communi-
ties (see Study 1), learning or sharing (i.e., coordinating) that knowledge will require ex-
tensive interaction and communication among team members (Choudhury and Sampler, 
161
1997; Brooks, 1975), which are considered information-processing tasks (Galbraith, 
1973; Crowston, 1997). As such, the second requirement for using OIPT in this context is 
fulfilled, making OIPT an appropriate lens to understand development performance in 
FLOSS communities.
2.2.1  The Relationship Between Structure and Performance: Fit
Galbraith (1973) explains the relationship between performance and organizational struc-
ture by describing a situation in which subordinate workers are tasked with performing 
simple tasks. When an unusual circumstance occurs due to a change in the organization’s 
environment, the worker will seek a superior to resolve the situation and will then com-
plete the task. 
Such a situation could occur in a FLOSS community in any of the contribution stages 
depicted in Fig. 3.2. When contributors lack certain knowledge that is required to move 
through the contribution stages, such as identifying which files need to be changed in or-
der to implement a feature or resolve a bug, they will seek out that knowledge. The com-
mitters, having experience with the source code and the community in general, will be the 
members most likely to possess this knowledge or could at least identify individuals who 
do. Therefore, contributors constantly seek out committers to assist them in resolving a 
myriad of issues related to the contribution process. 
Before a contribution is committed into the community code base, committers are also 
required to intervene and, possibly, modify contributed patches before they are commit-
ted. As one committer puts it: “I’ve written before on mailing lists that only about two out 
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of every five submitted patches I review go in unchanged on a good day and that seems to 
match other maintainers’ experiences, too,” 1 suggesting that contributions demand some 
effort from committers before they are committed. Although the relationship between 
committers and contributors is not one between a superior and a subordinate, completing 
a development task will require them to interact in a manner similar to how OIPT de-
scribes the relationship between a superior and a subordinate.
Based on OIPT, an organization’s structure starts to affect performance when superiors 
are no longer able to respond to the subordinates’ requests for intervention in a timely 
manner. This situation occurs mainly when the number of requests exceeds the superiors’ 
capacity for handling them, which is a function of the uncertainty inherent in the task per-
formed by the organization (Galbraith, 1973; Tushman, 1979). As a result, tasks are not 
completed as quickly when superiors are overloaded, and the overall performance of the 
organization suffers. Thus, such situations occur when the organization’s information-
processing needs exceed its information-processing capacity, which we refer to as lack of 
fit for short.
It is not surprising that lack of fit would occur in FLOSS communities since commit-
ters are mostly volunteers and will very likely have less time to dedicate to community 
coordination than would a full-time supervisor in a more conventional organization. Fur-
thermore, whatever time committers can afford to give to the community will not be en-
tirely dedicated to resolving contributor issues, as the committers will also be engaged in 
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1 From the blog of a committer in the Django web framework FLOSS project: 
http://www.pointy-stick.com/blog/2007/11/02/development-experiences-version-control/
both their own development tasks and interactions with the broader community (Shah, 
2006; Crowston et al., 2005; Mockus et al., 2002). 
Based on OIPT, FLOSS communities, like organizations, can choose from two differ-
ent strategies to deal with lack of fit and improve development performance. First, a 
FLOSS community could increase the information-processing capacity of the committal 
structure to be able to process more contributions and give committers more time for their 
own development activities, thereby improving the development performance of the 
community. Second, the community could take action to reduce their information proc-
essing needs by reducing the uncertainty inherent in development tasks. We will refer to 
both of these strategies collectively as fit strategies.
2.2.2  Theoretical Assumptions
The extent to which we expect the fit strategies to work rests on a number of assump-
tions. The first assumption we make is that development tasks cannot be completed if 
there are outstanding coordination tasks, which is a reasonable assumption to make in 
software development as developers need to coordinate to ensure the functional integrity 
of the software (Brooks, 1975). 
The second assumption is about the nature of the coordination task, namely that it in-
volves communication among a group of developers and, therefore, cannot be subdi-
vided. As a result, we cannot have a single individual performing all of the coordination 
tasks; rather, coordination will demand the involvement of a group of developers, similar 
to how Brooks (1975) described communication channels between developers.
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The third assumption is that the committers are boundedly rational, meaning that they 
have a limited capacity to process and comprehend information (Simon, 1955). This as-
sumption results in the committal structure having a limited information processing ca-
pacity. 
The fourth assumption is that there is project-specific knowledge, which developers 
must gain before performing any development tasks within a FLOSS community, and 
that this knowledge is immobile in nature and requires extensive effort to transfer and 
communicate (Choudhury and Sampler, 1997; Fichman and Kemerer, 1997). In addition, 
this knowledge is heterogeneously distributed among community members. As a result, 
no two members possess similar knowledge, which makes it difficult to replace and/or 
add developers without incurring costs related to transferring the requisite knowledge 
(Brooks, 1975). 
Another result of this last assumption is that before new participants can partake in 
development efforts, they need to obtain the requisite knowledge by either reading the 
source code or by interacting with knowledgeable community members (Brooks, 1975), 
which places a burden on these knowledgeable members, including committers. Since 
committers are also boundedly rational, they will have to make a tradeoff between per-
forming their own development work and assisting other members. This tradeoff could 
potentially limit the flow of knowledge within the community (Kuk, 2006) and the num-
ber of individuals who can effectively participate in the development process; this, in 
turn, affects the overall performance of the community.
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Finally, because committers are the busiest community members and because devel-
opment progress depends on their intervention, we make a final assumption that the de-
velopment bottleneck resides within the committal structure and that improving the 
information-processing capacity of that structure will improve a FLOSS community’s 
development performance (Goldratt and Cox, 1994). Therefore, to expand its capacity for 
information processing, a committal structure has to be more decentralized, which can be 
done through the promotion of more committers from the ranks of the contributors. How-
ever, based on the assumptions we made, such a strategy will not come without a cost 
(Tushman and Nadler, 1978), the nature of which we have yet to fully understand. To that 
end, we formalize our research model in the following section.
2.3  Theoretical Model
Thus far, we have conceptualized FLOSS communities as information-processing sys-
tems whose goal is the production of software. Our basic argument, based on OIPT, is 
that high performing FLOSS communities will be those that manage to find a fit between 
their information-processing capabilities and their information-processing needs. 
We identified committers as being the potential performance bottleneck in FLOSS 
communities given that they are required to be involved with all contributions and are the 
busiest members of the community. Therefore, how committers are organized in the 
community, which we refer to as committal structure, will be the main determinant of a 
FLOSS community’s processing capacity (cf. Galbraith, 1973; Tushman, 1979).
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As for the information-processing needs of a FLOSS community, OIPT suggests that 
these needs will emerge from the inherent uncertainty of software development tasks and 
the environment (Galbraith, 1973). There are, however, many facets to the development 
tasks that can be sources of uncertainty, which OIPT does not specify. In order to identify 
the specific sources of uncertainty, we follow the work of Tushman (1979).
Tushman (1979) identified three main source of task-related uncertainty in organiza-
tional settings: 1) task routineness, defined as the unpredictability of the task, 2) task en-
vironment uncertainty, defined as the rate of change in the external environment that is 
beyond the organization’s control, and 3) task interdependence, defined as the extent to 
which tasks require coordination to be accomplished.
The same sources of uncertainty exist in FLOSS communities, which we identify in 
Tab. 3.2. However, the broad nature of the task environment uncertainty construct 
(Tushman, 1979) in addition to the differences in the competitive dynamics of FLOSS 
communities and that of the conventional market competitors (see Study 1) requires that 
we adapt the construct specifically for our context. As a result, we identify first-time con-
tributors as a source of uncontrollable, external environment uncertainty and rename this 
construct contributor uncertainty.
Following OIPT, we forward the model depicted in Fig. 3.3. We identified the cen-
tralization of the committal structure as the source of a FLOSS community’s information-
processing capacity, while task-related sources of uncertainty—task routineness, con-
tributor uncertainty, and task interdependence—are identified as the source of 
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information-processing capacity. In the following sections, we discuss the logic behind 
our model in more detail.
Figure 3.3: Overview of research model
Table 3.2: Overview of theoretical constructs
Construct Definition
Performance Progress made towards meeting the demands of the FLOSS commu-
nity.
Centralization The degree to which the committal activity in a FLOSS community is 
concentrated in the hands of a small group of committers relative to 
the overall size of the development structure’s membership
Task Routineness The degree of predictability in the software-development task done 
within the FLOSS community.
Contributor Un-
certainty
The unpredictability in development tasks that is introduced from the 
need to integrate the work from contributors who are considered ex-
ternal to the FLOSS development structure.
Task Interdepend-
ence
The degree to which developers’ development tasks in a FLOSS 
community require cooperation.
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2.3.1  Performance
According to Brooks (1975), effort and progress are two separate concepts. More effort 
can be expended by a software development project, but that does not guarantee that pro-
gress will be made. As Brooks (1975) explains, this occurs when more developers, whose 
tasks are sequential in nature, are introduced late into a project. The effort needed to bring 
new developers up to speed (i.e., the ramp-up effect) and coordinate development with 
them will only detract the most productive developers from making progress, thereby de-
laying the project. Our concept of performance is similar to Brooks’ (1975) notion of 
progress. As such, we define performance as the progress made towards meeting the de-
mands of the FLOSS community.
The situation with FLOSS development is similar to how Brooks (1975) described 
progress in traditional development teams. As explained in Sec. 3.2.2, we identified learn-
ing and coordination as two important stages in the contribution process (see Fig. 3.2). 
Committers might become involved in assisting contributors in the learning stage by an-
swering their technical questions and giving them guidance (von Krogh et al., 2003). The 
effort expended in this learning stage is equivalent to the ramp-up effect described by 
Brooks (1975). Progress would suffer as the productive committer chooses to trade-off 
some of his/her development and committal time towards helping other contributors.
The coordination stage is also similar to how Brooks (1975) described software-
development teams, as coordination will be required between committers and contribu-
tors before a contributed patch can be committed. The number of individuals with whom 
the contributor or committer need to coordinate may vary depending on who could af-
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fected if a problem occurs during the patch-committal process. Since we are assuming 
that development progress cannot happen if a community’s coordination requirements are 
not met, committers must perform the needed coordination tasks, which detracts them 
from making progress, thereby delaying the committal of a patch.
While the notions of effort and progress exist in FLOSS communities, progress has to 
be re-conceptualized for FLOSS communities. Unlike conventional software-
development teams for which where progress is measured by how close a team has 
achieved its deadline or met its project requirements (Espinosa et al., 2007; Gemino et al., 
2007; Crowston, 1997; Nidumolu, 1995; DeLone and McLean, 1992), FLOSS communi-
ties differ in two regards. First, there are no enforceable deadlines within FLOSS com-
munities because participation is voluntary, which makes it difficult to determine effec-
tiveness in terms of meeting deadlines (Raymond, 2001). Second, there are no preset de-
velopment requirements for FLOSS communities, which is similar to the conventional 
waterfall-development model of traditional software creation; rather, requirements are set 
by members on a needs basis with no guarantee that the needed features will be imple-
mented (Scacchi, 2002).
Given that committers make trade-offs similar to the trade-offs made by productive 
developers in traditional software development (Brooks, 1975), progress can be observed 
through the committal activity on the community code base (Koch and Schneider, 2002). 
A well organized FLOSS project will utilize the time of committers better to produce use-
ful code, rather than requiring them to expend their efforts on coordination and learning 
activities. More importantly, a commit corresponds to a met demand in the community 
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signaling that progress has been made (Grewal et al., 2006). Furthermore, a commit only 
occurs after all coordination and learning issues have been resolved and the committer is 
satisfied with the quality of the contribution (von Krogh et al., 2003). 
Therefore, if two projects have a similar number of committers, holding everything 
else equal, the team that is able to make more progress is the one that is able to commit 
more patches within the same time period. The committers for the project that commits 
fewer patches are probably expending more effort towards coordination and learning, 
which results in committal delays and fewer patches being committed within a specific 
time period.
To summarize, our definition of performance fits with the OIPT conceptualization of 
FLOSS communities as information-processing systems whose goal is the production of 
software. Software is produced as a result of all of the information processing and coor-
dination tasks completed by committers (Crowston, 1997; O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). 
These information-processing tasks must be handled by the committal structure, and the 
completion of these tasks occurs when a patch is committed. The committal structure will 
have a limited capacity for information processing that will be expended towards effort 
(i.e., coordination and learning) or progress (i.e., patch committal). As the effort require-
ments increase due to increased uncertainty, progress will be compromised. When effort 
is minimized by controlling uncertainty, progress is maximized.
2.3.2  Centralization
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The most prevalent conceptualization of centralization in recent FLOSS literature (e.g., 
Grewal et al., 2006; Wu et al., 2007; Tan et al., 2007) is based on the variations of the 
centrality concept from social network analysis (Freeman, 1979). The different conceptu-
alizations of centralization within the social network literature include: degree centrality, 
betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality (Freeman, 1979). Such conceptualiza-
tions reflect traits of individuals that are part of an underlying communication network. 
Our conceptualization of centralization departs from this network based understanding to 
a more classical organizational theory understanding of the construct and is mostly con-
cerned with the capacity of the social or organizational structure to process information.
In organizational literature, centralization has been conceptualized as a characteristic 
of the organization (Hage and Aiken, 1967; Ouchi and Dowling, 1974). It has been asso-
ciated with the span of control for supervisors in an organization (Hage and Aiken, 1967). 
Centralized structures limit control in the hands a few individuals in which a larger group 
of individuals must report to. Because a supervisor expends greater effort to oversee and 
communicate with a larger group of employees in centralized structures, he/she is de-
scribed as having a wide span of control that could result in the overwhelming of the su-
pervisor (Blau, 1968). In decentralized structures however, supervisors will be responsi-
ble to oversee and communicate with a smaller group of employees. As a result, they are 
described as having a narrow span of control in which supervisors are able to dedicate 
more of their time per employee compared to centralized structures (Blau, 1968).
Span of control doesn’t necessarily describe a relationship in which supervisors over-
see employees, it is also valid of the relationship between supervisor and employee in 
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which employees initiate communication and describes the time that a supervisor makes 
available for an employee (Blau 1968). The relationship between committers and con-
tributors in FLOSS communities might not be that of supervisor and subordinate, never-
theless, span of control could be used to describe the nature of communication between 
the two within a FLOSS community. Span of control describes the amount of time or ef-
fort any committer can make available per contributor, and thus, could be thought of as 
the capacity to deal with the demands of the contributors.
A committer might have to communicate with a large number of contributors which 
results in a situation that is analogous to having a wide span of control (i.e., centralized 
structure). The need to communicate and coordinate with all these contributors is likely to 
overwhelm the committers’ capacity for information processing as the number of con-
tributors increase. A narrower span of control (i.e., decentralized structure) on the other 
hand is less likely to overwhelm any individual committer and spread the workload over 
a greater number of committers. As a result, when the span of control for committers is 
wide, the capacity of the committal structure is likely to be at its limits and is said to be 
centralized. On the other hand, given the same number of committers and a narrow span 
of control, the committal structure would still have the capacity to process more informa-
tion because the committers are less overwhelmed. Such structures are described as being 
decentralized.
Based on our prior discussion, centralization is defined as the degree to which the 
committal activity in a FLOSS community is concentrated in the hands of a small group 
of committers relative to the overall size of the development structure’s membership. 
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While adding committers would make a FLOSS community’s committal structure seem 
more decentralized, how decentralized the committal structure is relative to other com-
munities will depend on the proportion of members of the development structure (i.e. 
contributors) that posses committal rights. Based on our discussion in Sec. 3.2.1, we ex-
pect committers to be the main development bottleneck in a FLOSS community because 
all development activities will require their involvement. Therefore, we expect that the 
way in which they are organized will have a profound impact on the community’s per-
formance.
FLOSS communities can exhibit both centralized and decentralized development 
structures. Decentralized structures are expected to provide a greater capacity for process-
ing information, since a larger group of members will not only add to the processing ca-
pacity of the structure but will distribute more of the workload to leave smaller tasks for 
individual committers. However, we do not expect that adding committers will be cos-
tless (cf. Tushman and Nadler, 1978) since a larger group of committers could increase 
the need for coordination (Brooks, 1975; Crowston, 1997). Nevertheless, according to 
OIPT, we expect both types of committal structure will be the best fit for different devel-
opment conditions.
2.3.3  Task Routineness
We define task routineness as the degree of predictability in a software development task 
(Perrow, 1967; Tushman, 1979; March and Simon, 1993). Routine tasks are simple in na-
ture and are reflective of the knowledge required to accomplish them (Turner and Ma-
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khija, 2006). Simple tasks will draw from a limited domain of knowledge and will require 
little effort to accomplish (Zander and Kogut, 1995; Grant, 1996a). Non-routine tasks, on 
the other hand, have a great degree of unpredictability (Perrow, 1967). Such tasks will 
also require complex underlying knowledge that draws from a diverse set of knowledge 
domains (Turner and Makhija, 2006). As a result, non-routine tasks will require individu-
als to put forth greater effort to accomplish them (Zander and Kogut, 1995; Grant, 
1996a).
Assuming that the source code reflects a FLOSS community’s underlying develop-
ment knowledge, non-routine tasks will require the modification or addition of a greater 
number files. The reason behind such modification is the fact that it is good programming 
practice to encapsulate similar functionality into the same modules or files (Page-Jones, 
1998). FLOSS communities are known to follow good programming practices (MacCor-
mack et al., 2006; Raymond, 2001); therefore, it is probable that contributed patches re-
flect the complexity of the development tasks.
What is important, however, is how these patches impact committal structures. As the 
number of files modified by a patch increase, the code that needs to be reviewed by a 
committer also increases. In addition, the likelihood that such a patch will interfere with 
the work of other developers will increase as more files are impacted, thereby increasing 
the chance that the committer will be required to coordinate between developers. Fur-
thermore, since the code is not localized to a specific file, when a patch introduces a bug, 
the committer’s debugging task will be much more complex since he/she is required to 
trace a larger number of files. As a result, we expect that non-route development tasks 
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will place a greater amount of coordination requirements on committers, thereby placing 
a heaver information-processing burden on the committal structure than would routine 
tasks.
Furthermore, non-routine tasks will place greater learning efforts on committers. Con-
tributors who are required to perform these complex tasks will also be required to change 
a greater portion of the source file in the code base. Before a change is made to any file, 
the contributor must understand the contents of that file and understand the best way to 
make the changes. To obtain that understanding, contributors will not only need to read 
the source code (Raymond, 2001), but they will also need to seek the assistance of com-
mitters in helping them understand the impact of their changes (Krogh and Hippel, 2006). 
As a result, greater information-processing requirements are placed on the committal 
structure due to learning requirements associated with non-routine tasks. Hence,
H 1 Task routineness is positively related to a FLOSS community’s performance 
Because routine tasks are simple and highly predictable, they will not generate a great 
amount of uncertainty and will not require much in terms of information processing. Fur-
thermore, since the requisite knowledge for completing such tasks is easily codifiable, it 
is easier to communicate by nature (Grant, 1996b, 1996a; Kogut and Zander, 1992), mak-
ing the time spent by any one individual to learn or communicate development knowl-
edge relatively small. Therefore, we expect routine tasks to put little strain on the devel-
opment structure in terms of development-related information-processing requirements, 
making a centralized structure, with its limited information-processing capacity, fit with 
the completion and management of such tasks. Decentralized structures, on the other 
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hand, will introduce extra overhead from the need to coordinate between committers (cf. 
Tushman and Nadler, 1978).
Knowledge of non-routine tasks is more varied and likely to be tacit in nature (Kogut 
and Zander, 1992), thus making it more difficult to share and communicate (Choudhury 
and Sampler, 1997). Therefore, non-routine tasks will strain centralized development 
structures and overwhelm the central committers not only because of the effort required 
to review complex patches but also because of the extra effort needed to communicate the 
tacit development knowledge in this technology-mediated environment (Daft and Lengel, 
1986). 
Given that committers are the most productive developers in a FLOSS community 
(Shah, 2006; Mockus et al., 2002), a distributed committal structure will allow commit-
ters to specialize in different aspects of complex code base development (Grant, 1996a). 
As a result, committers will need to obtain specialized knowledge about the specific parts 
of the code base that they work on (von Krogh et al., 2003).
With a greater number of specialized committers, the information-processing require-
ments are distributed over a greater number of committers, resulting in less effort being 
performed by any one individual (Tushman, 1979). Coordination and learning activities 
can then be performed in parallel, resulting in less overall time needed to perform them, 
even if the time required for any individual task increases due to the extra coordination 
efforts required with distributed structures. 
Therefore, we expect the performance gains for FLOSS communities as development 
tasks become more routine to be higher under a centralized committal structure than un-
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der a decentralized committal structure because of the lack of coordination overhead be-
tween committers. It can also be said that as tasks become less routine, the performance 
gains for decentralized committal structures will be higher than for centralized committal 
structures because the coordination and leaning tasks being performed in parallel. As a 
result, a distributed committal structure becomes a better fit for non-routine development 
tasks. Hence,
H 2 As tasks become more routine, FLOSS communities with centralized committal struc-
tures will have higher performance gains than communities with decentralized committal 
structures. 
2.3.4  Contributor Uncertainty
Contributor uncertainty is defined as the unpredictability in development tasks that is in-
troduced from the need to integrate the work of contributors who are considered external 
to the FLOSS development structure. Before contributors can submit patches, they need 
to acquire the requisite knowledge about the code base that will allow them to make a 
contribution. Since this knowledge is tacit in nature, it will require a great deal of com-
munication with other knowledgeable developers.
Because the committers are the most knowledgeable about the code base, they will 
spend a great deal of time communicating with contributors, responding to their ques-
tions, and explaining the intricacies of the code base (von Krogh et  al., 2003), which 
places a learning-related burden on committers’ information-processing capacities. This 
is true mostly of contributors who are new to the development process in a FLOSS com-
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munity, as returning contributors would likely have absorbed the norms and knowledge 
related to making a contribution to the community without placing much burden on the 
committers. This effect is similar to Brooks’ (1975) concept of the ramp-up effect. 
In addition, new contributors are likely to be the least knowledgeable about the code 
base. As a result, their patches are likely to introduce more bugs or violate some of the 
programming guidelines or assumptions that must be adhered to, such as variable access 
rules and coding conventions. Therefore, patches from new contributors will require more 
scrutiny and, therefore, more effort from the committers, resulting in delays in the com-
mittal of the patch. Therefore, we expect contributor uncertainty to have a negative im-
pact on performance. Hence, 
H 3 Contributor uncertainty will be negatively related to a FLOSS community’s perform-
ance. 
When a problem occurs during the committal of a contributed patch, the committer 
will have to read through the code base to find the source of the bug or communicate with 
other developers to find a solution, both of which are information-processing tasks. As 
the number of such problems increase, a centralized committal structure will become 
overwhelmed if it does not promote more committers due to its limited information-
processing capacity (Tushman, 1979; Ahuja and Carley, 1999). When the committal 
structure is no longer coping with the community’s information-processing load, external 
contributions are the first to be ignored by committers who will focus on their own devel-
opment work. FLOSS communities could cope with lack of fit due to high contributor 
uncertainty by making the committal structure more decentralized. This, in turn, would 
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development and decision-making tasks free of constraints by any specific individual 
(Tushman, 1979).
A decentralized committal structure has the development knowledge and decision-
making authority more distributed throughout the community. As a result, the committal 
and development workload is distributed among a greater number of committers resulting 
in less information-processing work for each individual committer. Furthermore, since 
the knowledge is distributed, the coordination and learning activities will not come to a 
halt when a committer decides to take the time to assist a new contributor. For these rea-
sons, we argue that a decentralized structure is a better fit for situations in which con-
tributor uncertainty is high, as it will result in higher performance gains with increased 
uncertainty when compared to centralized committal structures. Hence,
H 4 As contributor uncertainty increases, FLOSS communities with centralized committal 
structures will have lower performance gains than communities with decentralized com-
mittal structures. 
2.3.5  Task Interdependence
When task completion requires the cooperation of multiple individuals or organizational 
units, it is said to exhibit interdependence (Tushman, 1979; Malone and Crowston, 1994). 
There are two types of interdependence: intra-unit interdependence and inter-unit inter-
dependence (Tushman, 1979). Intra-unit interdependence occurs when individuals within 
the same organizational unit are required to cooperate to complete a task, while inter-unit 
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interdependence occurs when different organizational units within an organization are 
required to cooperate. 
Intra-unit cooperation was found to be much easier than inter-unit cooperation because 
the members of a single organizational unit possess common knowledge and language, 
which makes it easier for them to cooperate (Tushman, 1979; Grant, 1996a). Cooperation 
across organizational units is much more difficult since the language and knowledge dif-
fers significantly from one unit to another, making it difficult for members of one unit to 
cooperate easily with those of another unit. As a result, different organizational units col-
laborate through designated managers or liaisons who have the necessary skills and 
authority to work with other units (Tushman, 1979).
A similar organizational pattern can be observed in FLOSS communities in which de-
velopers organize around functional software units referred to as modules (Crowston 
et al., 2005). Organizing source code such that similar and related functionality is encap-
sulated into the same module is considered good programming practice. Such organiza-
tion allows modules to exhibit a high degree of within-module interdependency, which is 
known as cohesion (Page-Jones, 1998). Since similar functionality is contained in single 
modules, the developers working in each module would share similar knowledge and be 
able to collaborate as if they were in a single organizational unit in which joint problem 
solving is important (Tushman, 1979). 
Since modules’ functionality is limited in scope (Page-Jones, 1998), each module is 
assigned an owner who is responsible for coordinating its development efforts (Crowston 
et al., 2005; Crowston, 1997). Within-module coordination is centralized, and it is appro-
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priate because of the limited coordination and development information-processing re-
quirements generated from a single module. These requirements are lessened because 
only a small group of developers who share common knowledge related to the modules 
are involved in the development, which allows them to coordinate more effectively. 
Therefore, we argue that within-module coordination does not generate a significant 
strain on the development structure.
Inter-unit interdependence can also be observed within FLOSS communities when de-
velopers working on separate modules are required to coordinate. The need for such co-
ordination is caused by the functional dependencies between modules (Crowston, 1997). 
Developers working on different modules will possess different sets of knowledge, mak-
ing coordination more difficult than within-module coordination (Tushman, 1979; Grant, 
1996a). Unlike intra-unit dependencies for which problems are localized to the module 
the developers are working on, problems might not be localized to one particular module 
when inter-unit dependencies exist. Therefore, managing the effects of inter-unit depend-
encies is more difficult.
To coordinate in these contexts effectively, not only will the developers need to proc-
ess coordination information, but they will also need to build common knowledge that 
will allow them to organize their development tasks (Grant, 1996a). This common 
knowledge consists of understanding the requisite development information of the other 
group (von Krogh et al., 2003), which negates the benefits of having a distributed devel-
opment structure because the developers can no longer specialize in their own modules. 
In addition to performing all of the coordination tasks, committers will also be required to 
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perform more development-related information-processing tasks, which forces them to 
make tradeoffs affecting the overall performance of the community. Therefore,
H 5 Task interdependency will be negatively related to a FLOSS community’s perform-
ance. 
As mentioned in the previous section, task interdependence in software development 
occurs between developers when they are working on the same source code files within a 
module or when the source code files they are working on have functional dependencies 
that span modules (Malone and Crowston, 1994; Crowston, 1997). Since within-module 
dependencies do not put a significant strain on the development structure, it follows that 
the committal structure will not be strained. As a result, cross-module dependencies be-
come a significant source of development-related information-processing requirements.
Adding new committers will not help address this demand because more committers 
in addition to the existence of high dependencies would increase the amount of cross-
module communication channels needed to maintain the functional integrity of the soft-
ware (cf. Brooks, 1975; Crowston, 1997). As a result, more of the committal structure’s 
information-processing capacity would be expended in meeting coordination demands. 
The key to achieving fit in such situations becomes a matter of reducing information-
processing requirements in general (Galbraith, 1973).
Since task interdependence is created from dependencies in the source code (Brooks, 
1975; Crowston, 1997; Tiwana, 2008), we argue that coordination-related information-
processing requirements can be reduced through conscious design decisions that reduce 
cross-modules dependencies. If source code is designed to exhibit few dependencies be-
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tween program units (i.e., modules) and high dependencies within a single unit, then this 
would allow developers to work concurrently on different program units with little need 
for coordination between them; such a design is said to exhibit high modularity (Sanchez 
and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2006; Tiwana, 2008).
Limiting cross-module dependencies would limit the unanticipated side effects of 
making changes in one module, which often appear in different modules. This, in turn, 
reduces the need for coordination and communication because the development tasks per-
formed by developers would be restricted to specific modules and would enable develop-
ers working on different modules to work in parallel (Crowston, 1997). Such a limitation 
is equivalent to the strategy suggested by Galbraith (1973) for creating self-contained 
tasks. Furthermore, one of the assumptions Brooks (1975) mentions as to what would 
lead to an increase in the number of communication channels is the serialization (i.e., de-
pendencies) between tasks. Removing the serialization constraint would reduce the need 
to communicate between developers.
When coordination requirements are reduced, more of the committers’ time is freed 
for development-related information processing. As a result, the whole community bene-
fits from committers’ increased responsiveness to communication and knowledge sharing 
(Tushman, 1979) and from the specialization that results from modularization (Grant, 
1996a). These improvements make the community’s overall development more efficient 
and increase its overall development performance. More importantly, modular designs 
enable developers to work in parallel, and by reducing coordination requirements, it also 
reduces the coordination-related costs associated with adding more committers (Baldwin 
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and Clark, 2006). Therefore, we argue that distributed development is a good fit only 
when a community improves the modular design of its code base, thereby reducing the 
task interdependence between developers.
Therefore, what we expect to observe is that FLOSS communities with a distributed 
committal structure that manage to reduce task interdependence through improved modu-
lar designs will exhibit higher performance gains than similar communities with a cen-
tralized committal structure. We attribute this higher performance to the reduction of 
coordination-related information-processing requirements that are removed by the im-
proved source code design. Similarly, FLOSS communities with centralized committal 
structures and highly interdependent development tasks will perform better than similar 
communities with decentralized committal structures because decentralized structures 
will introduce more coordination-related information-processing requirements. Therefore,
H 6 As task interdependency increases, FLOSS communities with centralized committal 
structures will have higher performance gains than communities with decentralized 
committal structures. 
3  Methodology
3.1  Sample
To test our theory, we had to select a sample that satisfied the requirements stated in Sec. 
3.2.2.2. Specifically, we needed a sample that represents successful FLOSS projects that 
enjoy active development, as a great proportion of FLOSS projects are known to be dor-
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mant (Krishnamurthy, 2002). Only for actively developed projects, in which committal 
activity is ongoing over time,  could we observe variations in performance. Therefore, 
our sample frame was limited to successful projects that were likely to have ongoing de-
velopment activity (Crowston et al., 2003).
Prior literature used sourceforge.net to select their samples, citing that it represented a 
significant proportion of FLOSS projects (e.g. Krishnamurthy, 2002; Crowston and 
Howison, 2005; Stewart and Gosain, 2006; Stewart et al., 2006). However, there have 
been recent reports suggesting that the relevance of SourceForge.net as the main hosting 
service for FLOSS projects has declined (Paul, 2009a, 2009b). As such, we used 
ohloh.net, which is a website that lists over 275,000 FLOSS projects regardless of where 
they are hosted, to find a more representative sample of FLOSS projects. Our choice 
seems to have grounding, as sourceforge.net purchased ohloh.net to increase its relevance 
in the FLOSS-hosting market (2009hq).
Following the work of Wu et al. (2007), we selected from the top 1000 most success-
ful projects; however, our sample differed in that we used ohloh.net as the selection web-
site. We got further support that selecting projects from ohloh.net was the right choice 
when we found that only 22% of the top 1000 projects listed on ohloh.net were hosted on 
sourceforege.net. Therefore, we expect our results to have more external validity than 
prior literature that focused on sourceforge.net projects.
3.2  Data Collection
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For practical reasons, however, we were unable to analyze all of the projects listed in our 
sample frame. We found that prior literature focused on a specific programming language 
(e.g. Midha, 2008; MacCormack et al., 2006). They cite the choice of the language on the 
size and complexity of the resultant product (Midha, 2008; Wyuker; jones; seemidharefs). 
Since our goal is to respond to the call to increase the external validity empirical FLOSS 
studies’ findings (Koch, 2004), we expanded our selection to include three of the most 
widely used languages in FLOSS development that represent the primary programming 
philosophies: C, C++, and Python. We identified 289 potential projects for analysis repre-
senting 28.9% of the top 1000 projects. 
Following the recommendations of Howison and Crowston (2004) and prior empirical 
literature on FLOSS dealing with source code repositories (e.g. Wu et al., 2007; Midha, 
2008; Liu and Iyer, 2007), we screened the projects and excluded projects that repre-
sented meta-projects and projects with missing history or inaccessible repositories. Since 
there were no established criteria in prior literature as to what an actively developed pro-
ject was (besides the ranking on sourceforge.net), we had to establish our own criteria 
because the majority of the projects in our sample were not listed on sourceforge.net and 
varied significantly in their level of activity. Therefore, we identified an actively devel-
oped project as any project that observed at least a single commit per analysis period 
since the start of our observation2. This left us with a usable sample of 237 projects. We 
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2 The closes criteria was the one used by Koch and Schneider (2002) where they identify committers as 
active if they perform at least a single commit during an analysis period.
then downloaded the source code repository for all of the projects in our sample and pro-
ceeded with the data collection. 
Prior literature has examined FLOSS projects by observing the activity between re-
leases that spanned several months (Midha, 2008), while others observed the activity for 
fixed time periods ranging from one month to up to a year (e.g., Wu et al., 2007; Liu and 
Iyer, 2007; Stewart et al., 2006; Koch, 2004). We chose to go with a fixed period of three 
months, which we believe is long enough to capture any changes in the community’s ac-
tivity in response to changes in the structure.
Tab. 3.3 provides some descriptive statistics of the projects, which shows that the 
minimum number of commits per quarter was one. Notice how the number of commits is 
also skewed towards a high number of commits per month with a mean of 289.2 and a 
median of 116. The same could be seen for the number of committers, contributors, and 
popularity, which were measured as number of self-reported users in ohloh.net. This leads 
us to conclude that our sample is indeed representative of actively developed FLOSS pro-
jects. Tab. 3.4 lists the variables we collected from this sample and provides a summary 
of the corresponding construct definitions and operationalization.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for the project sample
Median Mean STD
Age
In weeks relative to 1-1-2007 4 5.64 48.7
Popularity 57.5 192.1 447.71
CommittersCount per quarter 5 10.84 14.489
Contributorscount per quarter 8 16.29 26.786
Commitscount per quarter 116 289.2 456.656
 
Table 3.4: Variable operationalization
Variable Definition Operationalization
Performance
(PERF)
Progress made towards meeting 
the demands of the FLOSS com-
munity.
The tallied count of commits listed in 
the repository within a three month 
window (Koch and Schneider, 2002; 
Grewal et al., 2006).
Centralization
(CENT)
The degree to which the commit-
tal activity in a FLOSS commu-
nity is concentrated in the hands 
of a small group of committers 
relative to the overall size of the 
development structure’s member-
ship.
The ratio of committers to total num-
ber of developers in the community 
(Ouchi and Dowling, 1974).
	

.
Task Routine-
ness (TROUT)
The degree of predictability in the 
software development task done 
within the FLOSS community.
The average number of files changed 
per commit.
Contributor
Uncertainty
(CUNC)
The unpredictability in develop-
ment tasks that is introduced from 
the need to integrate the work 
from contributors who are consid-
ered external to the FLOSS devel-
opment structure.
The ratio of new contributors to the 
total number of contributors during 
the analysis period.
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Task
Interdependence 
(TINT)
The degree to which the develop-
ment tasks of the developers in a 
FLOSS community require coop-
eration to be completed.
The modularity measure (Newman 
and Girvan, 2004; Newman, 2006b) 
of the leading eigen-vector partition-
ing (Newman, 2006a) of the depend-
ency graph for the beginning of the 
analysis period.
 
3.3  Variables
3.3.1  Performance
Content Validity
Performance is defined as the progress made towards meeting the demands of the FLOSS 
community. Since our theory is built on the premise that the committal structure is the 
bottleneck for development activities in FLOSS communities, we can assess how many 
tasks are completed by the committers based on the number of completed commits (Koch 
and Schneider, 2002; Grewal et al., 2006). We make the assumption that a commit ad-
dresses at least one community request by either fixing a bug or implementing a feature. 
Hence, we can compare the relative performance of communities based on how many 
issues are addressed while controlling for the differences between these projects. 
Procedure
To estimate performance, we counted the total number of commits made by a project per-
formed during a single analysis period. The distribution of the count data suffered from 
over-dispersion with a dispersion parameter of 56, which prevented us from using a 
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Poisson-based regression. To address this problem, we performed log transformation to 
normalize the distribution of the data.
3.3.2  Centralization
Content Validity
Centralization is defined as the degree to which the committal activity in a FLOSS com-
munity is concentrated in the hands of a small group of committers. In such cases, the 
majority of committal activity is done by a relatively small number of committers who 
divvy the distribution of the workload. When the development structure is more decen-
tralized, committal activity will be distributed among a greater number of committers. In 
decentralized development structures, the workload is more evenly distributed to a larger 
number of committers.
To estimate centralization, we calculated the ratio of committers to the total number of 
developers (i.e., contributors and committers) in a FLOSS community. The intuition be-
hind this measure is that the higher the ratio, (i.e., the greater the number of committers to 
total developers), the greater the distribution of workload, which is the reverse of cen-
tralization. Therefore, higher ratios represent more decentralized structures, while lower 
ratios represent more centralized structures. 
This notion of centrality is very close to the concept of span of control (Simon, 1997) 
that is measured as number of subordinates to supervisors (Ouchi and Dowling; 1974). 
While the relationship between a committer and contributor is not that of subordinate and 
supervisor, the ratio between their numbers reflect the density in upward communication 
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going from contributors to committers (Ouchi and Dowling, 1974). Low communication 
density (i.e., smaller ratio) suggests centralized structures where committers expend 
greater effort having to communicate with more contributors. Whereas low communica-
tion density (i.e., greater ratio) suggests a more decentralized structure where the com-
munication effort with contributors is distributed among a larger group of committers. 
Procedure
To obtain the centralization estimate, we counted the total number of committers and con-
tributors as identified from the revision control system for the whole analysis period. We 
then obtained the ratio of committers to total number of committers and contributors as 
an estimate of decentralization of committal structure. We subtracted that ratio from one 
to make it a ratio that increased with centralization. 
The variable, however, observed a non-normal distribution with distributional masses 
close to both zero and one. To address this distributional problem, we had to transform 
the variable into a nominal variable using a median split given the distributional charac-
teristics (MacCallum et al., 2002), where zero represents a decentralized committal struc-
ture and one represents a centralized committal structure3.
3.3.3  Task Routineness
Content Validity
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3 We test the robustness of our results using alternative splits to rule out that our results are an artifact of the 
median split and use the median split results because they are the easiest to present and interpret. See ap-
pendix A for details.
 We define task routineness as the degree of predictability in the software development 
task. Predictable tasks are analyzable and, therefore, easy to break down into simple rou-
tines and steps (Perrow, 1967). For software development tasks, simple routines and steps 
can be implemented and grouped into a single source file. Complex development tasks, 
on the other hand, will draw from different functional domains (Grant, 1996a) and will 
require the modification or addition of more than a single source file. Changes to more 
source files entails that the developer have to acquire the knowledge embedded in each 
modified file. Furthermore, spreading out the changes to a larger number of files increases 
the risk of introducing a bug or creating a conflict with another developer, as the likeli-
hood of two developers working on the same file increases (Crowston, 1997). Therefore, 
the average number of files changed per commit will be inversely related to the routine-
ness of the development task.
Procedure
To obtain the estimate of task routineness we first counted the total number of files 
changed or added over the analysis period. We then divided that number by the number 
of commits to estimate the average number of files changed per commit. We then log 
transformed the variable to normalize its distribution and mean center as recommended 
by Aiken and West (1991) when testing for interaction terms. As mentioned in the previ-
ous section, however, routine tasks are associated with a smaller number of changed or 
added files. As a result, this proxy will be negatively covaried to variables that truly rep-
resent task routineness. Since our variable is mean centered, we multiply it by negative 
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one to reverse the direction of the variance as to make it positively covaried in relation to 
task routineness.
3.3.4  Contributor Uncertainty
Content Validity
Uncertainty in task environment is defined as the unpredictability in development tasks 
that is introduced from the need to integrate the work from contributors who are consid-
ered external to the FLOSS development structure. The uncertainty comes specifically 
from new contributors who are likely to make more mistakes either because they know 
less about the current code base or about the development process. As a result, commit-
ters find themselves spending more time reviewing and committing the work of first time 
contributors (von Krogh et al., 2003). Furthermore, new contributors will require more of 
the committers’ time to help them get past the ramp-up effect (Brooks, 1975). Returning 
contributors are likely to have absorbed more of the knowledge required to make a con-
tribution to the code base and to have gotten past the ramp-up effect with a prior contri-
bution. Therefore, we make the assumption that returning contributors are considered part 
of the development team and will not introduce external uncertainty to the committal 
structure.
Procedure
We counted the number of unique contributors for the analysis period by extracting their 
names from the committal logs of the revision control system. We estimated contributor 
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uncertainty using the ratio of new contributors to the total number of committers. How-
ever, given the distributional characteristics of the variable where there are masses close 
to the values of zero and one, we had to perform a median split and dichotomize the vari-
able into low (zero) and high (one) uncertainty (MacCallum et al., 2002).
3.3.5  Task Interdependence
Content Validity
Task interdependence is defined as the degree to which the completion of development 
tasks in a FLOSS community requires the developer cooperation. The first form of inter-
dependence we discussed in Sec 3.2.3.5 was intra-unit interdependence, which are the 
dependencies shared by developers working on the same set of files. We also explained in 
Sec 3.2.3.5 another form of task-interdependence, inter-unit interdependence, which re-
quires coordination and communication between developers working on different mod-
ules. The need for communication across modules is generated by dependencies between 
the different modules on which developers are working. When organizational units 
maximize intra-unit dependencies and minimize inter-unit dependencies, it would allow 
the different units to work in parallel by reducing the communication and coordination 
requirements (Crowston, 1997). 
In software development teams, such separation could be achieved by managing the 
dependencies between the different functional units (i.e., modules) in the software on 
which the development team is working (Crowston, 1997). By minimizing coupling be-
tween modules, a software development team could reduce the need for communication 
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between groups working on different modules and could enable a parallel development 
process (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). On the other hand, developers working on the same 
modules that encapsulate highly related functionality will need to put forth less effort for 
communication due to the amount of shared knowledge between them from working on a 
highly specialized unit of software, This, in turn, enables shared problem solving and im-
proved maintainability of the module (Grant, 1996a; Page-Jones, 1998).
To estimate the level of dependencies across and within modules, we leveraged the 
leading eigen-vector method to partition the dependency graph of the source code and 
obtain an estimate of its modularity (Newman, 2006a). The modularity value would be 
high when cross-module dependencies are low (i.e., loosely coupled) and within-modules 
dependencies are high, suggesting that the modules are properly partitioned with very 
little interdependence of tasks across functional units (see Study 1). Therefore, the modu-
larity measure can be used as a proxy that is inversely related to task interdependence.
Procedure
First we extracted the dependency graph for a snapshot of the source code at the begin-
ning of the analysis period. We then used the leading eigen-vector method (Newman, 
2006a) to examine how well the graph could be partitioned into sub-graphs. Next, we ex-
tracted the modularity measure for the resulting partition from the leading eigen-vector 
method. We then mean centered the variable since we would be testing an interaction 
term (Aiken and West, 1991). Finally, we multiplied the value by negative 1 since the 
modularity estimate was inversely related to task interdependence.
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3.4  Controls
3.4.1  Age of Project
The age of the FLOSS project might have an effect on the number of committers since 
older projects have more established roles and procedures for coordination than younger 
projects, which might impact performance. In addition, age can serve as a proxy for the 
stage in which the FLOSS project is, which could affect the level of activity in the project 
and, thereby, its performance (Stewart et al., 2006). Age was measured in terms of num-
ber of months from the time the first committal was made to the source code up to the 
first day of the analysis period.
3.4.2  Programming Language
Different programming languages follow different philosophies. Some languages, like 
Python, focus on prototyping and are thus easier to develop for and collaborate on 
(Stewart et al., 2006; Midha, 2008). Such languages are designed with productivity in 
mind, which is why we expect language to have an impact on a community’s overall de-
velopment performance.
3.4.3  Project Popularity
A FLOSS project’s popularity might also play a role in performance because developers 
may find popular projects to be more attractive to join due to the social benefits associ-
ated with participation and exposure (Lakhani and Wolf, 2007; Lerner and Tirole, 2002). 
In addition, popular projects tend to have a greater number of software users, which 
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means the pool of potential contributors to the project is larger (see Study 1). Thus, hav-
ing more contributors will have an impact on overall project performance.
To measure popularity, we obtained the number of users that reported using the soft-
ware on ohloh.net. Given that ohloh.net is a social website for FLOSS developers, the 
number of users that report using a software product serves as a good proxy for popular-
ity amongst developers who are likely to contribute.
3.4.4  Size of Project
Projects with a larger code base are likely to be more complex and have a greater need for 
change (see Study 1). Therefore, we expect projects to differ in the amount of develop-
ment activity they require, which might make smaller projects inherently less active. Fur-
thermore, the rate of change in the source code, or the development inertia, has been 
found to be closely related with the size of the code base in Source Lines of Code 
(SLOC) (Booch, 2008). Therefore, it was important to control for the size of the code 
base, estimated as SLOC, for the beginning of the analysis period, which allowed us to 
compare differently size projects.
3.4.5  Number of Committers
While we are interested in the ratio of committers to external contributors in our study, 
the total number of committers still has implications for performance. Larger projects can 
perform a greater number of commits simply by virtue of having a larger group of com-
mitters. As a result, we controlled for the number of committers, as we are interested in 
the effects that are above and beyond size-related variables.
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3.5  Analysis and Results
Given the longitudinal nature of our study, we used a mixed-model analysis to fit our sta-
tistical models (Cohen et al., 2003). Specifically, we used the lme4 library (Bates and 
Maechler, 2009) for the GNU R (R Development Core Team, 2009) to perform a 
Gaussian-based mixed model given the normally distributed dependent variable. Before 
performing that step, however, we screened our data and made sure that we had no miss-
ing data or variables with distributions that violated the assumptions of mixed-model 
analysis. The correlation matrix (Tab.  3.5) suggests that our variables have discriminant 
validity given that the correlations between them are low.
Furthermore, we used the influence.ME package (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2009) to assess 
the influence of our observations on the results of the mixed-model analysis using Cook’s 
d (Cohen et al., 2003). With Cook’s d values less than .3, we concluded that no single ob-
servation had any excessive influence over the results.
Table 3.6 summarizes the results from our mixed-model analysis (Cohen et al., 2003). 
The mixed models were fitted such that the observations were nested within projects. 
Relative to the null model, the controls-only model was able to explain 17.7% of the 
variability. The main-effects model was a significant improvement over the control with 
an R2 of 23.84%. Since we are fitting a Gaussian-mixed model for an unbalanced design, 
the recommended method to estimate p-values for inference tests is to use a Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo simulation and estimate the 95% Highest Probability Density Interval 
(HPD) (Bates and Maechler, 2009; Chen et al., 2000).
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Table 3.5: Variable correlations and descriptive statistics
PERF CENT TROUT CUNC TINT AGE PER isGPL isC isCpp isPy POP SLOC COM
PERF 1.00
CENT 0.22 1.00
TROUT 0.24 0.03 1.00
CUNC 0.16 0.33 0.10 1.00
TINT -0.27 -0.03 0.21 -0.01 1.00
AGE 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.02 -0.15 1.00
PER -0.06 0.03 -0.02 -0.15 -0.01 0.04 1.00
isGPL -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.05 1.00
isC 0.21 0.12 0.10 0.02 -0.11 0.34 0.00 0.10 1.00
isCpp 0.20 -0.06 -0.24 -0.06 -0.29 -0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.03 1.00
isPy -0.13 -0.05 0.10 0.01 0.20 -0.29 0.00 -0.15 -0.63 -0.32 1.00
POP -0.20 -0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.39 -0.03 -0.11 -0.18 0.08 0.18 1.00
SLOC 0.44 0.14 -0.28 -0.02 -0.44 0.32 0.06 -0.04 0.35 0.29 -0.36 -0.26 1.00
COM 0.66 -0.08 0.14 0.15 -0.22 0.13 -0.01 0.04 0.19 0.17 -0.07 -0.24 0.39 1.00
min 0.00 0.00 -4.64 0.00 -0.42 -7.61 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.21 -6.01 -1.77
mean 4.68 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 4.54 0.42 0.82 0.43 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
median 4.84 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.27 4.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
max 8.33 1.00 5.03 1.00 0.65 13.16 10.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.15 3.73 3.05
std 1.64 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.29 2.65 2.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.41 1.15
  
The null hypotheses that the regression coefficient is different from zero is rejected 
with an alpha < .05 when zero is not within the range of the HPD interval. Based on this 
inference method, we notice that TROUT has a significant relationship with PERF with a 
coefficient of 0.2873 in the main-effect model. This result lends support to our hypothe-
sized positive relationship between task routineness and performance in H1. Similarly, 
the results suggest that TINT ha a significant relationship with PERF with a coefficient of 
-0.3801. This result lends support to the hypothesized negative relationship between task 
interdependence and performance in H5. We could not find support for H3 given that the 
CUNC has a non-significant coefficient.
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Table 3.6: Model fitting 
Model Null Control Main Effects Interaction Effects
Estimate HPD LowerHPD Upper Estimate HPD LowerHPD Upper Estimate HPD LowerHPD Upper
TROUT*C
ENT — 0.079* 0.007 0.176
CUNC*CE
NT — -0.153* -0.372 -0.03
TINT*CEN
T — 0.41. -0.035 0.738
CENT — 0.601*** 0.572 0.772 0.701*** 0.649 0.929
TROUT — 0.287*** 0.275 0.378 0.251*** 0.224 0.348
CUNC — 0.099 -0.03 0.151 0.162* 0.023 0.264
TINT — -0.37*** -0.813 -0.161 -0.56*** -1.036 -0.294
AGE — -0.062*** -0.109 -0.033 -0.071*** -0.113 -0.047 -0.069*** -0.112 -0.045
PER — -0.031*** -0.052 -0.019 -0.03*** -0.052 -0.021 -0.031*** -0.052 -0.022
isGPL — -0.153 -0.286 0.073 -0.124 -0.233 0.074 -0.125 -0.239 0.073
isC — 0.228 -0.042 0.544 0.011 -0.285 0.243 0.023 -0.263 0.264
isCpp — 0.132 -0.082 0.317 0.257* 0.055 0.412 0.252* 0.045 0.403
isPy — -0.222 -0.417 0.258 -0.279 -0.475 0.129 -0.271 -0.462 0.135
POP — -0.431 -1.666 0.411 -0.353 -1.346 0.472 -0.277 -1.229 0.591
SLOC — 0.002*** 0.067 0.202 0.056*** 0.111 0.24 0.06*** 0.113 0.24
COM — 1.226*** 0.979 1.115 1.089*** 0.878 1.006 1.085*** 0.878 1.004
Int 4.652*** 4.6779*** 4.603 4.77 4.344*** 4.25 4.43 4.314*** 4.202 4.391
AIC 5538 4623 4308 4311
LogLik -2766 -2300 -2138 -2136
Deviance 5532 4568 4227 4214
R2 — %17.2 %23.01 %23.08
Chi2 Diff — 983.745 341.096 13.14
P — <.0001*** <.0001*** 0.00434***
Significance codes: ‘***’ <0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1
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Since we used single-indicator variables as proxies for our theoretical constructs, we 
followed the recommendation of Venkatraman (1989) to test for the hypothesized fit in 
H2, H4 and H5 as moderation. We also followed the recommendations of Aiken and West 
(1991) and Cohen et al. (2003) and mean centered all of the continuous variables such 
that the intercept and lower-order effect terms could be interpreted.
We included the interaction terms in the interaction model between our main effect 
variables and CENT, which is the moderator that represents the centralization of a 
FLOSS community’s committal structure. Based on the Chi2 difference test, the interac-
tion model explains a significant amount of variability more than the main effect model. 
With an R2 of 20.08% the change in the effect size due to the addition of the interaction 
terms is quite small. This however is typical of moderation effects in psychological and 
management studies in which the median for the effect size for studies conducted over 
the past 30 years was found to be around 0.002 (Aguinis et al., 2005). McClelland and 
Judd (1993) attribute this to the small amount of residual variance, after accounting for 
the main effects, that is used to detect moderation effects.
The positive and significant coefficient of the TROUT*CENT coefficient (0.079, p-
value < 0.05) lends support to H2, which suggests communities with centralized commit-
tal structures are a better fit for routine tasks. To illustrate this, we plotted the simple 
slopes for the interaction term in Fig. 3.4, which shows how performance increases at a 
higher rate for centralized committal structures than for decentralized committal struc-
tures as the development task becomes more routine (Aiken and West,1991; Cohen 
et al.,2003). The simple slope for decentralized FLOSS communities is represented by 
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the main effect coefficient associated with TROUT in the interaction model (0.251, p-
value < 0.0001). The significance test for this main effect coefficient is also used to test 
whether the TROUT simple slope for the decentralized reference group is significantly 
different from zero (Aiken and West, 1991; Cohen et al., 2003).
Figure 3.4: Simple slopes for effect of TROUT over different levels of CENT
 To obtain the TROUT simple slope for the centralized FLOSS communities, we simply 
added the TROUT*CENT coefficient to the TROUT coefficient (0.33, p-value = < 
0.0001). The significance test for this simple slope was obtained by reverse coding the 
203
CENT variable such that the centralized FLOSS projects are the reference group and then 
refitting the interaction model (Aiken and West, 1991; Cohen et al., 2003).
As can be seen in Fig 3.4, the higher increase in performance is signified by the 
steeper and positive slope of the centralized committal structure line. Since TROUT is a 
continuous and mean-centered variable, the significance of the interaction term 
TROUT*CENT (p-value < 0.05) was used as a test to confirm that the difference in the 
simple slopes between the two levels of CENT is indeed significant (Aiken and West, 
1991).
The negative and significant slope of the CUNC*CENT coefficient (-0.147, p-value < 
0.05) lends support to H4, which suggests that a decentralized committal structure is a 
better fit for dealing with higher contributor uncertainty (i.e., the increase in numbers of 
new contributors). This result also confirms that the simple slopes for centralized and de-
centralized FLOSS communities are significantly different (Aiken and West, 1991).
To illustrate this difference, we plotted the simple slopes for the interaction term as 
shown in Fig. 3.5. The graph shows that the effect of uncertainty on performance has a 
positive and steeper slope for decentralized communities than for centralized communi-
ties. The CUNC simple slope for centralized FLOSS communities is non-significant 
(0.009, p-value > 0.1)4, suggesting that contributor uncertainty has no impact on perform-
ance for centralized FLOSS communities. On the other hand, the CUNC simple slope for 
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4 The significance test was obtained after reverse coding CENT and refitting the interaction model and us-
ing the significance test for the CUNC coefficient (Aiken and West, 1991).
decentralized communities was positive and significant (0.162, p-value < .05), which is 
contrary to our expectations.
Figure 3.5: Simple slopes for effect of CUNC over different levels of CENT
 Finally, we found partial support for H6, which suggests that centralized committal 
structures are a better fit when there is a high degree of task interdependence, as illus-
trated by the coefficient of the TINT*CENT term (0.406, p-value < 0.1). The results sug-
gest that FLOSS communities with centralized committal structures can perform better 
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than communities with decentralized committal structures as task interdependence is in-
creased.
To illustrate this, we plotted the simple slopes for the interaction term shown in Fig. 
3.6. The steeper slope for the relationship between TINT and PERF for FLOSS commu-
nities with decentralized committal structures suggests that centralized committal struc-
tures are a better fit for increasing task interdependence, as performance drops at a much 
slower rate than in decentralized committal structure (-0.5603, p-value = < 0.0001)5. For 
the simple slope for centralized committal structures, however, there was only partial 
support that it was significantly different from zero (-0.151, p-value < 0.1), suggesting 
that interdependence might have a less detrimental effect on performance for centralized 
FLOSS communities.
Furthermore, when looking at the increasing performance from the right side of the 
graph to the left, the same graph suggests that decentralized committal structures can ob-
serve higher performance gains as task interdependence is reduced by means of improv-
ing the software design to be more modular. However, the difference in between these 
simple slopes only finds partial support with the partially significant TINT*CENT coeffi-
cient (-0.41, p-value < 0.1) (Aiken and West, 1991).
206
5 The significance test was obtained after reverse coding CENT and refitting the interaction model and us-
ing the significance test for the TINT coefficient (Aiken and West, 1991).
Figure 3.6: Simple slopes for effect of TINT over different levels of CENT
4  Discussion
The main premise of our theory is that development activities within a FLOSS commu-
nity are information-processing tasks (Galbraith, 1973). Under the assumption of 
bounded rationality, we forwarded the argument that the committal structure will be the 
main bottleneck of performance as the information-processing requirements of a FLOSS 
community increased. The results of our statistical analysis suggest that there is good 
overall support for the theory we have forwarded about the performance of FLOSS com-
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munities as summarized in Tab. 3.7. We also summarize the main contributions of our 
work in Tab. 3.8
Table 3.7: Summary of empirical findings from the higher-order model
Hypothesis Coeffecient Support
H1: Task routineness is positively related to a FLOSS com-
munity’s performance.
TROUT: 0.287 p-value < 0.001 Supported.
H2: As tasks become more routine, FLOSS communities with 
centralized committal structures will have higher performance 
gains than communities with decentralized committal struc-
tures.
TROUT*CENT: 0.079 p-value < 0.001 Supported.
H3: Contributor uncertainty will be positively related to a 
FLOSS community’s performance.
CUNC: 0.099 p-value > 0.1 Not supported.
H4: As contributor uncertainty increases, FLOSS communities 
with centralized committal structures will have lower per-
formance gains than communities with decentralized commit-
tal structures.
CUNC*CENT: -0.147 p-value < 0.05 Supported.
H5: Task interdependency will be negatively related to a 
FLOSS community’s performance.
TINT: -0.37 p-value < 0.001 Supported.
H6: As task interdependency is increased, FLOSS communi-
ties with centralized committal structures will have higher 
performance gains than communities with decentralized com-
mittal structures.
TINT*CENT: 0.41 p-value < 0.1 Partially supported.
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Table 3.8: Summary of this work’s main contributions 
Finding Impact
FLOSS communities per-
forming simple tasks per-
form better.
•	
 Importance of good source code design to simplify develop-
ment. 
•	
 Contributors should work closer to the community and make 
small incremental changes rather than work in isolation and 
accumulate their patches into a single patch that is hard to 
incorporate. 
Centralized committal struc-
tures are a better fit for rou-
tine tasks.
•	
 The committal structure should match the needs of the com-
munity. 
•	
 There is no single superior structure. 
Decentralized committal 
structures are a better fit un-
der high contributor uncer-
tainty.
•	
 Decentralized committal structures are necessary if commu-
nity involvement is valued. 
•	
 Brooks’ law is not obsolete; the committal structure has to be 
overwhelmed for it to become obvious. 
Task interdependence in-
creases information-
processing requirements for 
a FLOSS community and 
reduces performance.
•	
 Importance of modularizing the source code and its effect on 
the performance of a FLOSS community. 
•	
 Further validation of the Newman (2006a) modularity meas-
ure. 
Decentralized committal 
structures are a better fit un-
der conditions of low task 
interdependence.
•	
 Decentralized committal structures are enabled by proper 
code design. 
•	
 Centralized committal structures might be the only way to 
continue to maintain and develop tightly coupled code bases. 
•	
 Brooks’ and Raymond’s views are complementary. Raymond 
explains how FLOSS development is conducted under condi-
tions of fit, while Brooks’ views become apparent under con-
dition with lack of fit. 
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In H1, we hypothesized that FLOSS communities will perform better when their de-
velopment tasks are more routine. We attributed the improved performance to the reduced 
information-processing requirement of routine tasks, which are less likely to overwhelm 
the committal structure. The results from our statistical analysis lend support to this hy-
pothesis.
These findings suggest that FLOSS communities could improve their performance if 
development tasks are simplified. Specifically, communities should invest their time in 
properly designing and organizing the source code such that similar functionality is en-
capsulated in specific modules (Page-Jones, 1998). The findings also signify the impor-
tance of working within the community for contributors. By being close to the commu-
nity and contributing small and incremental changes, contributors are likely to find the 
committal structure more responsive. Working in isolation and contributing a large patch 
to the community will likely require a significant time investment from committers and 
will most likely result in the patch not being accepted. 
In addition, we hypothesized that centralized committal structures are a better fit for 
routine development tasks because the coordination requirements between committers are 
generally lower for centralized committal structures than for decentralized structures due 
to the smaller number of communication channels that each committer is required to 
maintain with other committers (Brooks, 1975). This hypothesis also found support in our 
statistical analysis.
What these results suggest is that even though decentralized committal structures 
might have a higher capacity to process information, they are not the best fit for every 
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situation. Communities that maintain projects that require routine development activities, 
either from the simplicity of the problem or the maturity of project with plateaued devel-
opment activity, could be developed and maintained more efficiently with a centralized 
committal structure. On the other hand, more complex projects could benefit greatly from 
the distributing the development process. However, there is the limitation that the design 
of the code base must be improved to enable such a distributed development mode, as we 
shall explain in the discussion about the results for H5 and H6.
We hypothesize in H3 that increased uncertainty from having new contributors par-
ticipate might have a detrimental effect on performance, as new contributors, and even 
their patches, will demand extra attention from committers. The results did not lend sup-
port to this hypothesis. It is possible that the dichotomization of the variable was the 
cause of our failure to detect such an effect, which we acknowledge to be an unavoidable 
limitation in our methods (MacCallum et al., 2002). It could also mean that the central-
ized committal structure is overwhelmed and that the committers are doing a good job of 
organizing the committal activities so as to continue to maintain progress. To confirm that 
this was indeed the case, we would need to examine the number of ignored patches by the 
community. While there is no denying that such data could enrich our methods, we found 
it very difficult to collect, which seems to be a limitation that could be addressed in future 
work.
We were surprised, however, from the significant and negative interaction term that 
suggests, as we predicted in H4, that FLOSS communities with decentralized committal 
structures tend to perform better under higher uncertainty. The simple slopes suggest that 
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uncertainty had no impact on performance for centralized committal structures. However, 
higher uncertainty translated into higher performance under decentralized committal 
structures. 
The higher performance of decentralized committal structures under high uncertainty 
could be attributed to decentralized committal structures being able to deal with the ex-
ternal uncertainty introduced by new contributors more effectively. As we explained in 
Sec. 3.2.2, committal activities are performed in parallel, resulting in a continuance of 
committal activity when new contributors require the attention of one of the committers. 
This may even lead to more of the new contributors turning into regular contributors and 
adding to the increased performance of the community.
What is interesting about this finding is that it shows the direct tension between 
Brooks’ and Raymond’s views. The lack of performance improvement for centralized 
structures shows, as Brooks’ had anticipated, that there are no performance gains. To take 
advantage of new contributors’ effort, the community should be able to decentralize the 
committal structure to be able to handle the extra uncertainty introduced by new contribu-
tors. 
In light of these results, we conclude that it is a bit premature to consider Brooks’ law 
obsolete. Rather, it seems that Brooks’ law starts to take effect in FLOSS communities 
when the committal structure hits the limits of its information-processing capacity. This is 
even further highlighted by the support for H4 in which we specifically hypothesized that 
decentralized committal structures are a better fit for dealing with contributor uncertainty. 
We believe this to be true mainly due to their greater capacity for information processing 
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from their distribution of tasks and requisite development knowledge among a larger 
group of committers, which reduces the workload on any single individual.
In H5, we hypothesized that communities with fewer interdependencies in their devel-
opment task will generally perform better. We attribute this improved performance to the 
reduction in such communities’ need for coordination, which frees up more of the com-
mittal structure’s information-processing capacity for performing more tasks. The need 
from coordination stems mainly from dependencies between the source files on which 
different developers work, which creates the need for coordination Crowston (1997). By 
improving the design of the source code to exhibit higher modularity (i.e., low coupling 
between modules and high cohesion within a module), FLOSS communities can improve 
their performance. The results from our analysis generally support this hypothesis. The 
importance of this finding also stems from the fact that it offers further validation to the 
modularity measure (Newman, 2006a). 
Finally, we hypothesize in H6 that centralized committal structures are a better fit for 
highly interdependent tasks because highly interdependent tasks will require greater co-
ordination efforts. In communities with decentralized committal structures, committers 
will have to maintain communication channels with a larger group of committers to 
maintain the functional integrity of the developed software (Brooks, 1975; Crowston, 
1997). With higher task interdependence, the amount of information that needs to be ex-
changed in each channel will increase, making it impossible for a committer to maintain 
the same amount of channels. Therefore, centralized structures have the advantage of 
having a smaller group of committers maintaining a smaller number of communication 
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channels, which, in turn, take up much less of the committal structure’s information-
processing capacity. This hypothesis found support with the higher decrease in perform-
ance for decentralized committal structures as compared to centralized committal struc-
tures. 
The flip-side of the previous argument is that the improvement gains to software de-
sign in decentralized committal structures are greater than for centralized committal 
structures. We would even go as far as saying that large FLOSS communities with large 
committal structures require a highly modular design to continue to function. This also 
goes back to the tension between Brooks’ and Raymond’s view. While Raymond sup-
ported the distributed development model of the FLOSS community and touted its bene-
fits, the caveat to this idea is that the software should be designed to enable such a proc-
ess. Adding developers or improving performance always comes at an information-
processing cost, and FLOSS communities will be able to improve on both only up to 
what the information-processing capacity of the committal structure would allow them to. 
After that point, the community must make a trade-off to either reduce their information-
processing needs or increase their information-processing capacity.
5  Limitations and Future Research
Although our work provides insight into the development structure of FLOSS communi-
ties, care should be taken so as not to confuse the development structure with the com-
munication structure (Crowston and Howison, 2005). There is evidence that a FLOSS 
community’s communication structure will not match its development structure (Mockus 
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et al., 2002). As such, it will be rather interesting to know how the two relate. Our work 
raises the following questions that future studies could help address: could an increase in 
communication activity signal that there is a problem in coordination that could be reme-
died by increased communication; and will this affect the sustainability of the community 
since it would result in an increased cost for participation and an information overload on 
the members (Jones et al., 2004; Kuk, 2006)? 
The way we conceptualized the development structure to exclude the communication 
structure might seem to be a limitation; however, it was a necessary simplification that 
lead us one step closer to understanding organizational structures in FLOSS communities. 
We explained that we took this approach because we saw the main function of a FLOSS 
community as being the development of software and that all contributions must be proc-
essed by committers; therefore, they are indeed a bottleneck in the development structure. 
Prior work that examined development organization in FLOSS communities took a 
small-sample approach (Mockus et al., 2002; Shah, 2006; O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007) 
or mainly examined the communication structure (Crowston and Howison, 2005). This 
work came as a response to the call by Koch (2004) for more studies that attempt to gen-
eralize findings across a diverse set of FLOSS projects. Future studies could build on our 
work and take a more granular approach to classifying FLOSS community structures and 
understanding their effects on participation and productivity in addition to their relation 
to the communication structure.
It is also important to highlight the limitations of our methods in the hope that future 
studies could improve upon them. The first of these limitations relates to the quarterly 
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window used to aggregate our data. While we have justified our selection based on prior 
work that used anywhere from a one-month to a one-year window, we feel that our selec-
tion was somewhat arbitrary. We hope to vary this window of analysis with our future 
work and compare the results. The limited computational resources at this time prevented 
us from feasibly performing this task.
Furthermore, due to the unusual distribution of some of our variables, we were left 
with no choice but to dichotomize the variables. Such an approach might yield spurious 
relationships and result in lowering the power of the statistical analysis (MacCallum 
et al., 2002). However, we ruled out the chance that our results are spurious by conduct-
ing the analysis using alternative methods for factoring the variables and found the results 
to hold (see Appendix A). We chose to use the results of the dichotomized variables be-
cause they are easier to present and interpret. The fact that we found significant results 
despite the lower statistical power of our chosen method of factorization suggests that the 
actual effects that we are trying to detect might have a larger effect size in reality. While 
we were limited in terms of the variables we could extract from the available data ar-
chive, we hope to make improvements in future work by augmenting our data with sur-
veys and alternative data sources.
Finally, while we may have espoused the idea that there is no single superior organiza-
tional form, we only examined a subset of the potential tradeoffs between the different 
committal structures. There are still some broader implications for the different committal 
structures that future studies could expand on. For example, what are the actual organiza-
tional costs for a community to change the committal structure and how might that 
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change impact contributors and performance over the transition period. Furthermore, 
given that such initiatives could be conceptualized as a form of business-process reengi-
neering, the risk that such initiatives could fail does exist. Therefore, it will be important 
to understand what factors might contribute to the success or failure of such initiatives.
6  Conclusion
The goal we set out to achieve with this study is to determine if organizational theories of 
fit apply to FLOSS communities, knowing that FLOSS communities have emergent 
structures by nature (O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). We leveraged OIPT (Galbraith, 
1973) to argue that FLOSS communities that perform highly in terms of source code out-
put will organize to achieve the best fit between their information-processing capabilities 
and needs. The empirical results lend support to our theory that high-performing FLOSS 
communities match their development structure, as the embodiment of their information-
processing capabilities, with their software development tasks, as the main source of their 
information–processing needs.
This work contributes to both theory and practice. From a theoretical standpoint, we 
have shown that FLOSS communities are not so different from conventional organiza-
tional units from an information-processing perspective. We have also given an explana-
tion as to how the emergent development structure in FLOSS communities could form in 
response to the community’s information-processing needs. In addition, we have given an 
account of the different development-related organizational structures and have found 
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that there is no single superior structure; rather, what is important in the development 
process is finding the fit between the community’s development needs and its structure.
Our theoretical deductions and empirical results support the idea that FLOSS commu-
nities performing development tasks that are generally routine, highly interdependent, 
and generate little contributor uncertainty will perform better under a centralized commit-
tal structure. On the other hand, decentralized committal structures thrive under the con-
ditions of task non-routineness, low task interdependence, and high contributor uncer-
tainty.
More importantly, these findings highlight the tension between the views forwarded 
by Brooks (1975) about software development and Raymond (2001) about FLOSS de-
velopment. While both of these views have been seen as conflicting, we show with this 
work that they are actually complementary. We attribute the conflict to the lack of clarity 
in the assumptions of both views and find that Raymond’s view generally holds true of 
FLOSS development until the committal structure is overwhelmed. In such cases, we be-
gin to see signs that Brooks’ views hold true even in FLOSS development.
The results of our study are equally useful to FLOSS community organizers and or-
ganizations that seek to increase the development output from FLOSS communities that 
are under their management. We have highlighted the importance of good code design in 
managing dependencies between developers to allow for a more distributed development 
process. 
Our work also makes clear that promoting committers is not always a favorable option 
to improve the output of the community or to help developers when they are over-
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whelmed, especially when the source code is highly interdependent. The best course of 
action in such situations involves a reorganization of the source code. Adding more 
committers might simply heighten the cost of coordination between developers, thereby 
reducing the overall performance of the community. This shows how FLOSS communi-
ties are no different than any other software development team and that Brooks’ law 
(Brooks, 1975), as one of the most important classical theories on software project man-
agement, still holds true in the FLOSS context.
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Appendices
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 Appendix A:  Robustness of Median Split Results
To ensure that our results are not caused by the median split (MacCallum et al., 2002), 
we performed a tertile split on both CUNC and CENT and refit our interaction model. 
The results are summarized in Tab. 9 and 10, which show that our results hold, suggest-
ing that the median split did not have an impact on our results. With all continuous vari-
ables mean centered, we could interpret the interaction effects and lower order main ef-
fects (Aiken and West, 1991). 
If you recall from Tab. 7, we found support for H1, H2, H4, and H5. In Tab. 9, we can 
see that TROUT has a positive and significant coefficient, thus supporting H1. TINT also 
has a negative and significant coefficient, providing support for H5. In Tab. 9, we have 
the results from the interaction model. The TROUT*CENThi coefficient is positive and sig-
nificant suggesting that the TROUT coefficient for the high centralization group is higher 
and significantly different than the coefficient for the reference low centralization group, 
thus providing support for H2. The CUNChi*CENT coefficients are also significant or 
partially significant and negative, suggesting that groups with high centralization have a 
significantly lower coefficient than the reference group with low centralization, providing 
support for H4.
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Table 3.9: Main-effect model with tertile split of CENT and CUNC
Term Coeffecient P-Value Supports
TROUT 0.287 0.0001*** H1
CUNC_med 0.13 0.296
CUNChi 0.103 0.575
TINT -0.43 0.0001*** H5
CENTmed 0.336 0.0001***
CENThi 0.857 0.0001***
Table 3.10: Interaction model with tertile split of CENT and CUNC
Term Coeffecient P-Value Supports
TROUT*CENTmed -0.018 0.315
TROUT*CENThi 0.11 0.039* H2
CUNCmed*CENTmed -0.129 0.315
CUNCmed*CENThi 0.164 0.513
CUNChi*CENTmed -0.336 0.002** H4
CUNChi*CENThi -0.106 0.096. H4
TINT*CENTmed 0.347 0.301
TINT*CENThi 0.241 0.844
TROUT 0.264 0.0001***
CUNC_med 0.097 0.75
CUNChi 0.259 0.006**
TINT -0.642 0.001***
CENTmed 0.499 0.0001***
CENThi 0.796 0.0001***
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